Truth On Target: Benghazi to Extortion 17 A CH-47 flying into a HOT LZ without gunship support was a sitting duck

Story by: Stewart Stogel – The role U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice and her staff may have played in the assembly of the Benghazi terror attack talking points – namely that the attack was prompted by a Muslim mob upset over an obscure online video – is moving back under the microscope, following a dump of documents from the Obama administration that appears to have made things foggier, not clearer.

It’s just one of the questions persisting around the al-Qaida-affiliated terror attack in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans. As time has passed since the targeted attack last Sept. 11, issues appear to have become more – not less – obscured.

It was Rice who went on national television shows – repeatedly – shortly after the ambassador’s death was announced, and said that the Muslim mob was enraged by the online video about Mohammad.

That story since has been thoroughly debunked, and the filmmaker was jailed, although it was on unrelated probation violations.

Rice has maintained that she was simply repeating “talking points” given to her by the Obama administration when she appeared on a series of network phones to explain what had happened and why.

But a probe by WND shortly after the White House released 100 pages of emails related to the Libyan attacks has shown that Rice and members of her personal staff in fact played a central role in developing those talking points.

WND found that Rice’s press secretary, U.S. United Nations Mission spokeswoman Erin Pelton, and Rice’s Deputy U.N. Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo both played roles in formulating the Libyan talking points.

Ironically, while the White House promoted the email “document dump” as a move for transparency, a close examination showed exactly the opposite. The identities of numerous administration officials were purged in countless emails. Both senders’ and recipients’ names were repeatedly redacted. And entire documents referred to in several emails were replaced by blank pages.

“The ARB unclassified final report was incomplete in that the reason for Stevens being in Benghazi was known to Hicks, but the ARB ignored the testimony Hicks gave on this point,” Toensing further explained to WND.

Hicks elaborated on this point by commenting to the House oversight committee that when he told the ARB the reason Stevens went to Benghazi, Pickering looked visibly upset and asked, “Does the 7th floor [where the office of Secretary of State Clinton is located] know about this?”
So far, there have been dozens of key issues about the tragedy for which there have been no answers from Obama administration officials:

What did you know, and when did you know about the standoff occurring in Benghazi?
Why did President Obama declare publicly in initial comments only hours following the Benghazi attack that it indeed was a terrorist attack but later in a CBS interview backtracked by saying that it was too early to determine whether it was a terrorist attack?
Were Obama and Clinton informed at the time the attack was unfolding? If so, what orders did Clinton give to seek to secure the facility?
Was Clinton in direct contact at any time with the Secretary of Defense to determine what Special Forces were available to lend assistance? Was she also in contact with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency to ascertain whether he had any assets in the area to rush to the assistance of the beleaguered facility?
If she had not been informed at the time of the attack, at what level in the Department of State were officials informed and what action, if any, was ordered and with whom in the Defense Department and at CIA were they in contact?
Who were the State Department officials aware of the pre-911 security requests from Ambassador Christopher Stevens and other U.S. personnel in Libya?
What was Stevens doing in Benghazi without his usual security detail, especially since he had written earlier to the State Department on the poor security at the facility, considering the already dangerous environment of Libya?
Why were his repeated requests for security either ignored, or turned down?
Since warnings are issued by the State Department on every anniversary of 9/11 to all posts to heighten security, why wasn’t it done at Benghazi, especially since the ambassador was traveling to the facility on a mission known by the State Department and CIA?
Why weren’t U.S. forces directed to be sent in, in light of a statement by the U.S. commander for Africa, Gen. Carter Ham, that he had the capabilities and was ready to go but never directed to go. Why is that?
Why was a U.S. Marine fast action team out of Rota, Spain, told to take off their uniforms before going in to rescue the ambassador and the other three Americans? Why did the military conclude that the military couldn’t do anything? Why didn’t the accountability board even look at that? Why did CIA have such a large detail at the safe house location?
Why did Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick F. Kennedy withdraw from Libya’s capital a 16-member special operations forces detachment that was assisting with security, a decision which was made two weeks prior to the Benghazi attack?
What was the rationale for Kennedy’s decision in light of frequent appeals by Stevens for enhanced security, as he expressed increasing concern about the deteriorating security environment in Libya and the fact that the Libyan government itself was not in a position to provide adequate security at the U.S. embassy or consulate in Benghazi?
Considering the increasing volatility in Benghazi and the fact that the consulate there was in an isolated position, why did the State Department and the CIA keep it open?
There were reports that the two former SEALs – Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty – killed in attempting to protect the ambassador and the consulate were contractors for CIA and their main purpose was to work out of a safe house not far from the consulate, ostensibly to inventory various weapons, some of which separate reporting says were then transferred to the opposition forces in Syria. In light of this prospect, why wasn’t more security in place to protect the few CIA contractors who were there?
In such a high-risk security environment, why was security for the consulate provided by Libyans? Did they stick around to provide security for the consulate once the attack began?
Since they may not have, there also are indications that some of those providing security at the consulate either tipped off the terrorists or somehow pinpointed where in the consulate to attack, as well as identify the location of the safe houses where U.S. personnel escaped once the attack began. What has the State Department investigation revealed as to collusion with the terrorists by local Libyans charged with providing security for the consulate?
Why was the FBI barred for 24 days from going to the consulate to secure evidence when reporters were given ready access and had obtained sensitive information which was later turned over to U.S. authorities?
We were told that four State Department officials involved in the decision-making process on security were removed or resigned. We now learn that isn’t true. Why did the State Department lie about the status of those in State Department management responsible for this security debacle?
In light of the Benghazi experience, has there been any effort by the Obama administration in close coordination with the Defense Department and CIA to revise operational procedures to ensure that quick-reaction armed resources are available much sooner in future instances of impending or actual attack on U.S. facilities abroad?

Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters

September 2011

By Grace V. Jean

(Was the CH-47 flying into a HOT LZ situation without gunship support? If it only had M240's then it probably was a sitting duck. Was the aircraft shot down in the daytime or at night? The aircraft is too large to be flying into hot LZ's with out gunship suppressive fire.)

One of the biggest drawbacks of helicopters is that they are slow, which makes them vulnerable to enemy fire. U.S. special operations units, which recently suffered a historic loss when Taliban fighters downed a Chinook helicopter, killing 30 U.S. troops, including 22 Navy Seals, would greatly benefit from faster choppers.

“One hundred and seventy knots is not enough,” said Army Col. Douglas Rombough, the program executive officer for rotary wing at U.S. Special Operations Command. “We have to have a minimum of 200 knots capability. After you add all the things you like to add to the outside of that aircraft to make it shoot, move, communicate, with all the drag out there, we need to be proceeding to the objective at 200 knots or better.”

SOCOM helicopters are rapidly wearing down after a decade of nonstop operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military rotary-wing aircraft typically remain in service for a 20-year lifespan. But in the case of special operations forces, which fly helicopters at higher gross weights, the aircraft are only making it to the 15-year mark because of heavy usage in the wars, officials said.

Despite an extensive modernization program under way to recapitalize the vertical lift fleet, Army special operations officials have said that they cannot meet future operational requirements with upgrades alone.

Only new designs can achieve the speed, endurance, range and payload that operators want, officials said. Systems also are needed to reduce pilot workload.

“We’ve got to go through a whole new process. We need game changer-type stuff for all those reasons,” Rombough said at a special operations industry conference.

Conventional forces, too, are eyeing new aircraft. Army officials have said that the service’s rotary aircraft fleet by 2030 will have reached the ends of its useful life.

Finding replacement aircraft means technology development must start now.

In 2009, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates mandated that all the services begin looking at future joint rotary-wing lift requirements. They came up with four classes of joint multi-role aircraft: heavy, medium, light and ultra light.

At the conference, Rombough presented a PowerPoint briefing with slides that illustrated some deficiencies of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopter. It cannot operate in 60 percent of the areas in Afghanistan, which is known for unforgiving flying conditions with rugged terrain, high altitudes and dusty environments. The new joint multi-role aircraft will have to provide drastic improvements over that current capability, he said. That includes increasing hover altitude by 150 percent, increasing payload by 40 percent, and doubling mission speed and endurance. Special operators also want to reduce acoustic detection by 50 percent and cut in half the aircraft’s turning radius.

In the meantime, Army special operations aviation forces are in the final stretch of modernizing their rotary-wing fleets. When the process is completed in 2015, the fleet will be composed of 192 aircraft and three variants: the MH-60M Black Hawk, the MH-47G Chinook and the MH-6M Little Bird.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for an additional MH-47G company. That effort will begin in 2013 and will be completed in 2015, when the fleet will comprise 69 Chinook aircraft, said Brig. Gen. Kevin Mangum, commander of the Army Special Operations Aviation Command. The new M-model Blackhawks, too, will finish fielding by 2015, he added.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command will also have a fleet of nearly 300 unmanned systems, to include the RQ-7 Shadow, and the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, derived from the Air Force’s family of Predator and Reaper remotely piloted aircraft.