Sunday, December 19, 2010

Two Chinese Shanghai Changxing aircraft carriers and Varyag Helo Carrier for PLAN Marines

PLA's Growing Force Projection Capabilities
Publication: China Brief Volume: 10 Issue: 25 December 17, 2010
By: Jeffrey Engstrom

Chinese Naval Flotilla
China’s assertiveness along its littoral—underscored by recent diplomatic disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea—has raised international concerns about how Beijing intends to project its growing military power. While certainly worthy of attention, a narrow focus on Chinese activities along the periphery obscures a more profound trend, whereby the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing in ways that will allow it to project forces farther beyond its borders. In the wake of President Hu Jintao’s promulgation of the “historic missions of the armed forces in the new period in the new century” (xin shiji xin jieduan wojun lishi shiming) or “new historic missions” for the PLA in 2004, China has engaged in a variety of missions abroad, including counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, disaster relief in Haiti, and non-combatant evacuation operations in the Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, Beijing has invested resources in a number of platforms—such as large amphibious ships, long-range transport aircraft, at-sea replenishment vessels, and hospital ships—that cannot be explained in the context of preparing for a Taiwan conflict. Meanwhile, the PLA has begun training and equipping for a wider range of activities, some of which have already been demonstrated on the international stage. These types of activities are likely harbingers of Chinese force projection over the next few decades [1].

Force Projection Activities to Date

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO): As Beijing’s foreign interests and holdings continue to grow, its citizens are increasingly living abroad to manage and engage in a variety of business, manufacturing, energy, and mineral extraction activities. This trend increases the likelihood that foreign disasters, either natural or manmade, could affect Chinese citizens overseas. In the wake of ethnic unrest in southern Kyrgyzstan this past June, China evacuated nearly 1,300 nationals using a total of nine chartered flights (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, June 17). Similar small-scale Chinese non-combatant evacuation operations have also occurred in Haiti (2010) and the Solomon Islands (2006).

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO): China’s first foray into United Nations peacekeeping operations occurred in 1989, when Beijing sent 20 election observers to Namibia in support of UNTAG [2]. In subsequent years, the number of Chinese deployed at any one time has swelled to over 2,000 peacekeepers [3]. During this period, Chinese personnel have also participated in a wider range of activities well beyond their original observer duties, including peacekeeping and civil policing, as well as providing engineering, transport, and medical services. Today, Chinese peacekeeping personnel can be found in Cote D’Ivoire (UNOCI), Lebanon (UNIFIL), Liberia (UNMIL), Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Sudan (UNAMID & UNAMIS), Timor-Leste (UNMIT), and Western Sahara (MINURSO). Participation in UN missions provides the PLA with a number of benefits such as training in a multinational context, experience in conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW), and operational knowledge of different political, ethnic, and geographic environments [4].

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR): China has contributed to at least 10 HA/DR missions since 2002 [5]. These include taking an active role in responding to Cyclone Nargis in Burma in 2007 and sending a 60-person search and rescue team to Haiti in January 2010. Meanwhile, the recent seventh revision of the PLA’s Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), which delineates specific training requirements, underscored the importance of humanitarian assistance/disaster response. Both the recently built Anwei-class hospital ships and multipurpose large amphibious ships (of which one was recently added to the fleet) will contribute to the deployment of emergency response personnel overseas [6].

Sea-lines of Communication (SLOC) Protection: In December 2008, days after Chinese sailors were rescued from a pirate attack by Malaysian naval forces, the PLAN dispatched a flotilla of three ships. This original flotilla consisted of two destroyers, an at sea replenishment ship, included helicopters and approximately 70 naval special forces, and sailed over 4,600 nm to the Gulf of Aden [7]. Now two years later, China has deployed its seventh flotilla and has maintained a continuous presence in the Gulf. Two Fuchi-class at-sea replenishment ships have alternated duties refueling a pair of deployed PLAN surface ships (a combination of various destroyers, frigates, and recently a landing platform dock), as well as re-stocking them with drinking water and food. The at-sea replenishment ships have made extensive use of local ports to re-supply (See “The Chinese Navy’s Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean,” China Brief, July 22).

Current and Future Capabilities

As the PLA’s force projection capabilities continue to improve over time, China will have the means to participate in a wider range of operations outside of its borders, to potentially include counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and even forcible entry operations. Considered below are five categories of key platforms that will be crucial to China’s future force projection capabilities: transport aircraft, aerial refueling, large amphibious ships, aircraft carriers, and satellites. The PLA will undoubtedly have to develop associated doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to effectively employ these platforms, but the actual development of the platforms is an important and necessary ingredient for force projection.

1. Transport aircraft: Transport aircraft are the quickest means to move troops and most materiel long distances and to send forces far inland, often necessary when infrastructure such as road and rail are lacking. Provided a friendly airfield (or at least permissive skies for airborne insertion or drop), transport aircraft are essential arrows in the quiver of force projection as they can deliver mission critical materiel to overseas units in hours or days, rather than weeks typically required by cargo ships. While only the United States and Russia possess numbers of transport aircraft ranging in the hundreds, China currently has a small but not insignificant fleet of approximately 47 large and medium transport aircraft (the Il-76M and Y-8, respectively) [8]. Augmenting China’s military airlift capability is a growing civil aviation fleet that consists of two dozen large transport aircraft and is composed of Boeing 747F, McDonnell Douglas MD-11F, and Airbus A-300F aircraft [9].

2. Aerial refueling: Aerial refueling presents another vital component for the projection of military force, without which many expeditionary capabilities are severely hampered. China currently possesses approximately 13 aerial refueling aircraft that can deliver slightly over 35 percent of France’s total refueling capacity at a range of approximately 1,000 nm [10]. Cognizant of the need to improve capabilities in this realm, China has sought to purchase tankers abroad, as well as indigenously produce more aircraft capable of carrying out this task (Jane's Intelligence Review, June 12, 2008). Currently, the indigenously produced H-6U (converted from the B-6 medium bomber) is only capable of refueling PLA Air Force and Navy J-8s and J-10s through a probe-and-drogue system. China recently demonstrated its aerial refueling capability in support of simulated long-range operations this past September during the Peace Mission 2010 multilateral exercise in Kazakhstan (See “China Showcases Expeditionary Military Power in Peace Mission 2010,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 28).

Large amphibious ships: More than any other platform, large amphibious ships arguably most embody force projection because they allow a country to place forces ashore almost anywhere. Based on sealift capability alone, China can currently transport a theoretical maximum of nearly 12,000 PLAN marines and PLA amphibious infantry for relatively short distances to potential hot spots in the East and South China Seas with its fleet of 50+ medium and tank landing ships (LSM and LST, respectively) [11].

With the recent acquisition of a landing platform dock (LPD), Beijing has begun to develop amphibious capabilities that can achieve global reach. As a result of its single Type-071 LPD, an amphibious battalion of up to 800 PLAN marines can potentially be placed on nearly any undefended or lightly defended shore in the world without the need to secure basing rights or over-flight permission ( This ability of the Type-071 LPD to operate worldwide was demonstrated recently in the aforementioned SLOC protection operations in the Gulf of Aden and could also be used to support other types of operations in the future such as an out of area HA/DR or NEO.

Though its goals are currently unknown, China is likely to develop more large amphibious ships in the future. For example, the theoretical acquisition of an additional two Type-071 LPD would provide enough sealift for a Marine Expeditionary Unit-sized force—a unit that is arguably the United States’ most flexible tool for force projection. However, to achieve true MEU-like ability China would still need to develop or acquire a helicopter carrier such as a landing helicopter assault (LHA) or landing helicopter dock (LHD) to provide air support.

Aircraft carriers: China is by some accounts currently pressing ahead with refurbishing the Soviet-built, Ukrainian-supplied carrier Varyag. Others have suggested that Beijing is seeking to build an indigenous carrier from scratch (See “Is the PLA Navy Making Plans for a Three Carrier Battle Group?”, China Brief, January 4, 2008; “China’s ‘Charm Offensive’ Loses Momentum in Southeast Asia [Part I],” China Brief, April 29). Further speculation exists over whether the PLAN will purchase Russian built aircraft such as the Su-33 or develop an aircraft carrier capable version of the J-10, tentatively named the J-15 [12]. A future Chinese aircraft carrier would provide defensive air cover and a platform for strike aircraft, a capability that would vastly enhance force projection capabilities and flexibility, but is certainly not the only means to prosecute such operations.

Satellites: China is developing satellites for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and navigation purposes. The Jianbing/Haiyang series of electro-optical and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) reconnaissance satellites has grown over the past decade and is currently supplemented by one Tianlian data relay satellite [13]. China is expected to eventually develop a future network of six data relay satellites that will provide near real-time feeds of its various ISR satellites [14]. Not willing to fully rely on unimpeded access to the U.S. maintained GPS network in the future (a system that Washington can turn off), China sees its Beidou series of satellites as an important means of navigation. That said Beijing has yet to expand the system for extra-regional use [15].


Although still relatively nascent compared to France or the United Kingdom, two countries that regularly send forces abroad, Chinese force projection capabilities are growing and expanding under the broad rubric of President Hu’s “new historic missions.” The development witnessed in these growing operational capabilities along with an expanded strategic-level focus potentially is a double-edged sword, likely to have profound implications for both the U.S.-Sino relationship and international politics more broadly.

On the one hand, Washington’s call for China to become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system implies burden sharing in the maintenance of international peace and security. In this regard, a more active and capable PLA will enable China to better contribute to multilateral efforts seeking to provide global public goods. The ability to identify and capitalize upon opportunities for military-to-military collaboration will be a crucial task for U.S. policymakers. On the other, even in the defense of the global commons—the policing of sea-lanes, for instance—Chinese force projection capabilities have the potential to erode or displace American leadership. A more active PLA also increases the possibility of encountering U.S. forces abroad or, even possibly, of the PLA operating at cross-purposes to American interests. Finally, future expeditionary activities, even of a non-combat nature, will further improve the war-fighting capabilities of the PLA, a point clearly not lost on Chinese strategists.


1. I define Chinese force projection capability as the ability of the PLA to send military equipment and personnel from Mainland China to engage in overseas military operations across the full spectrum of combat and non-combat missions.
2. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 25, November 2009: 4-5.
3. As of February 28, 2010 China was the 14th largest contributor of currently deployed peacekeepers, ahead of the United States, France, or the United Kingdom. “Factsheet: United Nations Peacekeeping,” United Nations, accessed: December 13, 2010,
4. Bates Gill and Chin-Hao Huang, “China’s Expanding Role in Peacekeeping,” SIPRI Policy Paper, No. 25, November 2009: 15-16.
5. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 56.
6. The OMTE is “the authoritative guide to how the PLA organizes, implements, and evaluates training.” Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 2009, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 51; Jane’s Information Group, “Anwei (Type 920) class,” Jane’s Fighting Ships, February 2010 and Jane’s Information Group, “Procurement, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, April 2009.
7. China did not undertake this operation lightly. Beijing acted only after the passage of four related United Nations Security Council resolutions, an invitation from the Somali Prime Minister to join the operation, and public statements testing the waters of international opinion by senior PLA officials. Peter Kammerer, "Shot Across the Bow," South China Morning Post, January 9, 2009: 13.
8. The Military Balance 2010, London: IISS, 2010: 402-404; Jane’s Information Group; “Infrastructure, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, January 2010; Jane’s Information Group; “Air Force, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, August 3, 2010.
9. “Infrastructure, China,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, January 2010 and “Jade Cargo International – Details and Fleet history,”, accessed: December 15, 2010,
10. It is also important to note that the B-6 has a much more limited range than France’s aerial tankers which have refueling reach well beyond 1,000 nm. These estimates are approximate and are based on simple modeling using data provided by The Military Balance 2010, London: IISS, 2010: 129; Jane’s Information Group, “XAC H-6”,” Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, May 25, 2010; Air Force Pamphlet 10-1403: Air Mobility Planning Factors, Secretary of the Air Force, Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, December 18, 2003.
11. These numbers exclude the Yulian-class (a ship that is limited to coastal use) and are derived from data from The Military Balance 2010, London: IISS, 2010; 402; Jane’s Information Group, “Sea Lift,” Jane’s Amphibious and Special Forces, August 27, 2009; and “Type 079 (Yulian Class) Medium Landing Ship,”, accessed: December 14, 2010,
12. Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2009: 371.
13. Kim Nodskov, The Long March of Power: The New Historic Missions of the People’s Liberation Army, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2009: 246-258.
14. Ibid., 248.
15. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense: 36.


Project 048: China's Secret Aircraft Carrier Command

According to information circulated in the Chinese media, during the meeting between Chinese Defense Minister General Liang Guanglie and Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada on March 20, wherein General Liang confirmed China's intent to develop aircraft carriers, a mysterious unit was reportedly present at the meeting.

The “048 Engineering Command" is purportedly an inter-agency task force within the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) responsible for developing "special large military ships" or aircraft carriers (, March 22; Nownews, March 21).

"Project 048," as it is referred to in the Chinese media, is reportedly equal in stature with other core units under the umbrella of the PLAN Headquarters, and under the directorship of the PLAN Party Committee. Although the precise status of the unit is unconfirmed through available sources, reports speculate that the joint-command of "Project 048" may be under a PLAN deputy commanding officer, or as high as under the direct command of a PLAN commanding officer.

According to Chinese media reports, the name of the project may have been determined based on the Central Military Commission's decision to launch its project to build "special large military ships" back in 2004 in the month of August, which corresponds with the number 04 and 8 (hence Project 048) (, March 22; Nownews, March 21).

Full preparations for building the aircraft carriers reportedly followed in 2005, which includes the purchase of ship-based test machines and ship-borne landing gears. While domestic carrier power, power distribution system designs were all allegedly completed (Hong Kong Commercial Daily, March 22).

A Japanese news report citing unspecified military sources reported that "China will begin construction of two conventional aircraft carriers this year." Citing the same source the report stated, "production of parts for the electricity control system has already begun in China and plans call for completing the two conventional carriers by around 2015 … [a] system for operating those carriers will be established by 2020." "[China's] first nuclear-powered flattops would be constructed in 2020 or later" the report added (Asahi Shimbun, February 14).

According to Li Ou, deputy-mayor of Siping City in Jilin Province, who wrote a commentary in the People's Daily—the media organ of the Central Committee of the CCP—the reason behind the timing of General Liang's statement, “China cannot be without an aircraft carrier forever," has to do with the situation along the Taiwan Strait. According to Li, China already possessed the "compressive national strength to construct aircraft carriers" many years ago, and the reason why China denied this capability for so long was due to the tense state of cross-Strait relations.

Li said that the central leadership was concerned that the United States would use this known Chinese capability as an excuse to support Taiwan's independence. Now that tensions in the Taiwan Strait have eased, Li wrote that the central leadership no longer has to worry about U.S. interference, and in the event that Taiwan independence forces return, if China has an aircraft carrier then it will be more difficult for the United States to intervene (People's Daily Online, March 25).

According to the Asahi Shimbun: “Construction has already begun on a wharf along Yalong Bay in the Sanya district of Hainan island. The wharf would provide base functions for aircraft carriers as well as include underground storage for ammunition” (Asahi Shimbun, February 14).

Information concerning "Project 048" also appeared in the same report, which referred to it as a “special task force for [the] construction of aircraft carriers” (Asahi Shimbun, February 14). The reported unveiling of "Project 048" at the meeting with the Japanese defense minister, whom—along with its Asian neighbors—has been wary of China's military modernization, is another demonstration of China's increased confidence in both regional and global affairs.

The outpour of statements from high ranking Chinese military officers in recent months, culminating in Defense Minister Liang's remark, may be "signaling" a major announcement at the upcoming PLAN Naval Review on April 23, which commemorates the
60th anniversary of the PLAN's founding back in 1949.

The initial recognition of an official document of the Chinese aircraft carrier construction program December 17, 2010
The initial recognition of an official document of the Chinese aircraft carrierconstruction program

Core Tip: Recently, Japanese media said the research institute under China's State Oceanic Administration, China Institute for Marine in the recently published "China National Offshore Development Report", the first time an official document of the

State of China in 2009 confirmed the aircraft carrierconstruction program and Speculation that China will be the first aircraft carrier built in 2012. Japanese media also speculated that China is building two Shanghai Changxing 50,000 to 60,000 tons class aircraft carrier.

Foreign media release Varyag aircraft carrier converted the island when the ship clear pictures.

Foreign media's latest aircraft carrier Varyag modification shown in the Varyaghas been installed radar.

Global Times, December 17 the Japanese media recently reported that theresearch institutions under the State Oceanic Administration of China, China Institute for Marine in the recently published "China National OffshoreDevelopment Report"mentioned in 2009, China has developed the idea ofbuilding aircraft carrier And plans. Japanese media that China plans to buildaircraft carriers for the first time recognized by national official documents, and speculation that China will be the first aircraft carrier built in 2012.

According to Japan, "Asahi Shimbun " reported on the 16th, the Chinese State Oceanic Administration research institute under the China Institute for Marinein the recently published "China National Offshore Development Report says that " in 2009, China has developed the concept and plans to build aircraft carriers. The report also said the construction of aircraft carriers that China will officially to the sea power, the great rejuvenation of Chinese nation, which isnecessary for achievement of the conditions.

Reported that the aircraft carrier built in China it is already open, but has not been officially confirmed. Japanese media speculated that China is in ShanghaiChangxing Island shipyard is building two 50,000 to 60,000 tons-class aircraft carrier, one of them into the water in 2014. Meanwhile, Dalian Port is beingrenovated the former Soviet Union aircraft carrier Varyag (5.85 tons), and put into use in 2012.
01-10-2008, 09:01 PM

On December 31, the Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Pao cited a report that no one in the western media has detected concerning a Jane's Defence Weekly article which reported that China has plans to develop three-carrier battle groups (CBVG) over the next decade. News about this development has been widely discussed in the Hong Kong and Taiwanese press. Citing Jane?s, Wen Wai Pao reported that as a part of its carrier battle group plans the People?s Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) intends to establish an even stronger submarine fleet; having added 20 nuclear-powered submarines in the past five years, increasing the total number of submarines to 55. The report indicated that the PLAN currently has 70 destroyers and frigates, 50 dock-landing ships and 45 coastal warships (Wen Wei Pao, December 31, 2007).

Taiwanese news sources highlighted Gordon Jacobs, a Chinese military analyst based in the United States?whose report on the modernization of China's navy in the Jane's report was one of the sources for the report?as stating that if the Chinese government contracted for the construction of the carrier groups in 2006, then it is possible for the first battle carrier group to break water as early as 2011, be in service in 2014, and by 2016 be accompanied by a second service-ready aircraft carrier group (Lienhe Pao, December 31).

Jacobs cited Chen Yung-kang, an official in Taiwan's Ministry of Defense (MOD), who during a presentation at a defense conference held in Taiwan in 2006 argued that Taiwan needed submarines to strengthen its defense capability against China's quickly expanding naval power and its plan to develop two battle carrier groups by 2020 (AFP, November 26, 2006). Chen added that the Soviet-made Varyag Carrier was being upgraded and repaired at Dalian in Northeastern China, and being prepared for training use (, December 30, 2006; China Times, December 31, 2006). The Chinese government is still tight lipped about its future plans for the former Soviet aircraft carrier which is now dry docked in Dalian and painted in standard PLAN grey. Taiwanese experts believe that the PLAN intends to activate the carrier as a part of its three carrier battle group plan.

In 2007 Chinese government sources admitted for the first time that Beijing is researching and capable of building an aircraft carrier, as stated by Huang Qiang, a spokesman for the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense of China (CSTIND). Furthermore, Zhang Yunchuan, the CSTIND chairman, said in March 2007 that China was indeed researching the building of aircraft carriers: "China stands for strategic active defense and, even when it owns aircraft carriers, it will definitely not intrude into or occupy any other nation or resort to force with the use of carrier vessels," Zhang said (People's Daily, April 25, 2007).

China Plans Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) Within Taiwan Straits

On December 4, 2007, during a meeting with a visiting U.S. delegation headed by U.S. Representative Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS), chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia, The Pacific, and the Global Environment in the U.S. House of Representatives, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian asserted that China was planning to design an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) within the Taiwan Strait (Liberty Times, December 6, 2007). President Chen alleged that Beijing planned to submit the proposal to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and at the same time, Beijing planned to inaugurate a new air route on the Chinese side of the median of the Taiwan Straits.

According to Dr. Joseph Wu?Taiwan?s de facto ambassador to the United States?in early December, the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC) issued a press release stating that the Central Military Commission and the State Council had approved the route and flights would run some 4.2 nautical miles (7.8km) west of the centerline (Taipei Times, December 20, 2007).

The Taiwanese government claims that since approval for the bid had to be attained from the Central Military Commission, which has authority over China's civilian aviation and airspace, China?s bid to the ICAO to operate on Taiwan's side of the Straits can be construed as a militarily provocative move, as it also gives them the ability to deny access to foreign aircraft in the area.

China?s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang repeatedly denied any knowledge of China?s plan to establish an ADIZ within the Taiwan Straits at press briefings (Ta Kung Pao, December 11, 2007).

In related news, citing Taiwanese military sources that Japanese government sources later confirmed, Japanese newspaper Asahi Shimbun revealed that Chinese Hong-6 bombers from the Huaining air force base in Anhui province conducted military maneuvers in areas of the East China Sea in September 2007, the route covered areas that are jointly enclosed by the Taiwan Straits Air Defense Identification Zone and the Japan Air Defense Identification Zone. The Hong-6 bombers reportedly made 20 sorties to the area on September 11 and 23, which forced Japanese F4 fighter jets based at Naha base in Okinawa Prefecture to respond by conducting a total of 12 sorties along the routes (Asahi Shimbun, January 2).

In an interview with Kensuke Ebata, a subject matter expert on defense and military affairs in Tokyo and member of the Japanese Security Export Control Committee, Asahi Shimbun reported Ebata as saying:

Hong-6 bombers can carry long-range air-to-sea missiles ? So it is possible for the bombers to attack vessels at sea. Personally, I think the bomber pilots were undergoing a training exercise under the scenario of blocking the arrival of U.S. aircraft carriers in Taiwan in the event of an emergency situation there."

The flights may also have been aimed at trying to contain U.S. forces following large-scale maneuvers near Guam in August under a scenario that the United States was at war with China," he added (Asahi Shimbun, January 2).

Thursday, December 16, 2010

Secure the Border Now

Border Patrol agent killed by Mexican bandits
'Murderous rampage … has now transcended the border into the U.S.'

By Jerome R. Corsi-WorldNetDaily
December 16, 2010

Border Patrol agent Brian A. Terry was killed last night in a gun battle with five armed bandits in a remote area just north of the U.S. border with Mexico, outside Nogales, Ariz. Four of the suspects involved in the shooting are in custody and one suspect remains a fugitive, according to the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol.

Terry, 40,, was transported to a hospital where he died from his wounds this morning.

One of the bandits in custody was wounded in the gun battle, which took place at about 11 p.m. Mountain Time, and transported to a local hospital. Santa Cruz County Sheriff Tony Estrada in Nogales confirmed to WND that his office had been contacted by the U.S. Border Patrol shortly after 11:10 p.m. local time last night, requesting law enforcement and emergency medical services back-up.

"The report was that shots had been fired," Estrada said, "so we responded and transported agent Terry and one of the suspects to the hospital. Tragically, agent Terry died." Estrada said the incident occurred in an unpopulated area about 12 miles north of the U.S. border with Mexico, near a residential area of Rio Rico, Ariz.
WND previously reported Rep. Ted Poe, R-Texas, was joined by 20 members of the House to introduce the National Guard Border Enforcement Act, H.R.6253, authorizing the secretary of defense to make 10,000 National Guard troops available upon request to a U.S. governor to serve the border under the command of the requesting governor.

On Sept. 28, according to a Texas Department of Public Safety advisory, Mexican pirates killed David Michael Hartley, a U.S. citizen, when he was jet-skiing with his wife on Falcon Lake, south of Laredo, Texas, along the Mexican border.

The Hartley murder remains unsolved.
Border Patrol Agent Robert Wimer Rosas Jr.
United States Department of Homeland Security - Customs and Border Protection - Border Patrol
U.S. Government
End of Watch: Thursday, July 23, 2009

Biographical Info
Age: 30
Tour of Duty: 3 years
Badge Number: C255

Incident Details
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Date of Incident: Thursday, July 23, 2009
Incident Location: California
Weapon Used: Gun; Unknown type
Suspect Info: In custody; guilty plea

Border Patrol Agent Robert Rosas was shot and killed while on patrol near Campo, California, at approximately 9:15 pm. He was shot multiple times after exiting his patrol vehicle on the Shockey Truck Trail along the border.

Agent Rosas was following a group of suspicious individuals and had radioed for backup from other agents. The group split up before the backup agents arrived at the location and Agent Rosas began to follow one of the smaller groups. The responding agents located him suffering from several gunshot wounds.

Three suspects were arrested in San Jose, California the following day. Four additional suspects were arrested in Mexico two days after the shooting. The 17 year old suspect believed to have shot Agent Rosas was apprehended and sentenced to 40 years in prison.

Agent Rosas had served with the Border Patrol for three years. He is survived by his wife, 2-year-old son, and 11-month-old daughter.
Border Patrol Agent Brian A. Terry
United States Department of Homeland Security - Customs and Border Protection - Border Patrol
U.S. Government
End of Watch: Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Biographical Info
Age: 40
Tour of Duty: 3 years, 5 months
Badge Number: Not available

Incident Details
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Date of Incident: Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Incident Location: Arizona
Weapon Used: Rifle; AK-47
Suspect Info: One at large

Border Patrol Agent Brian Terry was shot and killed near Rio Rico, Arizona, while attempting to apprehend a group of armed subjects. The suspects had been preying on illegal immigrants with the intent to rob them.

Agent Terry and several other agents were attempting to arrest the group when shots were exchanged between the suspects and agents. Agent Terry was reportedly struck in the back by rounds fired by a suspect armed with an AK-47.

(AK-74 Kalashnikov Assault rifle-Venezuela has received its first delivery of tens of thousands of Russian assault rifles. It is the first batch out of a total of 100,000 Kalashnikov rifles which Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has ordered from Moscow. Saturday, 3 June 2006-BBC News -- Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
The newest variant, which is a substantially improved variant with longer range, more sensitive seeker, improved resistance to latest countermeasures, and a heavier warhead. Venezuela acquired 1,800 Russian antiaircraft missiles in '09 --By Juan Forero, Washington Post Staff Writer-Sunday, December 12, 2010

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA - Russia delivered at least 1,800 shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles to Venezuela in 2009, U.N. arms control data show, despite vigorous U.S. efforts to stop President Hugo Chavez's stridently anti-American government from acquiring the weapons. The United States feared that the missiles could be funneled to Marxist guerrillas fighting Colombia's pro-American government or Mexican drug cartels...

It had been unclear how many of the Russian SA-24 missiles were delivered to Venezuela, though the transfer itself was not secret. Chavez showed off a few dozen at a military parade in April 2009, saying they could "deter whatever aerial aggression against our country." A high-level Russian delegation told American officials in Washington in July of that year that 100 of the missiles had been delivered in the first quarter of 2009.

The wounded agent was flown to a hospital where he succumbed early the following morning. Four members of the group were taken into custody and at least one suspect remains at large.

Agent Terry was a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and had served with the United States Border Patrol for 3.5 years. He is survived by his parents, brother, and two sisters.

Border Patrol Agent Alexander Sanderlieb Kirpnick
United States Department of Justice - Border Patrol
U.S. Government
End of Watch: Wednesday, June 3, 1998

Biographical Info
Age: 27
Tour of Duty: 2 years
Badge Number: N383

Incident Details
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Date of Incident: Wednesday, June 3, 1998
Incident Location: Arizona
Weapon Used: Handgun
Suspect Info: Sentenced to life

Agent Kirpnick was shot and killed as he and his partner attempted to arrest five drug smugglers about two miles north of the Mexican border in Arizona. Agent Kirpnick had subdued two of the suspects and his partner was attempting to subdue the other three when one of the suspects shot Agent Kirpnick in the head. He was flown to a local hospital but died at approximately 0400 hours.

All of the suspects were eventually apprehended. The suspect who murdered Agent Kirpnick was arrested in Mexico and extradited to the United States where he was tried for the murder. He was found guilty and sentenced to two consecutive life terms.

Agent Kirpnick immigrated to the United States in 1988 from Russia and became a US citizen in 1995 before joining the Border Patrol in 1996.

Border Patrol Agent Jefferson L. Barr
United States Department of Justice - Border Patrol
U.S. Government
End of Watch: Friday, January 19, 1996

Biographical Info
Age: 33
Tour of Duty: 8 years
Badge Number: Not available

Incident Details
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Date of Incident: Friday, January 19, 1996
Incident Location: Texas
Weapon Used: Handgun
Suspect Info: Two suspects shot and wounded

Border Patrol Agent Jefferson Barr was shot and killed in Texas while attempting to arrest four drug smugglers near the Rio Grande River. During the arrest one suspect pulled out a gun and shot him in the shoulder. The bullet traveled downward, severing his aorta and causing severe internal damage.

Despite being wounded, Agent Barr was able to return fire and wounded two of the suspects. One of the wounded suspects was taken into custody and the other was located in a hospital in Mexico.

201 pounds of marijuana were found at the scene of the shooting. Agent Barr had served with the agency for 8 years.

Special Agent Keith Connelly
United States Department of Justice - Border Patrol
U.S. Government
End of Watch: Wednesday, September 6, 1989

Biographical Info
Age: 42
Tour of Duty: 18 years
Badge Number: Not available

Incident Details
Cause of Death: Gunfire
Date of Incident: Wednesday, September 6, 1989
Incident Location: California
Weapon Used: Gun; Unknown type
Suspect Info: Pled guilty

Agent Connelly was shot and killed during an undercover investigation in Fresno, California. He and his partner were posing as employers offering cash for illegal immigrants. As they attempted to make an arrest in a convenience store parking lot the suspects opened fire, wounding both agents. Agent Connelly later succumbed to his wound.

The suspected shooter pled guilty to murdering Agent Connelly and was sent to prison. He is eligible for release in 2013.

Agent Connelly had served with the Border Patrol for 18 years. He was survived by his wife and two sons.

New START Treaty skips China

New START Treaty's China Challenge
by Peter Brookes September 20, 2010

Discussion of the US-Russia Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty -- a k a New START -- has so far pretty much skipped one very important consideration: China.

In the run-up to last week's committee vote to send the treaty to the floor for ratification this fall, senators quite rightly debated whether New START overly restrains US missile-defense options, has weak verification procedures, cuts too many US missiles or warheads (relative to Russian reductions) or might affect nuclear North Korea and near-nuclear Iran.

But lawmakers haven't yet fully faced the problem that, as we build down our strategic nuclear forces (by some 20 percent under New START) in the White House's hopes that others will disarm, China is involved in a strategic buildup.

So, before there's any final vote on an arms-control pact that would endure for the next 10 years, it'd be wise to give some thought to Beijing's burgeoning bevy of bombs.

While the exact shape of China's grand ambitions may not be clear, there's little question they exist. Few would dispute that Beijing wouldn't mind taking the head seat at the table of global powers, now occupied by Washington.

As such, China has been growing all aspects of its national power: political, economic and military. Nor is the last limited to a break-neck conventional buildup; its strategic forces are booming, too.

China long relied on a small, land-based nuclear force of ICBMs in fixed silos and on a limited number of road-mobile missiles, providing for a "sufficient and effective" deterrence in Beijing's eyes.

But the force has started getting bigger, better and badder. For instance, while the US strategic arsenal desperately needs updating, Chinese nuclear forces are being modernized across the board.

And China's warhead numbers are up, by some estimates even doubling in recent years. The Pentagon says Beijing may now be able to put multiple nukes on a single, newly developed, road-mobile missile.

Indeed, if any country can undertake a so-called "rush to [nuclear] parity" with the United States and Russia, it's China, especially considering its aspirations, wealth and willingness to lavish largesse on its armed forces.

Basically, Beijing could become a nuclear peer competitor of Washington and Moscow in the not too distant future, in light of the expected arms cuts under New START.

It doesn't end there.

China's 2nd Artillery (nuclear forces) is reportedly building 3,000-plus miles of tunnels in central China, known as "the Underground Great Wall" -- likely providing Beijing with an enhanced, land-based, second-strike capability. Naturally, China's ICBMs are thought to be targeted at us.

But Beijing is also diversifying its nuclear capabilities by broadening its force structure into the traditional triad -- missiles based not just on land but also on bombers and subs.

China's new class of strategic submarine may already carry its first sea-based ICBMs. And Beijing's building another "boomer" sub class, too, significantly raising its nuclear-strike mobility and survivability -- while lowering detectability.

It's also adding advanced strategic bombers to the mix. Analysts believe China is developing long-range cruise missiles for these aircraft, which may have both conventional and nuclear warheads.

Making matters more complex is China's highly secretive, indeed opaque, stance on its nuclear forces. The People's Liberation Army (the collective name for China's military) has a penchant for strategic denial and deception -- and an unwillingness to talk about the issue officially.

That's a real challenge to our intelligence and policy community, leaving lots of unanswered questions about China's strategic doctrine, capabilities and intent as Beijing bolsters its armed forces -- while avoiding arms-control agreements.

As such, in considering New START, senators need to take time not only to consider the other salient questions about the deal -- but also to figure China into their deliberations on a new strategic treaty with Russia.

Heritage Foundation senior fellow Peter Brookes is a former deputy assistant secretary of Defense.

START Over With the Russians to Ratify Treaty
by Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D. December 1, 2010

The New START treaty has faced more opposition than the Obama administration expected. If it fails to win Senate approval, the administration has no one to blame but itself.

The administration could have had an agreement that flew through the Senate, if only it had consulted with and listened to Republican senators before negotiating with the Russians. Instead, it negotiated a very poor deal with Moscow, lined up some retired Republican officials to support it and demanded that GOP senators hop on board. It's the same "my way or the highway" approach the White House used to ram through Obamacare.

But New START skeptics don't have to buy into the take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum. It's still possible to get a better treaty. One way is to further amend it. Declarations attached during the ratification process won't do the trick. The Russians can ignore them. Amendments can deliver binding improvements to the treaty. Of course, the Russians would have to agree to those amendments when the instruments of ratification are exchanged - something that's not very likely.

But there's a better way to fix the treaty: Start over. A 10-year treaty governing the most dangerous weapons on Earth should be negotiated to the highest standards. This one was not. It has loopholes, vague language and inequities that negotiators more attentive to U.S. interests would never have countenanced.

An arms control treaty should never be sloughed off as merely tolerable or treated like some high school project graded on a curve. Nor should the issue of nuclear weapons be used merely as a diplomatic tool to improve relations with Russia. Rather, the treaty should jealously guard U.S. security and interests - something New START just doesn't do.

Negotiations could start over under two scenarios: 1) the Senate rejects or refuses to consider the treaty, or 2) Russia refuses to ratify our version of the treaty with either amendments or reservations, or even declarations.

Luckily, there's time to start over. The Moscow Treaty under which the numbers of deployed strategic weapons on both sides are going down won't expire until the end of 2012. The Russians may fume, but they'd come back to the negotiating table to see what they could get from us in a new round of talks. Driving a harder bargain with them will ultimately earn their respect. After all, that's how Ronald Reagan negotiated with the Soviets, and it worked out well indeed.

So what should a new approach look like? The first thing is to fill the verification gap left by the lapse of the old START treaty. The administration should negotiate a verification and transparency protocol to the Moscow Treaty that does a better job than New START would of verifying the numbers of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, since they are a Russian advantage.

Second, we should negotiate a follow-on to the Moscow Treaty. In that, we must make absolutely certain that no mention is made of limiting missile defenses. The Russians are trying very hard to revive the Cold War bargain struck in the defunct 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. They want to insert treaty language that will give them a claim to veto our missile defense upgrades and prepare the ground for future negotiations on strategic defense systems.

It's not in our interest to even hint that the Russians have any say-so over how we defend Americans from nuclear attack. We could negotiate a side agreement on genuine missile defense cooperation with the Russians to meet any future threats from nuclear proliferation, but that agreement should be about encouraging, not limiting missile defense systems.

Third, while a new agreement could decrease the number of strategic weapons, we should not reduce our deployed strategic warheads below the Moscow Treaty level of 1,700 to 2,220 unless the Pentagon has conducted a thorough review of whether doing so will harm U.S. security in an increasingly proliferated world.

Fourth, the follow-on treaty should make clear that its purpose is to improve the strategic defense of both parties, not to pursue the unrealistic goal of getting to zero nukes.

Such an agreement would sail through the Senate. There would be no need for strong-arm political tactics, no need to try to buy votes with funding promises. You would have a truly bipartisan arms control treaty, much like START I and the Moscow Treaty. More important, you'd have an approach that does a far better job of safeguarding American security than New START ever would.

Critics have legitimate concerns that are frankly being ignored. Given the state of play, the best way to rectify this problem is to start over. That's the only way to achieve an arms control treaty that can pass the Senate.

Kim R. Holmes, a former assistant secretary of state, is a vice president at the Heritage Foundation.

Wednesday, December 15, 2010

Stop the Senate pork-laden Omnibus Bill

Senate Omnibus Bill: Nearly 2,000 Pages of Runaway Spending and Pork
By Brian Ried December 15, 2010

As recession-weary Americans continue to tighten their belts, not even trillion-dollar deficits can persuade Senate Democrats to stop their spending spree. In a single 1,924-page bill crafted in secret and will be voted on before anyone has read it fully—Congress is set to spend a staggering $1.1 trillion on discretionary programs for fiscal year (FY) 2011, plus an additional $160 billion in emergency war spending.

...This is exactly the kind of secretive, pork-laden, massive spending bill that induced a voter revolt last month.

The Ugly Details

The Senate omnibus bill’s offenses go well beyond its overall cost and size. It would spend more than $1 billion to begin implementing the unpopular and unaffordable Obamacare law, which a federal court has ruled unconstitutional. The bill also includes a number of anti-energy policies that make it unnecessarily difficult to tap into America’s domestic energy supply, wastes $1.5 billion in taxpayer dollars on climate change initiatives, and defunds activities for vital nuclear waste storage at Yucca Mountain.

And, in what has become a grand holiday tradition, the Senate stuffed the bill with more than 6,000 earmarks, including:

•$450,000 for the World Food Prize in Des Moines, Iowa;
•$500,000 for the Edward M. Kennedy Institute for the United States Senate in Boston;
•$100,000 for YouthCare in Seattle;
•$550,000 to rehabilitate Beacham Street in Massachusetts;
•$300,000 to renovate the Josephine Bakhita House in Wilmington, Delaware;
•$150,000 to renovate the Tibbits Opera House in Michigan;
•$500,000 for streetscaping in Porter County, Indiana;
•$200,000 to install solar panels at the Community Food Bank, Inc., in Arizona;
•$700,000 to reconstruct Norwood Drive in Pennsylvania;
•$500,000 for Denver Bike Sharing;
•100,000 for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway Transportation Museum in Columbus, Mississippi;
•$3.5 million to research Formosan Subterranean Termites in New Orleans;
•$1 million for peanut research in Athens and Tifton, Georgia;
•$500,000 for oyster safety in Florida;
•$600,000 for the Lewis and Clark Legacy Trail in North Dakota;
•$750,000 for the Monterey Bay Sanctuary Scenic Trail Project in California;
•$125,000 to develop a walking trail in Mississippi;
•$2 million for an Ice Age National Scenic Trail in Wisconsin;
•$250,000 for Pigeon Point Lighthouse in California; and
While fully funding Obamacare and earmarks, the Senate once again failed to find to room to adequately fund defense [3]. This risks leaving our troops ill prepared to defend the nation at home and abroad.

What Congress Should Do

Congress should end [4] the era of massive, pork-laden omnibus spending bills and finally bring runaway spending under control. They can start by passing a continuing resolution that (at the most) freezes FY 2011 discretionary spending at the FY 2010 level. The next Congress can then immediately get to work enacting rescission bills for 2011 to cut spending and adequately fund defense and quickly move to writing a responsible FY 2012 federal budget.

In the meantime, the FY 2011 continuing resolution should be one page long, stating that current spending levels shall continue. Prior to a vote, the Congressional Budget Office should verify that the bill does not (a) shift funding to new Democratic priorities, (b) include advanced appropriations binding future Congresses to spend money, or (c) include unrelated government expansions and regulations. Anything less represents a return to the irresponsible politics of usual and continues the federal budget down the road to crippling deficits and tax hikes.

Article from The Foundry: Conservative Policy News:

Tuesday, November 30, 2010

Forces facing Russia

The hungry Dragon - China
Russian Oil Fields -- Up for Grabs if Russia is not careful

The government of Russia should stop making trouble for the US in Iran and start thinking about their open southern flank to China. Once China sucks up all the oil
in the Caspian region they will turn their eys to the Russian Oil Fields.

Turkey maybe holding their hand out but could get it bitten off by China.
Chinese mobile missiles
Wed, Jun 09, 2010

ISTANBUL – Iran warned Russia yesterday against siding with Tehran’s enemies in supporting fresh UN sanctions over its nuclear dispute with the West.

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s latest admonishment of Moscow, until recently an ally, came a day before the UN security council could vote to impose a fourth round of sanctions, which Russia is expected to support.

“There is no big problem, but they must be careful not to be on the side of the enemies of the Iranian people,” Mr Ahmadinejad told a news conference in Istanbul, where he was attending a summit along with Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin.

Group Armies
The main combat power of the PLA ground forces is found in 18 group armies, which are corps-sized combined arms units with gross manpower ranging from 45,000 to 60,000 personnel. The composition of group armies varies according to their location, mission, and readiness level, but generally include 2~5 combat divisions or brigades (infantry and armour), as well as a number of combat support and combat service support units. Some group armies have also been assigned with helicopter and special forces units. The largest tactical formation of the ground forces, the group army is an “army-level” organisation in the PLA’s administrative hierarchy, normally headed by a major general.

Currently, the Beijing, Shenyang, Jinan, and Nanjing military regions each has three group armies, and Lanzhou, Guangzhou, and Chengdu military regions each has two group armies. While some group armies are tasked with the defence of a specific geographic region, others are intended for deployment anywhere within the country whenever required. Some divisions within certain group armies are designated ‘rapid reaction units’, ready for deployment within 24 hours without requiring any train-up or reserve augmentation.

Traditionally, China was regarded as largely a land power with only very limited naval forces. During the Cold War-era, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was mainly tasked with the defence of China’s coast against amphibious assaults from the U.S. or Soviet Union. Since the late 1980s, China has been seeking to develop a ‘blue water’ navy force capable of operating in the regions beyond its offshore waters. The modernisation of the PLAN over the past decade has been driven by two factors, the possibility of a military conflict with Taiwan over the island’s declaration of independence, and more recently, the growing needs to protect China’s sea lines of communications (SLOC) in order to secure the country’s global network of energy resources and trading activities.

The 225,000-man PLAN is organised into three fleets: North Sea, East Sea, and South Sea Fleets. Each fleet is composed of surface forces, submarine forces, naval aviation, and coastal defence forces. The South Sea Fleet also has two marine brigades, totalling some 10,000 men. In time of crisis, the PLAN can be supported by China’s merchant and fishing ship fleets. Main naval bases include Lushun, Huludao, Qingdao, Shanghai, Zhoushan, Wenzhou, Xiamen, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, and Yulin.

China operates the largest submarine force among Asian countries, consisting of 8~10 nuclear-powered submarines and 50~60 diesel-electric submarines. The second-generation Type 093/Shang Class nuclear-powered attack submarine and Type 094/Jin Class nuclear-powered missile submarine have already entered service. Older Type 033/Romeo Class and Type 035/Ming Class diesel-electric submarines, which were based on the 1950s-era Soviet technology, are being gradually replaced by the newer indigenous Type 039/Song class and Russian-built Kilo Class. The even newer Yuan Class has also entered batch production.

Since 1990, the PLAN has received a total of 13 destroyers in six classes, as well as 20 brigades in four classes. Most of the Chinese-built surface combatants are equipped with the Chinese indigenous YJ-83 anti-ship cruise-missile (ASCM). Early vessels were armed with the HHQ-7 short-range air-defence missile system, while later variants are fitted with more capable medium- to long-range air-defence missile systems and vertical-launch system (VLS) modules. To complement these vessels, the PLAN is introducing the modernised Type 022/Houbei Class low-visibility missile boat to replace the ageing Houku class. Additionally, China is said to be considering building one or more aircraft carriers to further enhance its long-range power projection capability.

The amphibious warfare fleet of the PLAN has been expanding slowing since the early 1990s, with the introduction of 19 Type 072-II/Yuting and Type 072-III/Yuting-II class tank landing ships, as well as a Type 071 landing platform dock (LPD), which features a large helicopter flight deck and a floodable docking area for up to four aircraft cushion landing crafts. It was estimated that the current amphibious fleet of the PLAN is capable of transporting an army division, including its personnel and heavy equipment, to cross the Taiwan Strait. However, additional transport capacities can be achieved by employing container ships and roll-on/roll-off ships of the merchant fleet.

The PLAN has been following a three-step strategy in its modernisation process. In the first step, it aimed to develop a relatively modernised naval force that can operate within the first island chain, a series of islands that stretch from Japan to the north, to Taiwan, and Philippines to the south. In the second step, the PLAN aims to develop a regional naval force that can operate beyond the first island chain to reach the second island chain, which includes Guam, Indonesia, and Australia. In the third-stage, the PLAN will develop a global naval force by the mid twenty-first century.

Dragon's Fire: The PLA's 2nd Artillery Corps

China oil flow up on new Kazakh pipe
China secured access to vast oil deposits in western Kazakhstan today after the energy-rich Central Asian nation said it had completed the expansion of a major oil pipeline to its eastern neighbour.

News wires 01 July 2009
A Kazakh company in charge of the project said the first test shipment of oil had been successfully completed through the newly built Kenkiyak-Kumkol pipeline.

"The implementation of this project will have tremendous influence on the whole oil and gas industry, providing new opportunities for oil exports," Reuters quoted KazStroyService as saying in a statement.

The new link, which starts near the Kenkiyak field operated by China's CNPC, gives China better access to Kazakhstan's oil provinces in the west and follows Beijing's intensified efforts to boost energy supplies from Central Asia.

The first phase of the pipeline, between central Kazakhstan and China's western Xinjiang region, was completed in 2006.

The latest link expands this pipeline to Caspian Sea oil fields.
Chinese oil companies such as CNPC own stakes in several Kazakh oil producers, including CNPC-AktobeMunaiGaz, the operator of Kenkiyak and Zhanazhol fields, and PetroKazakhstan, which operates the Kumkol group of fields.

Kazakhstan, hit hard by the global economic crisis, has stepped up contacts with China for fresh investment. Beijing further strengthened its foothold in the former Soviet republic in April after it agreed to lend Kazakhstan $10 billion in a "loan-for-oil" deal during Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit.

As part of the deal, CNPC bought a stake in MangistauMunaigas, a company whose fields are also close to the starting point of the extended pipeline. Kazakhstan and China agreed to build the 3000 kilometre pipeline in 1997 and have said they would later double the capacity of the combined pipeline from the current 10 million tonnes a year.

Kazakhstan, which produced 71 million tonnes of oil last year, plans to double output within the next decade and seeks to diversify its exports as well as sources of investment in the industry dominated by Western oil majors. China is also building a pipeline to import up to 40 billion cubic metres of Central Asian gas a year.

The link originates in Turkmenistan and goes through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

Armen Manvelyan
Kazakhstan is the country number one by its oil reserves in the Pre-Caspian region. According to some information, 2/3 of the Caspian Sea oil is concentrated in the very coastal regions of Kazakhstan. That’s why the collapse of the Soviet Union was soon followed by the struggle for the control over the oil sector of Kazakhstan. If the participants of the first stage of the struggle were Russia and the US, than China joined them in the second stage.

The Kazakh factor: After continuous negotiations and under the conditions of the US political inactivity, the Russian people managed to persuade the Kazaks to construct a new oil pipeline from the oil-rich Tengiz to Novorossisk. The Russian party made such a decision after long hesitations. Before that the official Russia had turned to different steps to reduce the extent of the oil supplied from Kazakhstan. The second country of the former Soviet Union with its oil reserves after Russia had serious transportation problems: there was a net of pipelines of 6000 kilometers length connecting Kazakhstan with the Russian city Samara. Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline was working still at the Soviet period, connected Kazakhstan with the Russian Samara and continued its way to Europe through the oil pipeline of “Drudzba.” As a matter of fact it was the only route the countries could supply the international market with their oil.

The official Astana was looking for an alternative to Russian route. The entry of the American oil companies into the oil sector of Kazakhstan was not welcomed. In 1993 the president N. Nazarbaev signed a contract with the president of Chevron oil company K Derry in Alma-Ata to found the biggest joint oil company on the territory of CIS. For the oilfield exploitation was founded the company “TengizChevroil” the main shareholders of which, besides Chevron became “KazakhOil”, Mobil, “Lukarkon” and “Lukoil” owing 5% of shares1. In Russia this contract was called the blow over their own interests. The number of oil pipelines connecting Kazakhstan with Samara was reduced. To overcome the Russian obstacle Chevron began pumping a part of the oil to Aktau and Turkmenbashi ports, and from there to Baku. From Azerbaijan the oil cisterns were sent to the oil storage in Batumi port by railway. Due to this complicated scheme Chevron managed to pump the Kazakh oil to the world market. In 1997 for about 3.7 million tones of Kazakh oil was pumped to the Black Sea ports of Georgia by the same route, more than to Samara. Under those conditions Kazakhstan and Russia were actively negotiation on Tengiz—Novorossiysk oil pipeline construction. The contract between the two countries (by the participation of the Omani Sultan) was concluded on July 17, 1992; however, it went into effect only in 1996. It was also furthered by the fact that the construction of the oil pipeline (Tengiz—Novorossiysk) began still at the Soviet period and was half ready. In April 1996 a corresponding contract was concluded between the two parties – Russia and Kazakhstan2. The oil pipeline with the length of 1600 kilometers and costing $2 billion was to pump for about 500.000 barrels of oil per day to the oil storage situated in the Russian sector of the Black Sea coast of Novorossiysk. To finish the pipeline construction Russia founded a new consortium which was to finance and built up the pipeline. The official Moscow was in a hurry to strengthen its positions in the Caspian Sea coast. The oil pipeline was to fortify Russia’s domination in the region and, in particular, in the Caspian Basin. By the initiative of official Moscow and with the participation of Kazakhstan and Oman was founded the Caspian pipeline consortium (CPC). Besides the three countries, other oil companies also participated in CPC. On April 27, 1996 in Moscow was signed a contract on the oil pipeline construction by the participation of B. Yelzin and N. Nazarbaev. Russia was holding the majority of shares3. In the newly founded consortium Russia had 24% of shares, Kazakhstan – 19%, the Omani Sultanate – 7%. The American oil giant Chevron got 15% of shares, the Russian “Lukoil”- 12.5%, 7.5 by 7.5% were concentrated in the hands of American Mobil and “RosOil,” 2 by 2% got the Italian Agip Spa and British Gaz, 1.75 by 1.75 to the American Oryx and Kazakh Munaigaz.

In August 2007 the construction of the oil pipeline was over and the oil began flowing to Novorossiysk. However, the official opening ceremony was held later – on November 27, 2001. The next day the first tanker loaded by Kazakh oil of Tengiz mark left Novorossiysk. At first for about 8 million tones of oil per year was flowing through the oil pipeline; however, later on the extent was increased up till 28 million. At that period for about 60 million tones of oil per year was exported to Kazakhstan, 28 million out of which was exported to Novorossiysk and 15 million – Samara. In other words, the exploitation of the oil pipeline increased Kazakhstan’s economic dependence on the Russian pipelines.

Thus, by mid 1990s there was a well-shaped political opinion in Moscow that the US was activating its influence in the region. Under the conditions of the new political realities on July 21, 1994 the Russian president Boris Yelzin signed a document for the protection of the interests of the Russian Federation in the Caspian Sea Basin4 prepared by the foreign minister Andery Kozyrev and the National Security Service director Yevgeni Primakov, after which Russia made its oil policy more active, quickly undertaking the construction and restart of Baku-Novorossiysk and Tengiz-Novorossiysk oil pipelines. As a matter of fact, exploitation of these oil pipelines was unambiguously considered to be Russia’s victory in the region.

The Chinese course: China is also very much interested in the Caspian Sea rich with energy resources. And if in the first half of 1990s this country was unnoticeable, than in the second half the situation sharply changed. With its high rate of growth in economy China had excessive demand of energy carriers. Official Beijing even had to quit the supply of the export oil: the local crude oil was hardly enough for home consumption. That’s why China got interested in the Caspian Sea Basin and especially in Kazakhstan. China’s interest in Kazakh oil was also in the interests of Astana. The president Nursultan Nazarbaev was long desiring to separate the Kazakh oil to weaken its dependence on Russia. The west was supporting Kazakhstan’s president putting forward the idea of Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline construction. But the Chinese course was not included in the US regional plans. The first result of Kazakh-Chinese negotiations was produced in September 1997, when, during his official visit to Astana, the Chinese Prime Minister Lee Pen signed a contract on the Kazakh-Chinese oil pipeline construction. The 3200 kilometer-long oil pipeline with the capacity of 20 million tones and costing $3-3.5 billion was to begin in the Kazakh Atyrau and end in the Chinese town Alashankou. The Chinese party undertook the full financing of the project, but later on, when the oil prices considerably dropped, it was talked about inexpediency of this and other suchlike projects. However, in realization of both of the projects (Atyrau- Alashankou, Baku-Ceyhan oil pipelines) politics remained the priority: the parties financing the pipelines were attaching special importance to the political context of the issue, besides the economic one.

However, the further rise in oil prices favored the realization of the project. In June 2003 during the visit of the president of Chinese People’s Republic Khu Dzintau to Kazakhstan the Chinese national oil company signed a contract on Kazakh-China Atyrau- Alashankou oil pipeline construction with the Kazakh government. The contract supposed not only the oil-pipeline construction: China began making serious investments in the oil sector of Kazakhstan, which strengthened its position both in the Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Basin.

In spite of the efforts of Russia and the west, especially the US, to fail the oil pipeline construction, they didn’t manage. On May 2006 the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline was launched for the first time, but the official opening was held on December 15 of the same year5. In that way Kazakhstan built the first oil pipeline which was to make a detour of Russia to supply China with oil. It was the first oil pipeline built in the Caspian Sea Region countries detouring Russia. The second one, as it is known, is Baku-Ceyhan.

The construction of Kazakh-Chinese oil pipeline was of great importance for Kazakhstan. The country was entering an important and perspective market weakening its dependence on Russia, and, at last, was built an oil pipeline completely passing through its territory. For the oil pipeline exploitation was founded “Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline” company to be controlled by the state oil companies of China and Kazakhstan on equal terms6. The parties also negotiated about a gas pipeline construction.

One might say that the president of Kazakhstan partially managed to reduce his country’s dependence on Russian companies, however, the official Astana is still negotiating with other countries, including Iran and Azerbaijan, over oil transportation and other routes.

1Бутаев А., Каспий: зачем он Западу?
2R.Hrair Dokmejian & Hovann H. Simonian, Troubled Waters.The Geopolitics of The Caspian Region. New York, 2001, p. 36.
3Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia
4Robert V. Barylski, «Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub», Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 1995.
5Ian MacWilliam, Kazakh-China oil pipeline opens, BBC News, Almaty.
6Dmitry Kosyrev, Kazakh-Chinese oil pipeline a new reality of global politics, RIA Novosti, 31/ 05/ 2006.

Sunday, November 28, 2010

North Korea and China
N Korea supplying nuclear technology to Iran & Myanmar: UN report
The 75-page report, "reinforces US claims that North Korea has emerged as a key supplier of banned weapons materials to Washington's greatest rivals," 'The Washington Post' reported.
Now Iran has Nuclear Ballistic Missile -- KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran The findings of the report indicate, "North Korean involvement in nuclear ballistic missile related activities in certain other countries, including Iran, Syria and Myanmar".

In April 2009 the United Nations named the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation (aka KOMID) as North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional weapons. The UN lists KOMID as based in Central District Pyongyang.[53] However it also has offices in Beijing and sales offices worldwide which facilitate weapons sales and seek new customers for North Korean weapons.[54]

KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran[55] and has done deals for missile related technology with the Taiwanese.[56] KOMID representatives were also involved in a North Korean deal to mass produce Kornet anti-tank guided missiles for Syria[57] and KOMID has also been responsible for the sale of equipment, including missile technologies, gunboats, and multiple rocket artilleries, worth a total of over $100 million, to Africa, South America and the Middle East.[58]

North Korea's military has also used the company Hap Heng to sell weapons overseas. Hap Heng was based in Macau in the 1990s to handle sales of weapons and missile and nuclear technology to nations such as Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's medium-range ballistic missile, the Ghauri, is considered to be a copy of North Korea's Rodong 1. Even in 1999, intelligence sources said North Korea had sold missile components to Iran.[59] Listed directors of Hap Heng include Kim Song In and Ko Myong Hun.[60] Ko Myong Hun is now a listed diplomat in Beijing[61] and may be involved in the work of KOMID.[62]

A UN sanctions committee report stated that North Korea operates an international smuggling network for nuclear and ballistic missile technology, including to Burma, Syria, and Iran.[63]
Arms flows fuel attacks in Darfur

Extracted from the full report by Amnesty International entitled "Blood at the Crossroads: Making the case for a global Arms Trade Treaty" (AI Index ACT: 30/011/2008) September 2008, available from

In early 2008 a spate of attacks, including on civilians, worsened the already dire human rights and humanitarian situation in certain areas of Darfur. This case shows that even in the face of the UN arms embargo on Darfur and the ongoing serious abuses and human rights violations, crimes against humanity and war crimes being perpetrated by parties to the conflict in that region of Sudan, arms have been continuously deployed into Darfur. Furthermore, arms have been knowingly supplied into the hands of the parties to the conflict through Sudan and Chad, including by Permanent Members of the Security Council. Cargo aircraft have continued to ferry in military items, notably small arms, light weapons and ammunition, used in the bulk of violations and abuses. In addition, the Sudanese armed forces have used jet fighters, military utility planes, military helicopters, artillery and armoured vehicles to facilitate direct attacks on civilians and indiscriminate attacks. The lack of commitment by China and Russia to strengthen the UN arms embargo is made worse by the weak systems of state laws, regulations and corresponding capacities in the region which are insufficient to prevent the violation of the UN arms embargo.

Since 2004, Amnesty International has repeatedly called for all States to refrain from supplying arms to all parties to the conflict in Darfur until they demonstrate respect for their obligations under international law, particularly under international human rights and humanitarian law. [1] Amnesty International drew attention in November 2004 to the fact that Sudanese government Antonov aircraft, MiG fighter jets and helicopter gunships bombed villages, killed civilians and forced the people to flee their homes in Darfur. However, in 2007 and 2008, Sudanese government forces and militia continued using indiscriminate aerial bombardments and direct armed attacks on civilians, while also perpetrating other serious violations of human rights in Darfur. Amnesty International has also condemned the grave abuses of human rights perpetrated by armed opposition groups in Darfur.

As the following account shows, the Government of Sudan, government allied militia (often referred to as Janjawid), as well as armed opposition groups operating in Darfur have continued to receive plentiful supplies of small arms and conventional military equipment over recent years which are continually used to facilitate and commit serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur. The supply process has continued despite international appeals for the suspension of such arms transfers and the imposition on 29 March 2005 of a UN Security Council arms embargo on all parties to the conflict in Darfur.

Continued Armed Clashes Affecting Civilians
Previous inflows of arms on all sides have preceded an escalation of conflict in Darfur initiated by those who received them. The heavy arming of groups allied to the government intensified in Darfur after the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006 which contained pledges to disarm the Janjawid militia. This was followed by the mass incorporation of groups, which had formerly been part of the Janjawid, into government paramilitary organizations - the Popular Defence Forces (PDF), the Border Intelligence, and the Border Police or the Nomad Police. Those incorporated were equipped with new small arms, uniforms and 4x4 vehicles by the Sudanese government.

Breakaway factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), contributed to a process of fragmentation and by early 2008 there were numerous armed opposition groups operating in Darfur, increasingly divided along ethnic lines. As a result of indiscriminate and direct attacks on civilians, ongoing serious violations of human rights, particularly by government and paramilitary groups, about 280,000 people were displaced during 2007 bringing the number of displaced in Darfur to more than 2,387,000 by the beginning of 2008. The death toll in Darfur was estimated to be over 200,000 since the conflict began in 2003.

In October 2007, the UN Panel of Experts, tasked with investigating breaches of the UN arms embargo and identifying individuals who impede the peace process and commit violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in Darfur, confirmed the involvement of members of the Border Intelligence Guard and the Popular Defence Forces in attacks by “tribal” militia groups in Southern Darfur that resulted in significant civilian casualties and destruction of civilian property.[2] The Panel also identified a number of instances in which rape was used as an instrument of warfare and found substantial evidence of violations of the right to life and violation of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The Panel concluded that all parties to the conflict had conducted these violations, but the Sudanese Armed Forces, the faction of the Sudan Liberation Army led by Minni Minawi, and “tribal” militia groups had most noticeably carried out the violations.

Amnesty International reported during May and August 2007 on additional supplies of arms to Sudan and more deployments of arms in Darfur.[3] In October 2007, Amnesty International received further reports of arms flows into Darfur. Sudanese soldiers were reportedly seen unloading arms boxes from a large Ilyushin IL76 cargo plane operated by FASO Airways at Nyala airport in late October.[4] In addition, in late December 2007 and early January 2008 several flights of Antonov 12 and Ilyushin 76 cargo planes operated by AZZA Transport were reportedly witnessed flying into El Geneina airport from Khartoum.[5] According to the UN Panel of Experts investigating breaches of the UN arms embargo, AZZA Transport has frequently carried out cargo flights to supply the Sudanese armed forces.[6] Also in January 2008, Amnesty International received a report that small arms were being distributed to militia in El Geneina.[7] Sudanese jet fighters, reportedly Chinese Fantans, were also seen above the West Darfur capital, El Geneina. In early 2008, a spate of attacks, including on civilians, worsened the already-dire human rights and humanitarian situation in some areas of Darfur. Sudanese government armed forces and allied militia carried out attacks in order to drive the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) out of the Sirba/Jebel Moon area of West Darfur.

The apparent air bridge in support of the Sudanese government armed forces and its allied militia broadly coincided with a reported military build up of JEM in West Darfur backed up by the Chadian armed forces. Large supplies of small arms and light weapons reportedly supplied to JEM from Chad for use against the Sudanese government, appear to have helped JEM to capture a wide swathe of land in south-east Darfur from August 2007, attacking closer to the Government of Sudan’s important interests - Adila (an important railhead) and Wad Banda (in Kordofan). In August – September 2007, JEM took control of much of Haskanita and on 29 September 2007, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) base in Haskanita in North Darfur was attacked, killing 10 AMIS peacekeepers. Allegedly two armed opposition groups, reportedly offshoots of JEM and of SLA/Unity, attacked the AMIS base and looted arms. The Sudanese army then occupied the town and burned it to the ground.

In December 2007 and January 2008, with reports of significant military support from the Chadian armed forces, JEM moved to the Jebel Moon/Sirba area, defeated a Sudan Government convoy and took over the area (see further below). The UN Secretary-General’s report of 14 February spoke of 74 vehicles carrying Chadian forces entering Sudan and linking up with JEM in December 2007.[8] JEM issued numerous communiqués talking of the “liberated areas” and in January JEM moved south and threatened to attack Sudanese forces based in El Geneina. The Sudanese armed forces responded with a big military build up around El Geneina, and, for a short time, handing over policing to Chadian armed opposition groups, indicating distrust of local police.

On 7 January 2008, only eight days after the UN-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) formally took over peacekeeping from the African Mission in Sudan, Sudanese Armed Forces attacked UNAMID peacekeepers travelling in a supply convoy in Darfur. This attack was in blatant violation of IHL. It was followed a week later on 13 and 14 January by a Government of Sudan Antonov military utility aircraft bombing two villages near Geneina which violated the UN ban on offensive military flights in and over Darfur, under Security Council Resolution 1591 of March 2005. Aerial attacks, conducted by the Sudanese government forces, with Antonov aircrafts rarely allow distinguishing between civilian and military objects, resulting in indiscriminate killings and injuries and destruction of civilian property. Sudanese Antonov aircraft usually carry between 12 and 16 bombs weighing 100kg, described as “very basic steel drums full of dynamite” which are apparently rolled out from the rear load ramp and when used for aerial attacks on villages are not precisely targeted. For example, in April 2007 a Sudanese government Antonov bomber and helicopters attacked the village of Umm Rai in North Darfur, hitting a school and killing two people.

Meanwhile, at the end of January 2008, Chadian armed opposition groups launched an attack against N’Djamena, the capital of Chad, briefly taking control of parts of the city on 2 and 3 February. The Chadian government accused the Government of Sudan of having backed the Chadian armed opposition groups by providing logistical support. JEM forces then reportedly moved rapidly westwards to help President Deby of Chad and the Chadian armed opposition groups were pushed south and moved back to Sudan. The Sudanese authorities allegedly rearmed the Chadian opposition groups, so that by March 2008 they were making attacks once more against Chad army columns in the Chad-Sudan border areas.

In February 2008, while JEM forces were present in Chad, the Sudanese Armed Forces and Janjawid militia launched an attack against the JEM-held areas in Darfur. Such attacks occurred on Abu Suruj, Sirba and Sileia on 8 February and on Jebel Moon on 18, 19 and 22 February. The Sudanese armed forces used their traditional tactics: indiscriminate aerial bombing of settlements with Antonov planes and striking with helicopter gunships before launching ground attacks with Janjawid militia as well as the army, looting and raping especially in Sirba, and striking indiscriminately at civilians. Altogether, 115 people were reported killed in the campaign, mostly civilians, including women and children, and it is estimated that 30,000 people were displaced. Up to 12,000 refugees fled into neighbouring eastern Chad, according to the UNHCR. An official report on the attacks by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and UNAMID said that the Sudan Armed Forces had “failed to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives” and that the scale of destruction “suggests that the damage was a deliberate and integral part of a military strategy”. Humanitarian organizations were not able to access any of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and others in need of food from mid December 2007 until 3 March 2008, leaving around 160,000 people without access to humanitarian assistance. During February-March 2008, JEM was allegedly receiving new armaments from the Government of Chad and had started launching attacks to retake Jebel Moon.

The UN Arms Embargo on Parties to the Darfur Conflict
Since 29 March 2005, the UN Security Council has prohibited arms transfers to any of the parties to the conflict in Darfur and specified that the Government of Sudan may not transfer military equipment to Darfur without prior approval from the Sanctions Committee of the Security Council. However, the parties to the conflict have continued to receive and deploy arms in Darfur, aided by poorly designed and implemented arms trade control laws and mechanisms in neighbouring and supplier States.

The terms of the arms embargo are set out in two Security Council resolutions. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of Resolution 1556 (2004) of 30 July 2004, the Security Council decided “that all states shall take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply, to all non-governmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed, operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for the aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories” as well as the provision “of technical training or assistance” related to these items. With paragraph 7 of Resolution 1591 (2005) of 29 March 2005, the Security Council decided that these provisions of Resolution 1556 shall “also apply to all parties to the N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and any other belligerents” and therefore to the Government of Sudan.

In addition, offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region are prohibited, according to UN Security Council Resolution 1591. The UN Security Council has explicitly demanded from the Government of Sudan, in accordance with the Sudanese Government’s commitments under the 8 April 2004 N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the 9 November 2004 Abuja Security Protocol, that it immediately “cease conducting offensive military flights in and over the Darfur region.”[9] However, this does not apply to non-offensive military flights which, if carried out in order to move military equipment or supplies into Darfur, nevertheless require the prior authorization of the UN Sanctions Committee on Sudan. Within Darfur the re-supply of military equipment is not permitted and only the withdrawal of military equipment is allowed when the Parties have notified the Cease Fire Commission (CFC) of a troop movement, and the CFC subsequently specifies the route along which the troops have to move.

A Committee of the Security Council was set up by Resolution 1591, together with a Panel of Experts. The tasks of the Committee described in paragraph 3 include monitoring the implementation of the embargo and authorizing as appropriate “the movement of military equipment and supplies into the Darfur region” by the Government of Sudan. Crucially, in the light of ongoing arms transfers to the Sudanese government including mainly by China and Russia, two Permanent Members of the Security Council, the Committee clarified its understanding in its report of 28 December 2006 that the embargo allowed Member States to “provide arms and military equipment to the Government of the Sudan outside the Darfur region and that the Government could move military equipment or supplies irrespective of their origin into the Darfur region on the condition that such movement was approved in advance by the Committee upon a request by the Government.”

In practice, the UN Sanctions Committee decided that China, Russia and others could continue sending arms, related material of all types and technical assistance and training to the Sudan government despite its repeated flagrant violations of the UN embargo, provided those deliveries were not destined for Darfur. The Chinese and Russian governments say they have told Sudan’s government that their weapon supplies must not be used in Darfur but Sudan’s government openly says it will send military equipment where it likes.[10] Acknowledging “the risk” in March 2007, the UN Panel of Experts appointed under Resolution 1591 recommended that supplying States should henceforth request the Sudanese government to provide an end-use certificate, which would state the destination of the respective military goods and services, and should notify the Committee in advance.

The UN Security Council Panel of Experts has submitted reports detailing violations of the UN arms embargo by the Government of Sudan and Sudanese armed opposition groups, for example in October 2006[11], and in its March 2007 interim report the Panel noted “the ongoing violations of the arms embargo” and recommended “that the Security Council revisit options for strengthening the arms embargo presented by the Panel in its previous reports, including provisions pertaining to: (a) expansion of the arms embargo to the entire territory of the Sudan (potentially with targeted exemptions); (b) verification of arms and ammunition; (c) end-use certification; and (d) restrictions on dual-use items.”[12] In October 2007, the UN Panel issued yet another report that documented further numerous violations of the arms embargo. However, the Security Council has not acted upon the report’s recommendations, despite the clear evidence of violations and important recommendations to improve the embargo.[13]

Photographs of three Chinese-made Nanchang A-5 "Fantan" jets in Nyala, South Darfur, whose deployment was a clear violation of UN Resolution 1591 by the Sudanese government, were provided by the UN Panel and the Nyala airport's logbooks were cited as evidence of the jets’ arrival from points outside Darfur (El Obeid and Wadi Sayyidna). The UN embargo also prohibits offensive military flights in Darfur and Fantan jets are used as ground attack fighters, not as air supremacy aircraft that could secure Sudan's borders (see more on the Fantan jets further below).

The UN Panel of Experts report also provided photographic evidence of two Russian Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopters deployed from Khartoum to El Fasher, and documents an additional nine rotations of Mi-24s to Darfur, as well as the deployment of a Mi-8 assault/transport helicopter in Darfur during 2007. Yet successive attempts by the Sanctions Committee in terms of Resolution 1591 to compel the Government of Sudan to seek prior Security Council permission before deploying such military helicopters to Darfur have been ignored by the government, thus making its deployments formal violations of the UN arms embargo.

In addition, the UN Panel also provided evidence of the Sudan government’s use of two white Antonov 26 aircraft to bomb locations and conduct military reconnaissance in Darfur, including one with "UN" painted on its wing, a clear violation of IHL.[14] The use of white paint on such military equipment by the Sudanese Government, which it has done since March 2005, is particularly egregious since aircraft painted white can easily be mistaken for UN aircraft.[15] In addition, three Antonov 26 aircraft appear to have been fraudulently registered with the same number, ST-ZZZ, according to the UN Panel[16]. According to reliable aviation records, one of these planes was supplied from Russia to Sudan in September 2006. After one of the three planes crashed and its markings painted over, another was seen deployed in Darfur by the Sudanese government in September 2007.[17]

The UN Panel concluded that from September 2006 to June 2007, the Government of Sudan conducted offensive military overflights in Darfur, which included aerial bombardments by Antonov aircraft, aerial attacks by Mi-24 attack helicopters and the use of air assets for military surveillance. Sixty-six such aerial attacks were reported during that period, of which 24 were confirmed definitively. Despite this, in 2007 the Russian government continued to provide training to the Sudanese air force pilots.[18]

Arms Supplies to Sudan and Deployments in Darfur
Despite the serious ongoing violations of human rights and humanitarian law by the Sudanese armed forces, the Government was able to import military and civilian arms and ammunition worth $17.2 million in 2006 through commercial entities mostly from China but also Iran and Egypt, according to latest available customs data.[19] This total does not include government-to-government arms transfers to Sudan. Most of the recorded commercial imports of arms and ammunition relate to the following categories:

· “military weapons other than revolvers and pistols” accounted for $9.3 million, the bulk of which was 1,653 tons of weapons (54,406 items) from China worth $9.1 million;

· “armoured vehicles and parts” accounted for about $4 million, with a large shipment of 500 tons from Iran worth $2.9 million;

· “military revolvers and pistols” totalling $1.1 million, with the largest transfers from Egypt ($525,925) and China ($437,911), the latter for 36 tons and 1,403 items.

Recorded arms and ammunition shipped by Chinese commercial entities in 2006 accounted for 67 percent of Sudan’s commercial arms and ammunition imports that year according to the customs data, followed by those from Iran (18 percent), and Germany (6.9 percent, the largest transfer being for armoured vehicles). It is not known if such imports from China and Germany could be related to the UNMIS[20], to which China contributes military and police personnel and Germany provides police personnel. Ammunition for assault rifles and machine guns used in Darfur can be traced to China, Bulgaria and Iran.[21] Nevertheless, small arms and light weapons with Chinese manufacture markings were seen in the hands of Sudanese soldiers and militia backed by the Sudan armed forces in Darfur in late 2007 to mid 2008. These have included mortars, machine guns, single-barrel anti-aircraft guns, rocket propelled grenades, assault rifles and sniper rifles.[22]

Weapons and munitions of Janjawid fighters seen in Darfur during February 2008 included a considerable arsenal of mortars, rocket launchers and anti-aircraft guns, mostly of Chinese origin, which they claimed was supplied by the Sudanese government in October 2007.[23] Mohammed Hamdan, the commander of one of the main Janjawid militia groups, with roughly 20,000 fighters in control of large areas of Southern Darfur, said in early 2008 that “the weapons, the cars, all that you see, we got it from the government...There were two places that had fallen to the rebels - Um Sidir and Kiryari [on the Chadian border] and after they fell, they [the Sudan government] called upon us…I had two meetings with the President. This was in September 2006. One meeting with the President was in his home. And they provided us with cars and weaponry and we moved to the Northern area.”[24] He claimed he and his 20,000 men defected from the Government in October 2007 and began forming alliances with non-Arab rebel groups who had been their enemies.[25]

Chadian armed opposition groups based in Darfur, with tacit and active support of the Government of Sudan, have also been using Chinese small arms and light weapons, as evidenced by the identity of arms captured from the Union of Forces of Democracy and Development (Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement, UFDD) in November 2007 and admissions by the other main Chadian opposition group, the Rally of Forces for Change (Rassemblement des forces pour le changement, RFC) in 2007.[26] In 2006, members of the United Front for Democratic Change (Front Uni pour le Changement Démocratique au Tchad, FUC) were photographed carrying Chinese-made QLZ87 35mm automatic grenade launchers outside the town of El Geneina in western Darfur near the Chad border, and its commander had just claimed to have visited the People’s Republic of China.[27] The use of Chinese small arms and light weapons corresponds to the findings of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring the UN arms embargo on Darfur and to the commercial trade data on arms imports to Sudan.

A member of a Chadian armed group operating in the Chad-Sudan border area holds a QLZ87 35mm automatic grenade launcher made by Chinese arms company Norinco. © Daniel Pepper/Getty Pictures

Between September 2006 and July 2007, the UN Panel of Experts noted 409 military and police cargo flights to Darfur, with an aggregate load capacity of approximately 13,000 tons.[28] The UN Panel of Experts found evidence that many of these flights transported military material to Darfur and recommended that six cargo companies in Khartoum be placed on an aviation ban. The UN Panel of Experts named the companies violating the UN arms embargo as Ababeel Aviation, AZZA Transport, Badr Airlines, Juba Air Cargo, Trans Attico and United Arabian Airlines.[29] The UN Panel requested that “all States take measures to deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in, or overfly their territory if that aircraft is owned, leased or controlled by or operated on behalf of these companies…[and] further recommends the immediate and complete closure of all the companies’ offices, and ban on the directors and shareholders of these companies from establishing new aviation companies or purchasing or leasing aircraft.”[30]

Sudanese soldiers offloading military containers from an Antonov 12 aircraft onto military trucks, including a Chinese truck, at El Geneina. The UN Panel of Experts on the Sudan arms embargo for arms trafficking into Darfur called for the grounding of this aircraft. © Amnesty International

The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have been the main suppliers of military aircraft to the Sudan Air Force. The Russian Federation sold twelve Mi-24 attack helicopters to Sudan in 2005[31] and signed a deal to supply at least 15 Mi-8 helicopters to Sudan for delivery in 2005 and 2006.[32] Such helicopters have been persistently used for indiscriminate attacks and direct attacks on civilians in Darfur. In 2004, Russia also exported 12 MiG-29 military fighter jets to Sudan which were reportedly seen flying in Darfur that year.[33] In October 2006 the Sudanese Government reportedly asked the Russian Government for a US$1 billion loan to fund the purchase of new fighters and helicopter gunships. [34] Sudan acquired three Antonov 26 military utility planes, a type of aircraft used regularly for indiscriminate aerial bombing in Darfur, and one such aircraft was delivered from Russia to Sudan in March 2004 and another in September 2006.[35]

In 2006, China also supplied eight K-8 jet trainers to Sudan capable of being equipped with a cannon, rockets and bombs for air to ground attack and K-8 flight simulators from the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corp (CATIC) / China Aviation Industry Corporation II (AVIC II) and Sudan is reportedly expected to acquire more K8 jets.[36] Photos taken in early 2008 of a K-8 jet in Sudanese Air Force livery (No. 802) show it fitted with fuselage-mounted machine gun pod and two wing-mounted rocket pods. In addition, Chinese F-7M military jets (modelled on the MiG-21) were transferred to Sudan in the early 1990s, and Sudan obtained 16 between 2006 and 2007 according to one authoritative source.[37] Eight of the 17 Chinese Shenjang F6 jets reportedly transferred to Sudan in the 1990s were still operational in 2007.[38] In addition, during 2007 Sudan reportedly began negotiations for the purchase of twelve Chinese FC1 jet fighters.[39]

Sudan also acquired Nanchang A5 “Fantan” jets from China which were first seen in Darfur in January 2007 and have been used for air to ground attacks in Darfur.[40] On 19 February 2008, two Fantans were used in an aerial attack at Beybey where three large bombs were dropped in a settlement killing eight civilians, including children, and wounding others. Shrapnel was spread over a wide area. Two Fantans have since been seen flying westward from Nyala with bombs and returning without them.[41] The Fantans have recently been given maintenance services by Chinese technicians and allegedly Sudanese pilots have been trained in China to fly the Fantans.[42]

The devastating impact of using combinations of these different weapons can be shown by the following example documented by the UN Panel in October 2007.[43] On 11 September 2006, the Sudan air force attacked Deribat and other surrounding villages with fighter aircraft believed to be Fantan jets which made low overhead passes, causing panic, while Mi-24 helicopters fired rockets and bursts of machine-gun fire into the village. Antonov aircraft dropped bombs randomly onto the village and surrounding areas. This aerial assault continued periodically until 11 December 2006 during which the village came under 13 aerial attacks, and a total of about 50 bombs and rockets impacted on or near the village. A total of 37 people were injured. Similar attacks occurred on the surrounding villages.[44] Afterwards in late December 2006 the Sudan armed forces, Arab militia and Fur tribesmen launched a coordinated attack on Katur and other villages south of Deribat. The attack was preceded by an aerial assault. Then attackers swept through the village looting and firing machine guns and other weapons into the houses and shops. Then the pillaged goods were loaded into trucks. Similar attacks occurred in other villages in the area. Several thousand civilians were displaced from their villages as a result of the attacks, and 34 women were reportedly raped during the attacks.[45]

The Sudanese government procured 212 military trucks from the Dong Feng Automobile Import and Export Limited in China that arrived at Port Sudan in August 2005.[46] Some of these trucks are used to deploy troops and militia in Darfur in violation of the UN arms embargo.[47] The Sudanese army has used military trucks to facilitate attacks in Darfur during which serious human rights violations have been committed. For example, Sudanese government soldiers used a Dong Feng truck, allegedly with a Chinese-made anti-aircraft gun, in an attack on Sirba on 15 December 2007 where eyewitnesses saw the gun being fired at village huts and one woman was burned alive and two others were badly disfigured by their wounds.[48] One witness recounted: “We saw a Dong Feng. It started firing. People began screaming. The shooting continued until the houses were burning. The woman was burned on her legs. Her body had a bullet hole that went from her chest to her back.”[49]

The UN Panel of Experts has also documented cases of large-scale looting by Sudanese government soldiers accompanied by Janjawid militia in Darfur with trucks.[50] Also photographed in Nyala, Darfur in March 2007, were six new-looking armoured personnel carriers appearing to be the same as the 4x4 BRDM-2 armoured vehicles previously supplied by Belarus and reportedly of Russian origin - 39 were delivered from Belarus in 2003 and another 21 were delivered from Belarus in 2004.[51] In addition, Russia and Belarus also supplied 8x8 infantry support BTR-80 and BTR-70 armoured personnel carriers to Sudan in 2000, 2004 and 2005.[52]

On 1 January 2008, the Sudanese government displayed a range of heavy weaponry in Khartoum which from video footage included Chinese Type 85 tanks, Chinese Type 59 tanks, Russian T-54 or 55 tanks, Chinese ZSL92 6-wheeled armoured vehicles with mounted canons, Russian M-46 field guns and Chinese 35 Type 59 -1 canon,[53] Belarussian D-30 122 mm howitzers,[54] Chinese Type-55 37mm anti-aircraft gun manufactured by NORINCO,[55] SA-7 GRAIL man-portable SAM systems probably made in Russia,[56] Iranian armoured personnel carriers, Russian 12-round BM-21 GRAD multiple launch rocket systems transferred from Belarus,[57] Egyptian SAKR multiple launch rocket systems[58] and assorted small arms. Apart from the deployment of artillery, small arms and light weapons, it is not known whether the military equipment on public display has been deployed into Darfur but there is a clear risk that some of these items will be deployed there.[59]

In September 2007, the Sudanese Minister of Defence, Lt-Gen Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein, told reporters that Sudan’s main military suppliers are Belarus, China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia and Russia, and that recently Sudan has signed cooperation deals with China and Russia to modernize its air force.[60] The Minister of Defence said that his government was striving to produce a wider range of military equipment locally within Sudan. According to the Military Industrial Company’s (MIC’s) website, the Elshaheed Ibrahim Shams Eldeen Complex “has been established in 2002 to produce heavy machineries and armoured vehicles. The complex has many factories to produce tanks, armoured personnel carriers, self-propelled artilleries, bulldozers and excavators for civil and military purposes.” However, there is some doubt as to what extent the Sudan factories can produce such military equipment as opposed to maintenance and simple assembly of imported components. In any case this production would almost certainly require the active support of the original supplier companies in China, Russia, Iran and Egypt.

Arms Supplies via Chad
Sudanese armed opposition groups committing grave human rights abuses in Darfur continued to receive small arms, light weapons and ammunition allegedly from Chad to supplement those captured from Sudanese armed forces and militia. The UN Panel of Experts' report of October 2007 documented the transfer of arms to armed opposition groups operating in Darfur and noted the repeated unloading of suspected military supplies in Abeché, eastern Chad near the border with Darfur, from an Antonov 12 cargo aircraft that flew with a fake Kazakhstan registration number (thereby using the registration “UN”) and under the name of a company that no longer exists.[61]

The UN Panel documented two cases of arms deliveries via Chad, including approximately 3,000 AK-47 assault rifles to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) active in Darfur. The UN Panel report had a picture of new-looking Tavor-21 bullpup assault rifles made by Israel Weapon Industries, reportedly seized by the Government of Sudan from the National Redemption Front (NRF, an armed group alliance operating in Darfur in 2006).[62] The following Israeli guns reportedly were seized by the Sudanese Government forces from armed groups in El Geneina - Tavor 5.56mm: serial number 34800168, Israel Weapon Industries Ltd. - Galil 5.56mm: serial number 2052161, Hebrew markings and seal - Galil 5.56mm: serial number 99114948, Model 707 (IMI). According to sources in Israel, the Israeli Ministry of Defence admitted that these guns were sold by Israel to Chad.

Sudanese armed groups, especially JEM whose members include those with close ties to Chad, received backing from the Chadian government and armed forces. For example, in early January 2008, JEM backed by Chadian armed forces clashed with the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development- Fundamental (Union des forces pour le développement et la démocratie – Fondamental, UFDD-F), a Chadian armed opposition group based in Darfur and supported by the Sudanese government. Sources in Sudan claimed the Chadian government forces were using at least one Swiss Pilatus light plane for bombing in West Darfur accompanied by one Mi-17 military helicopter and one Mi-24 attack helicopter.[63]

Swiss aircraft manufacturer Pilatus confirmed in January 2008 that Chad’s military aircraft fleet includes three Pilatus PC-7 turboprops, plus one Pilatus PC-9M bought by the Chadian air force in 2006 to replace a PC-7 it had purchased from France.[64] Most countries use Pilatus aircraft as trainers, but a PC-9 can be modified to carry up to 1,040 kg / 2,900 pounds of ordnance, and PC-7s can also be equipped with up to six hardpoints to carry munitions. Pilatus aircraft do not fall under the strict Swiss War Material Act, which forbids the export of military aircraft to combat zones. Instead, they are subject to Switzerland’s Goods Control Act (GKG) that covers dual-use goods and armaments. The sale of the replacement PC-9 was approved by the Swiss government in June 2006, reportedly on the condition that it would be used only to train pilots. Chad’s air force has two Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters and Mi-17 medium utility helicopters, which can be armed, and were allegedly also used in the attacks in January 2008. Chad also has two remaining old Aermacchi SF-260 turboprop trainer/ light attack aircraft from the nine captured from Libya during the 1980s. However, the Chadian air force is small compared to that of Sudan.

After the Chadian army fought with Chadian armed opposition groups near Abeche in late November 2007, commanders of the armed group took some journalists to see the captured weapons and damaged Chadian army equipment. One of the photos taken shows a damaged Chadian army armoured vehicle armed with heavy machine gun and other weapons mounts. It is an Israeli RAM-2000 vehicle, produced by the Ramta division of Israel Aircraft Industries. This type of vehicle only started appearing in the market around 2004.

In September 2006 La Lettre du Continent reported that the President of Chad had signed a contract on 5 September 2006 with a South African company for the delivery of 82 AML-90 armoured vehicles to be delivered with ammunition through Belgium.[65] On 3 March 2007, the Chadian media source claimed that a first delivery “of an order of forty French manufactured armoured tanks, AML 90, delivered in Belgium by South Africa” had arrived in Chad. The report added further that: “the armoured tanks are intended for the town of Adre and its surroundings to prevent the progression of the Chadian rebellion”[66] near the Sudanese border. On 7 December 2007, an Israeli website for military photographs showed an AFP picture taken on 6 December 2007 of “Chadian soldiers on armoured vehicles south of the Kapka mountain range in the east of the country near the border with Sudan's troubled Darfur region”. The armoured vehicles were Eland (AML-90).[67] A Belgian company known for supplying such armoured vehicles, approached by Amnesty International declined to confirm or deny delivering them to Chad,[68] but its website stated that the company “buys military vehicles and surplus goods, and resells after reconditioning them in its workshops. The company is particularly well known for supplying tracked armoured vehicles (AMX-13s, M109s and M113s), armoured wheeled vehicles (AML 60s / 90s) and riot-control vehicles (BDXs). Sabiex currently stocks Eland 60s / 90s (the South African version of the AML).”[69]

On 7 February 2008, Le Point reported that Libya had supplied Chad with ammunition for T-55 tanks and missiles for the Mi-24 attack helicopter. French military aircraft reportedly transported both items.[70] On 14 February 2008, the French Ministry of Defence acknowledged that the French army had helped the Chadian government with the transportation of ammunition from Libya, but the Minister did not say if French aircraft were used. He did reportedly say that Libyan aircraft could have delivered the ammunition, because various Libyan aircraft had landed at N'Djamena airport during the crisis.[71] In February 2008, the French government also announced its readiness to sell ERYX missiles to the Chadian armed forces.

France has been a commercial supplier of cartridges and firearms to Chad but in 2006, the largest commercial supplier of cartridges to Chad was Serbia which recorded the delivery of 48,610 kilograms of cartridges worth nearly $900,000.[72] On 3 February 2008, Chadian security forces came to arrest Ngarlejy Yorongar, a Chadian Member of Parliament and opposition leader at his home. They shot and injured his chauffeur in the right hand and then arrested the MP. Amnesty International was shown an ammunition round and a cartridge casing that were found at the compound and identified it as being of Chinese origin manufactured in 2006. Markings from another cartridge used in the attack suggest that one was of French origin.[73]

The lack of border control between Chad and Sudan, combined with active support in Chad for Darfur rebel groups, led the UN Panel on Darfur to suggest in October 2007 that an arms embargo should be imposed by the Security Council on eastern Chad (the Wadi Fira and Ouaddaï regions) to curtail illegal arms shipments to armed groups such as JEM in Darfur and help strengthen the UN arms embargo on the parties to the conflict in Darfur including the Sudan armed forces and militia. Under this arrangement, the Government of Chad could seek exemptions from the UN Security Council for arms transfers to garrisons in these two regions, with UNAMID and/or the EU Force authorized to monitor and inspect all such transfers. Alternatively, this mandate could be given to the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) instead of UNAMID.

Lessons from the Case of Darfur
Amnesty International believes that no government could be unaware of the serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and breaches of the UN arms embargo. Transfers of arms and military assistance, including with maintenance, production and training, have continued to flow to the Sudanese government forces and the allied militia and paramilitary organizations which have continued to use those transfers to commit violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Darfur on a large scale, including through indiscriminate aerial attacks by the Sudanese air force on villages. In addition, armed groups opposed to the Government of Sudan have continued to acquire arms and commit grave human rights abuses and violations of humanitarian law. The Darfur conflict has escalated and overflowed into Chad and the conflict in Chad has adversely affected Darfur.

There is evidence of military assistance and arms transfers by China and Russia to the Government of Sudan after the UN arms embargo was extended to include the Government of Sudan in March 2005. Some such transfers were deployed into Darfur by the Sudanese government in breach of the UN embargo. If China and Russia did not take necessary measures to prevent such transfers from being transferred and used in Darfur as required by the Security Council, for example by insisting on adherence to satisfactory end use certificates and by notifying the Sanctions Committee in advance of intended transfers to Sudan, then two Permanent Members of the Security Council could themselves have breached the UN embargo.

However, a mandatory UN arms embargo such as the one on the parties to the conflict in Darfur should not depend for its application on the Government of Sudan’s assurances or certificates about its end-use of military transfers, since the Government of Sudan has repeatedly violated the UN embargo and continues to commit serious violations of human rights and IHL in Darfur. Thus, Amnesty International supports the recommendation of the UN Panel of Experts in March 2007 to extend the UN arms embargo to the whole of Sudan with certain targeted exceptions (e.g. for peacekeeping) in order to increase the chances that no military transfers reach the Government of Sudan and any of the other parties of the conflict in Darfur.

Nevertheless, the international community has to face up to the fact that compliance with UN arms embargoes depends crucially on Member States having in place coherent laws and regulations as well as dedicated administrative and law enforcement capacity to control international transfers of arms, related equipment and military assistance programs. In most cases, such systems of coherent state laws, regulations and corresponding capacities are insufficient to prevent the violation of UN arms embargoes. By establishing an ATT with high common standards of control of conventional arms transfers, international cooperation and assistance between States and UN bodies to implement UN arms embargoes could be much more effective.
[1] Amnesty International, Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur of 16 November 2004 AI Index: AFR 54/139/2004.

[2] Final report of the Panel of Experts as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 2 of Resolution 1713 (2006), 3 October 2007, S/2007/584.

[3] Amnesty International Sudan: Arms continuing to fuel serious human rights violations in Darfur May 2007 (AI Index: AFR ), Amnesty International News Release, “Sudan: New photographs show further breach of UN arms embargo on Darfur” 24 August 2007.

[4] Eyewitness reports, October 2007.

[5] Confidential sources, January 2008.

[6] UN Panel report S/2007/584, September 2007; On 24 February 2007 an Antonov-12 (ST-AQE) operated by Azza Transport, although belonging to United Arabian Airlines, had crash-landed at El Geneina airport while carrying arms and military personnel (122mm two artillery howitzers and 40 to 50 olive drab wooden boxes suspected to contain arms and ammunition). On 29 May 2007, AZZA Transport was added to the economic sanctions list of the US Office of Foreign Assets Control for “constituting a threat to peace and stability in Darfur, and to have directly or indirectly supplied, sold, or transferred arms or any related materiel to belligerents in Darfur."

[7] Confidential source, January 2008.

[8] Report on Sudan by the UN Secretary General, 14 February 2008.

[9] S/2006/1591: para 6. The term “offensive military overflight” is discussed in the UN Panel of Experts’ October 2006 report (S/2006/795 paragraph 215) is defined according to the following criteria: “• Overflights in pursuit of a specific military objective that are undertaken for purposes other than defending the aircraft from a clear and imminent threat.• Use of the aircraft to achieve a military advantage disproportionate to that required to neutralize a clear and imminent threat.• Unprovoked attack with aircraft, such as strafing or bombing of villages.• Use of aircraft in support of offensive ground operations.• Retaliatory attack, that is, action in response to a prior attack.• Flights that deposit troops participating in an imminent offensive operation.• Operation of the aircraft in a manner to intimidate or harass, for example flying mock attack runs, frightening children and animals, circling over an area for a considerable period of time without any operational reason with the aim of scaring people and animals, destroying buildings with rotor wash, sonic booms and the like

[10] “Envoy to Sudan pledges effort on weapon sales”, Associated Press 11 July 2007 reported that “the mainland's special envoy to Sudan has pledged that Beijing would try to prevent the weapons it sold to Sudan from being used in Darfur, where more than 200,000 people have been killed and 2.5 million made refugees since 2003, when ethnic African rebels took up arms against Sudan's Arab-dominated government. Liu Guijin said the mainland would do its best to prevent weapons from finding their way into the wrong hands. While he outlined no specific measures, Mr Liu said the issue of where Chinese arms went and how they were used was something he had discussed with Khartoum.”

[11] UN Panel report October 2006, S/2006/795.

[12] UN Panel interim report March 2007, 07-27380.

[13] UN Panel report October 2007, S/2007/584.

[14] UN Panel report S/2007/584, paragraphs 201 to 210.

[15] UN Panel first reported on the use of white aircraft by the Government of Sudan in October 2006; see S/2006/795: §205 – 213.

[16] UN Panel Interim Report, April 2007.

[17] UN Panel report S/2007/584, paragraphs 209-210.

[18] Confidential source.

[19] UN Comtrade data, checked 8 March 2008.

[20] UNMIS is the acronym for the United Nations Mission in Sudan. UNMIS is a UN peace support operation set up under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. It is made up of civilian, military and police components. The UN Security Council authorized the establishment of UNMIS through its adoption of Resolution 1590 on 24 March 2005, following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

[21] Photographs of ammunition markings found in Darfur.

[22] Photographic records.

[23] Film and photographic evidence and testimony collected for the television documentary film, “Meet the Janjaweed”, broadcast on ”Unreported World” Channel 4 television in March 2008.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Photgraphic records of UFDD equipment displayed by Chadian government 27 November 2007 and interviews with RFC during 2007.

[27] Eyewitness accounts and photographs provided to Amnesty International of arms held by the United Front for Democracy and Change (French initials FUCD), see

[28] UN Report S/2007/584, page 33.

[29] UN Report S/2007/584, recommendation number 13, page 6.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Reported by Russia to the UN Register on Conventional Arms for 2005 and photographed in Darfur from January 2007.

[32] As reported by Russian authorities to the Moscow Defence Brief 1/2006. Note that Mi-8 helicopters are also made with minor variations as Mi-17 helicopters.

[33] Amnesty International, November 2004, op cit. In May 2008 a Russian jet was apparently shot down by JEM and its pilot killed.; The Sudan Tribune claimed on 21 July 2008 that 12 Russian-made MiG-29 planes had been secretly delivered to Sudan via Belarus, but both the Russian and Belarus authorities denied the export had taken place; see The Moscow Times “Arms Firm Denies Sudan Link”, Issue 3950, 23 July 2008, and RIA Novosti, 21 July 2008

[34] UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2004; Flight International, 21-27 November 2006; “MiG-29 Fulcrum High-Performance Combat Aircraft, Russia”,, undated,; “Russian MiGs in Sudan”, Charles R. Smith,, 4 January 2002,; “Mig-29SMT – Contracts, Orders, Sales” (regarding transfers to Sudan). “African MiGs – Part 3” by Tom Cooper, Air Combat Information Group (,; “Sudan: Civil War Since 1955” by Tom Cooper, Air Combat Information Group (, 2 September 2003,

[35] Delivery of Antonov registration ST-ZZZ in September 2006 according to aviation sources including Aero Transport DataBase; for background see Amnesty International Report Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur, 16 November 2004 AI Index: AFR 54/139/2004, pg. 10; "World Military Aircraft Inventory", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2005-2007.

[36] “China and Sudan pledge closer military ties”, Jane's Defence Industry, 1 May 2007; Amnesty International, May 2007, op cit, and photographs of K-8 jets in Sudan; and Air Forces Monthly, December 2006. For the supply of flight simulators, see

[37] "World Military Aircraft Inventory", 15 January 2007, and "World Military Aircraft Inventory", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 17 January 2005.

[38] Ibid, "World Military Aircraft Inventory", 1999-2007

[39] Andrai Chang, “China selling advanced weapons to Sudan” UPI, 15 February 2008

[40] Three Fantan jets were photographed in Darfur in January and March 2007.

[41] BBC Panorama, “China’s Secret War”, 14 July 2008.

[42] Ibid.

[43] UN Panel in October 2007 S/2007/584, page 82.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] UN report S/2006/65.

[47] UN Report S/2006/65, 30 January 2006, and direct sighting in Darfur.

[48] Eye witnees testimonies and research conducted in Darfur by the BBC for a television documentary broadcast by Panorama program on 14 July 2008

[49] Ibid

[50] See for example UN Report S/2007/584, pages 78 and 82

[51] UN Register of Conventional Arms for 2003 and Moscow Defence Brief, 1/2005

[52] Moscow Defence Brief 1/2006; for background see Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2001-2002 – reprinted in Amnesty International, Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur, 16 November 2004, AI Index: AFR 54/139/2004 - pp. 13; “Arzamas BTR-80A APC”, Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 June 2004. Also see: Jane’s Armour and Artillery, 2003-2004, pp. 520;

[53] Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2003-2004, pp. 782

[54] UN Register of Conventional Arms, Trade in Large Calibre Artillery Systems (Category III), 2002,; UN Register of Conventional Arms, 2003,$FILE/sg58.203.pdf.

[55] Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, 1995-96, pp. 188

[56] Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, 1995-96, pp.38. These could also have been made in Bulgaria, Czech Rep. Slovakia, Poland, Romanian and the former Yugoslavia.

[57] Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2003-2004, pp. 889.

[58] Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2003-2004, pp. 854; and

[59] Deployment of artillery in Darfur was reported by the UN Panel in October 2007 S/2007/584

[60] Sudan Tribune 3 September 2007.

[61] UN Panel report October 2007, paragraph 135.

[62] Interim report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005) concerning the Sudan, submitted pursuant to resolution 1713 (2006), April 2007, p.14 Fig. 2.

[63] “Swiss government summons Chad ambassador after Swiss”;; “Swiss Kerfuffle Over Chad’s Use of Pilatus Aircraft”, Defense Industry Daily, 23 January 2008.

[64] “Swiss Kerfuffle Over Chad’s Use of Pilatus Aircraft”, Defence Industry Daily, 23 January 2008.

[65] “Les frères Erdimi à l'offensive...”, La Lettre du Continent, 29 September 2006.



[68] Email from Sabiex to International Peace Information Service on 4 July 2007. “Vu la confidentialité due à nos clients, laquelle est par ailleurs toujours partie intégrante de tous nos contrats de vente, Sabiex a pour politique de ne jamais ni confirmé ni infirmer ce genre de rumeurs” [Translation - “In light of confidentiality supplied to our clients, which is an integral part of all our sales contracts, Sabiex' policy is not to confirm nor deny such rumours.”]


[70] “Munitions libyennes pour le Tchad via l'armée française”, Le Point, 07/02/2008.

[71] “Tchad : la France reconnaît avoir acheminé des munitions libyennes”, AFP, 14/02/2008.

[72] UN Comtrade Data 2006

[73] Either from French manufacturer, Manurhin Equipment, which now ostensibly only makes small arms ammunition manufacturing equipment, not ammunition itself, or manufactured in 2000 by Euro Impact which was the ammunition division of the French Government-owned Giat Industries (now Nexter); see the company website last accessed 4 June 2008; Arrêté du 18 décembre 2006 autorisant la société GIAT Industries à prendre ou à augmenter des participations au capital de sociétés (

In July 2008, a BBC Television report presented evidence of Chinese army trucks and several A5 Fantan fighter planes in Darfur. In February 2008, Fantan fighter planes were used to bomb the town of Beybey in Darfur in which a number of civilians were reportedly killed. In June 2008, the BBC acquired satellite photographs of two Fantan fighter planes at Nyala airport in South Darfur. 17
New Chinese Tanks in Sudan
by James Dunnigan
March 5, 2008

Chinese Type 96 (also called Type 88C) tanks were spotted in Sudan since last year, indicating that China has exported one of its most modern tanks to Africa. The 50 ton Type 96 has three man crews and modern sensors and electronics. The 90 series tanks are Chinese designs, and there appear to be as many as 2500 Type 90 series tanks in service, with as many as two thirds of them Type 96s. There are another 700 Type 79s and 80s, both of which were stepping stones to the 90 series. Most Chinese tanks, about 5,000, are Type 59s. Most of these have been upgraded from being a clone of the Russian T-54 to T-54 clones equipped with Western guns (copy of the British L7 105mm gun, firing depleted uranium shells) and modern electronics. China also has a copy of the German 120mm gun, which it may try to install in some Type 59 upgrades. Those Type 59s that don't get upgraded are being scrapped. This apparently means that the Type 59 force will shrink by at least several hundred tanks a year until all are gone.

Sudan has, until recently, had a tank force consisting mostly of about 200 Chinese Type 59s, but some of these appear to have been upgraded by the Chinese. Also spotted in Sudan have been Chinese Type 92 wheeled infantry fighting vehicle (similar to the U.S. Stryker).

China is very strict about keeping information on its tank force secret. The most modern tanks they have are the Type 98 and 99, which come close to matching early models of the U.S. M-1.
China, Angola sets up strategic partnership
09:35, November 20, 2010

Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping (R) shakes hands with Angola's Vice President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos during their meeting in Luanda, capital of Angola, Nov. 19, 2010. (Xinhua/Pang Xinglei)

Visiting Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping said here in Luanda on Friday that China and Angola would, during his visit, publish a join declaration on establishing strategic partnership between the two countries.

Xi made the remarks when holding talks with Angolan Vice President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, saying that this symbolizes a new stage for the relationship between China and Angola, according to a press release issued by the Chinese delegation.

After the talks, the two leaders witnessed a ceremony for signing seven inter-governmental cooperation agreements, covering economic technology, energy, mining, agriculture and finance.

During the talks, Xi lauded the energetic development of China and Angola's bilateral relations.

During the first nine months of this year, the bilateral trade volume increased by 80.8 percent over the same period of last year, hitting a record high.

Looking ahead, Xi also put forward a four-point proposal to further boost bilateral strategic partnership, including enhancing political trust, pushing forward substantial cooperation, expanding people-to-people and cultural exchange, and strengthening coordination in the international arena.

The Angolan vice president said that the Angola-China cooperation had not only contributed to Angola's economic reconstruction and people's lives, but also helped meet the needs for China's economy and energy consumption.

He said Angola is willing to elevate its relations with China in a comprehensive manner, according to the press release.

Source: Xinhua

While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China.

But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.

China wants a grip on the region to assure unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan.

Many of the P.L.A. soldiers entering Gilgit-Baltistan are expected to work on the railroad. Some are extending the Karakoram Highway, built to link China’s Sinkiang Province with Pakistan. Others are working on dams, expressways and other projects.

Mystery surrounds the construction of 22 tunnels in secret locations where Pakistanis are barred. Tunnels would be necessary for a projected gas pipeline from Iran to China that would cross the Himalayas through Gilgit. But they could also be used for missile storage sites.