Tuesday, May 21, 2013

Benghazi to Extortion 17 A CH-47 flying into a HOT LZ without gunship support was a sitting duck

Story by: Stewart Stogel – The role U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice and her staff may have played in the assembly of the Benghazi terror attack talking points – namely that the attack was prompted by a Muslim mob upset over an obscure online video – is moving back under the microscope, following a dump of documents from the Obama administration that appears to have made things foggier, not clearer.

It’s just one of the questions persisting around the al-Qaida-affiliated terror attack in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans. As time has passed since the targeted attack last Sept. 11, issues appear to have become more – not less – obscured.
 
It was Rice who went on national television shows – repeatedly – shortly after the ambassador’s death was announced, and said that the Muslim mob was enraged by the online video about Mohammad.

That story since has been thoroughly debunked, and the filmmaker was jailed, although it was on unrelated probation violations.

Rice has maintained that she was simply repeating “talking points” given to her by the Obama administration when she appeared on a series of network phones to explain what had happened and why.

But a probe by WND shortly after the White House released 100 pages of emails related to the Libyan attacks has shown that Rice and members of her personal staff in fact played a central role in developing those talking points.

WND found that Rice’s press secretary, U.S. United Nations Mission spokeswoman Erin Pelton, and Rice’s Deputy U.N. Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo both played roles in formulating the Libyan talking points.

Ironically, while the White House promoted the email “document dump” as a move for transparency, a close examination showed exactly the opposite. The identities of numerous administration officials were purged in countless emails. Both senders’ and recipients’ names were repeatedly redacted. And entire documents referred to in several emails were replaced by blank pages.
  
“The ARB unclassified final report was incomplete in that the reason for Stevens being in Benghazi was known to Hicks, but the ARB ignored the testimony Hicks gave on this point,” Toensing further explained to WND.

Hicks elaborated on this point by commenting to the House oversight committee that when he told the ARB the reason Stevens went to Benghazi, Pickering looked visibly upset and asked, “Does the 7th floor [where the office of Secretary of State Clinton is located] know about this?”
So far, there have been dozens of key issues about the tragedy for which there have been no answers from Obama administration officials:
  • What did you know, and when did you know about the standoff occurring in Benghazi?
  • Why did President Obama declare publicly in initial comments only hours following the Benghazi attack that it indeed was a terrorist attack but later in a CBS interview backtracked by saying that it was too early to determine whether it was a terrorist attack?
  • Were Obama and Clinton informed at the time the attack was unfolding? If so, what orders did Clinton give to seek to secure the facility?
  • Was Clinton in direct contact at any time with the Secretary of Defense to determine what Special Forces were available to lend assistance? Was she also in contact with the director of the Central Intelligence Agency to ascertain whether he had any assets in the area to rush to the assistance of the beleaguered facility?
  • If she had not been informed at the time of the attack, at what level in the Department of State were officials informed and what action, if any, was ordered and with whom in the Defense Department and at CIA were they in contact?
  • Who were the State Department officials aware of the pre-911 security requests from Ambassador Christopher Stevens and other U.S. personnel in Libya?
  • What was Stevens doing in Benghazi without his usual security detail, especially since he had written earlier to the State Department on the poor security at the facility, considering the already dangerous environment of Libya?
  • Why were his repeated requests for security either ignored, or turned down?
  • Since warnings are issued by the State Department on every anniversary of 9/11 to all posts to heighten security, why wasn’t it done at Benghazi, especially since the ambassador was traveling to the facility on a mission known by the State Department and CIA?
  • Why weren’t U.S. forces directed to be sent in, in light of a statement by the U.S. commander for Africa, Gen. Carter Ham, that he had the capabilities and was ready to go but never directed to go. Why is that?
  • Why was a U.S. Marine fast action team out of Rota, Spain, told to take off their uniforms before going in to rescue the ambassador and the other three Americans? Why did the military conclude that the military couldn’t do anything? Why didn’t the accountability board even look at that? Why did CIA have such a large detail at the safe house location?
  • Why did Under Secretary of State for Management Patrick F. Kennedy withdraw from Libya’s capital a 16-member special operations forces detachment that was assisting with security, a decision which was made two weeks prior to the Benghazi attack?
  • What was the rationale for Kennedy’s decision in light of frequent appeals by Stevens for enhanced security, as he expressed increasing concern about the deteriorating security environment in Libya and the fact that the Libyan government itself was not in a position to provide adequate security at the U.S. embassy or consulate in Benghazi?
  • Considering the increasing volatility in Benghazi and the fact that the consulate there was in an isolated position, why did the State Department and the CIA keep it open?
  • There were reports that the two former SEALs – Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty – killed in attempting to protect the ambassador and the consulate were contractors for CIA and their main purpose was to work out of a safe house not far from the consulate, ostensibly to inventory various weapons, some of which separate reporting says were then transferred to the opposition forces in Syria. In light of this prospect, why wasn’t more security in place to protect the few CIA contractors who were there?
  • In such a high-risk security environment, why was security for the consulate provided by Libyans? Did they stick around to provide security for the consulate once the attack began?
  • Since they may not have, there also are indications that some of those providing security at the consulate either tipped off the terrorists or somehow pinpointed where in the consulate to attack, as well as identify the location of the safe houses where U.S. personnel escaped once the attack began. What has the State Department investigation revealed as to collusion with the terrorists by local Libyans charged with providing security for the consulate?
  • Why was the FBI barred for 24 days from going to the consulate to secure evidence when reporters were given ready access and had obtained sensitive information which was later turned over to U.S. authorities?
  • We were told that four State Department officials involved in the decision-making process on security were removed or resigned. We now learn that isn’t true. Why did the State Department lie about the status of those in State Department management responsible for this security debacle?
  • In light of the Benghazi experience, has there been any effort by the Obama administration in close coordination with the Defense Department and CIA to revise operational procedures to ensure that quick-reaction armed resources are available much sooner in future instances of impending or actual attack on U.S. facilities abroad?
Read more at http://www.wnd.com/2013/05/rices-benghazi-cover-up-role-back-in-spotlight/#vWD7wqCdZpUMWdVA.99 
 
Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters 
September 2011 
By Grace V. Jean 
(Was the CH-47 flying into a HOT LZ situation without gunship support? If it only had M240's then it probably was a sitting duck. Was the aircraft shot down in the daytime or at night? The aircraft is too large to be flying into hot LZ's with out gunship suppressive fire.)
One of the biggest drawbacks of helicopters is that they are slow, which makes them vulnerable to enemy fire. U.S. special operations units, which recently suffered a historic loss when Taliban fighters downed a Chinook helicopter, killing 30 U.S. troops, including 22 Navy Seals, would greatly benefit from faster choppers.

“One hundred and seventy knots is not enough,” said Army Col. Douglas Rombough, the program executive officer for rotary wing at U.S. Special Operations Command. “We have to have a minimum of 200 knots capability. After you add all the things you like to add to the outside of that aircraft to make it shoot, move, communicate, with all the drag out there, we need to be proceeding to the objective at 200 knots or better.”

SOCOM helicopters are rapidly wearing down after a decade of nonstop operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Military rotary-wing aircraft typically remain in service for a 20-year lifespan. But in the case of special operations forces, which fly helicopters at higher gross weights, the aircraft are only making it to the 15-year mark because of heavy usage in the wars, officials said.

Despite an extensive modernization program under way to recapitalize the vertical lift fleet, Army special operations officials have said that they cannot meet future operational requirements with upgrades alone.

Only new designs can achieve the speed, endurance, range and payload that operators want, officials said. Systems also are needed to reduce pilot workload.

“We’ve got to go through a whole new process. We need game changer-type stuff for all those reasons,” Rombough said at a special operations industry conference.

Conventional forces, too, are eyeing new aircraft. Army officials have said that the service’s rotary aircraft fleet by 2030 will have reached the ends of its useful life.

Finding replacement aircraft means technology development must start now.

In 2009, then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates mandated that all the services begin looking at future joint rotary-wing lift requirements. They came up with four classes of joint multi-role aircraft: heavy, medium, light and ultra light.

At the conference, Rombough presented a PowerPoint briefing with slides that illustrated some deficiencies of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopter. It cannot operate in 60 percent of the areas in Afghanistan, which is known for unforgiving flying conditions with rugged terrain, high altitudes and dusty environments. The new joint multi-role aircraft will have to provide drastic improvements over that current capability, he said. That includes increasing hover altitude by 150 percent, increasing payload by 40 percent, and doubling mission speed and endurance. Special operators also want to reduce acoustic detection by 50 percent and cut in half the aircraft’s turning radius.

In the meantime, Army special operations aviation forces are in the final stretch of modernizing their rotary-wing fleets. When the process is completed in 2015, the fleet will be composed of 192 aircraft and three variants: the MH-60M Black Hawk, the MH-47G Chinook and the MH-6M Little Bird.

The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review called for an additional MH-47G company. That effort will begin in 2013 and will be completed in 2015, when the fleet will comprise 69 Chinook aircraft, said Brig. Gen. Kevin Mangum, commander of the Army Special Operations Aviation Command. The new M-model Blackhawks, too, will finish fielding by 2015, he added.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command will also have a fleet of nearly 300 unmanned systems, to include the RQ-7 Shadow, and the MQ-1C Gray Eagle, derived from the Air Force’s family of Predator and Reaper remotely piloted aircraft.            
Re: Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters
The AH-56 Cheyenne was the best replacement for aging conventional helos at the time back in the 70s. Misguided Army logic and contract fraud led us to living the dream with these aging designs. Current designs are pigs in the mountains and they need to be retired in favor of the faster compound helicopters.
rocket64 on 11/14/2011 at 11:25
Re: Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters
Take a look at the Hexplane at Olivervtol.com site. The solution we have been looking for has been analyzed and validated by experts. Hexplane can carry its payload over 200% faster and 200% father than helicopters and do it with an amazing redundancy. Hexplane's high altitude performance exceeds that of most helicopters.
Richard Oliver on 09/07/2011 at 17:09
Re: Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters
I am sure that a Stovl Jet system would be the way to go. Why mess around with a system that is outdated and has at best a max speed of 480 km. A Stovl Fan system with a Jet is going to give you good speed and they could make it stealthy. The major problem is Cash. I think better anti rocket measures would be the way to go economically.
sluggobuggo on 08/18/2011 at 02:43
Re: Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters
Was the CH-47 flying into a HOT LZ situation without gunship support? If it only had M240's then it probably was a sitting duck. Was the aircraft shot down in the daytime or at night? The aircraft is too large to be flying into hot LZ's with out gunship suppressive fire. The problem is the CH-47 is the only Army helicopter that can operate at altitude in Afghanistan. This was a mission for a flight of Blackhawks with gunship support if they had the performance to operate in the area.
William McQuade on 08/17/2011 at 16:41
Re: Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters
What exactly is a speedier helicopter going to give you? 170 knts vs. 200 knts. You are still going to get the shit kicked out of you when you land or take off. A V-22 would have been shot down even easier than a Chinook on that mission (no defensive weapons). What the Military needs figure out how to protect it's current aircraft better. The Chinook on that mission was armed with normal M240H machine guns. If it had Miniguns like a Special Ops birds, that might have made a difference is suppressing enemy fire.
Rod Bertrand on 08/17/2011 at 12:37
Re: Army Special Operations Command Wants Speedier Helicopters
Top speed is not the problem. Helicopters in Afghanistan are not being shot down in flight. They get hit during approach for landing and after takeoff while transitioning to forward flight. They need to figure out how to armor helicopters without add significant weight.
J. Dvorak on 08/17/2011 at 12:15
 
Spec Ops knew problem was when helo is on the LZ.
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3. ANSF Command, Control, and Communications Linkage
Source: International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
Orders or ciphers flowed through the National Military Command Center to lower level
commands. Each lower level of command had its own internal operations centers for
information flow vertically to the General Staff and the NMCC as well as horizontally to the
regional or provincial OCCs. The ANA Chief of the General Staff also routinely relayed
information and orders directly to lower level commanders via cell phone.
 
 Can anyone see a problem routing intel through the Afghanistan Government?
  
 

 
A Growing SOF Role in Traditional CIA Operations?29
A recent article maintains that U.S. SOF, in conjunction with the CIA, have “significantly
increased military and intelligence operations, pursuing the enemy using robotic drones and
commando teams, paying contractors to spy and training local operatives to chase terrorists.”30
These operations are said to be occurring in roughly a dozen countries, ranging from North
Africa, to Pakistan, to former Soviet republics “crippled by ethnic and religious strife.”31 One of
the concerns raised in this article is that U.S. SOF units, allegedly operating under secret “execute
orders” are conducting spy missions that were once the preserve of civilian intelligence agencies.
These operations are described as having less transparency and congressional oversight than
traditional CIA covert operations. Some suggest that this “covert war” is an appropriate response
to a covert war being waged against the United States, but others are concerned that it represents
a new model for war that deviates from well-defined rules for covert action. Another question
raised is “who should be running this war” if it is going to be conducted in a covert manner?
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rs21048.pdf
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress
 
December 3, 2010
 
It has also been reported that a number of insurgent leaders have left their bases
in Afghanistan to seek sanctuary in Pakistan because of the raids. Although these raids have
proven successful, President Karzai has recently called for these “night raids” to cease, which has
supposedly created friction between the Afghan leader and senior U.S. military officials in the
region.35
35 Thom Shanker, Elisabeth Bumiller, and Rod Nordland, “Despite Gains, Night Raids Split U.S. and Karzai,” New
York Times, November 16, 2010.
 
 
 
Current Organizational and Budgetary Issues
2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report SOF-Related
Directives21
The 2010 QDR contains a number of SOF-related directives pertaining to personnel,
organizations, and equipment. These include the following:
To increase key enabling assets22 for special operations forces.
To maintain approximately 660 special operations teams;23 3 Ranger battalions;
and 165 tilt-rotor/fixed-wing mobility and fire support primary mission aircraft.
18
 
18 USSOCOM website http://www.socom.mil/components/components.htm, accessed March 19, 2008.
19 Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 83, Number 2, March/April 2004
and Sean D. Naylor, “JSOC to Become Three-Star Command,” Army Times, February 13, 2006.
20 Information in this section is taken from Carlo Muňoz, “SOCEUR Chief Pegged: Air Force Two-Star to Head Up
New NATO Special Ops Headquarters,” Inside the Air Force, May 28, 2010 and NATO Fact Sheet, “NATO Special
Operations Headquarters (NSHQ),” accessed from http://www.NATO.int on July 1, 2010.
21 Information in this section is from Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010.
22 Enabling assets are a variety of conventional military units that are assigned to support special operations forces.
23 These teams include Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA) teams; Navy Sea, Air, and Land
(SEAL) platoons; Marine special operations teams, Air Force special tactics teams; and operational aviation
detachments.
 
The Army and USSOCOM will add a company of upgraded cargo helicopters
(MH-47G) to the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.
The Navy will dedicate two helicopter squadrons for direct support to naval
special warfare units.
To increase civil affairs capacity organic to USSOCOM.
Starting in FY2012, purchase light, fixed-wing aircraft to enable the Air Force’s
6th Special Operations squadron to engage partner nations for whose air forces
such aircraft might be appropriate, as well as acquiring two non-U.S. helicopters
to support these efforts.
 
 
In cooperation with the Army, USSOCOM will grow its helicopter fleet by eight
MH-47 Chinooks by FY2015; fielding is almost complete for upgraded MH-47G
and MH-60M helicopters. USSOCOM currently has 12 CV-22 Osprey aircraft
and hopes to add 5 more aircraft this year.
U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF):
Background and Issues for Congress
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in Military Ground Forces
February 6, 2013
 
In March 2009, Headquarters AFSOC declared initial operational capability (IOC)11 for the CV-
22.12 USSOCOM plans for all 50 CV-22s to be delivered to AFSOC by 2015.13 Since 2009,
AFSOC has completed three overseas deployments, to Central America, Africa, and Iraq, and
continues to be engaged currently in overseas contingency operations. Despite critical reviews of
the aircraft, AFSOC considers the CV-22 “central to our future.”14 AFSOC operates a diverse fleet
of modified aircraft. Of 12 major design series aircraft, 7 are variants of the C-130, the average
age of some of which is over 40 years old, dating from the Vietnam era. Because of the age of the
fleet, AFSOC considers recapitalization one of its top priorities.
 
SEC. 1283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EFFORTS TO REMOVE OR APPREHEND
JOSEPH KONY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD AND END THE ATROCITIES OF
THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY.
Consistent with the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery
Act of 2009 (Public Law 111–172), it is the sense of the Congress that—
(1) the ongoing United States advise and assist operation to support the regional
governments in Africa in their ongoing efforts to remove or apprehend Joseph Kony and his
top commanders from the battlefield and end atrocities perpetuated by his Lord’s Resistance
Army should continue as appropriate to achieve the goals of the operation;
(2) the Secretary of Defense should provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets, as authorized to be appropriated by other provisions of this Act, to support the
ongoing efforts of United States Special Operations Forces to advise and assist regional
partners as they conduct operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa;
(3) United States and regional African forces should increase their operational coordination
on efforts to remove or apprehend Joseph Kony from the battlefield and end the atrocities of
the Lord’s Resistance Army; and
(4) the regional governments should recommit themselves to the Regional Cooperation
Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army authorized by the African
Union.
By Chelsea Schilling
A former senior Pentagon official told radio talk-show host Glenn Beck where to find the shocking truth about billionaire George Soros’ influence on President Obama’s decision to deploy U.S. troops to Uganda – as he directed Beck’s listeners to Aaron Klein and WND.
On the March 9 GBTV show, retired Gen. Jerry Boykin, the former U.S. deputy under secretary of defense for intelligence – who has played a part in nearly every recent major U.S. military operation in the last four decades – said of  Aaron Klein:
He shows that there’s a more sinister side to this. And that is a George Soros connection to the whole influence on the administration of deploying U.S. military forces in there, certainly under the guise of going after Joseph Kony [leader of the rebel Lord's Resistance Army accused of major human rights atrocities], but I think there is some very good information in that article that shows there is a Soros connection to this whole thing. And, fundamentally, it’s about oil.
In the Oct. 15, 2011, expose, “Why U.S. military in Uganda? Soros fingerprints all over it,” Klein broke the news of Soros’ ties both to the political pressure behind Obama’s decision and to the African nation’s fledgling oil industry.
He revealed that Soros sits on the executive board of an influential “crisis management organization” known as the International Crisis Group, which recommended deployment of a special advisory military team to Uganda to help with operations and run an intelligence platform, a recommendation Obama’s Uganda action appeared to fulfill. In April 2010, the International Crisis Group released a report sent to the White House and key lawmakers advising the U.S. military run special operations in Uganda to seek Joseph Kony’s capture.
Klein also noted that the president emeritus of the International Crisis Group is also the chief author of “Responsibility to Protect,” the military doctrine used by Obama to justify the U.S.-led NATO campaign in Libya.
“Soros’ own Open Society Institute is one of only three nongovernmental funders of the Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect, a doctrine that has been cited many times by activists urging intervention in Uganda,” Klein wrote. “Several of the doctrine’s main founders also sit on boards with Soros, who is a major proponent of the doctrine.”
Klein also explains that Soros has close ties to oil interests in Uganda, as the billionaire’s organizations spearhead efforts to purportedly facilitate more transparency in Uganda’s oil industry, which is tightly controlled by the country’s leadership.
Read Klein’s exclusive report in its entirety here.
Watch Glenn Beck’s interview with Gen. Boykin here. (WND
 
b. 1208 Authority: 1208 is an authority unique to USSOCOM. Every operation which executes 1208 authority requires the Secretary of Defense approval. Section 1208 authority provides USSOCOM the ability to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations to combat terrorism. USSOCOM has included 1208 funding in its OCO budget request funding to enhance operational flexibility and mission execution.
 

Calling all Army aviators: Now is the time to go spec ops. Army Special Operations Aviation Command is seeking helicopter pilots and aviation officers to fill critical slots in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and to keep up with the overall high demand for Army pilots.
In fiscal year 2013, the command is looking for about 300 applicants.
The recruiting effort will continue at least through fiscal 2015, when the command hopes to reach 90 percent of the 160th's authorized strength, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Robert Witzler, the command chief warrant officer for Army Special Operations Aviation Command, said.
"The 160th has received authorizations for personnel growth, and the regiment already has the additional helicopters and equipment on hand and is employing them in combat," Witzler said. He said the unit is now operating at 75 percent of authorized personnel strength.
This unit growth, coupled with low recruiting numbers because of the high deployment tempo for Army aviators, has made it difficult for the command to grow at the desired rate, Witzler said.
"Special operations aviation capability is a precious resource that the nation has asked the Army to build," Witzler said. "You only need to read the paper to understand the contributions [special operations aviation] is making on the battlefield and across the globe every day. Demand for [this] capability has never been higher, and current manning levels make meeting our operational commitments a concern," Witzler said.
As outlined in a personnel message released in September, the command is seeking aviation warrant officers in these military occupational specialties:
• 152 — Scout/attack helicopter pilot
• 153 — Medium lift/utility helicopter pilot
• 154 — Heavy lift/cargo helicopter pilot
The command also is seeking aviation captains, MOS 15B.
There is no minimum rank or experience requirement, but the command is targeting aviation warrant officers in the grade of chief warrant officer 2 who have completed their first assignment or combat deployment, Witzler said.
As for the aviation captains, the command is seeking officers who are preparing to attend the captain's career course, as well as captains who have completed a company command, he said.
Once an application is submitted, it will take three to four months of processing before that soldier finds out if he or she will be given the opportunity to assess for the elite 160th, also known as the "Night Stalkers."
 
 MH-60L/M Black Hawk Defensive Armed Penetrator (DAP)
Primary Function: Armed escort and fire support for Special
Operations Forces. Speed: Max 222 mph, Cruise 138 mph.
Dimensions: Length: 64 ft. 10 in. Range: 450NM. Armament:
2 x 7.62 mm M134 minigun, M230 30MM Chaingun, 70mm
Hydra rockets, AGM-114 Hellfire air to ground missiles. Crew:
Four.
 
 MH-60K/L/M Black Hawk
Primary Function: Conduct overt or covert infiltration,
exfiltration and resupply of Special Operations Forces. Speed:
Max 222 mph, Cruise 138 mph. Dimensions: Length: 64 ft. 10
in. Range: 450 NM. Payload: 10 personnel w/internal tanks.
Armament: 2 x 7.62 miniguns. Crew: Four.

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