CIA Director Petraeus - Info not in Talking Points
1. The attack on the US consulate in Benghazi was to avenge the death of Abu Yaya al-Libi, al-Qaeda’s second in command.
“It was a flash mob with weapons,” is how the senior official described the attackers. The mob included members of the Ansar al-Sharia militia, about four members of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and members of the Egypt-based Muhammad Jamal network, along with other unarmed looters"
Oct 20, 2012 • By STEPHEN F. HAYES
The Times story is almost certainly wrong and the central part of the Ignatius "scoop" isn't a scoop at all. We'll start there.
David Ignatius, a reporter's columnist with excellent sources in the Obama administration and the intelligence community, reports: "Talking points" prepared by the CIA on Sept. 15, the same day that Rice taped three television appearances, support her description of the Sept 11 attack on the U.S. consulate as a reaction to the Arab anger about an anti-Muslim video prepared in the United States. According to the CIA account, "The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the US consulate and subsequently into its annex. There are indications that extremists participated in the violent demonstrations."
"For eight days after the attacks on the US consulate in Benghazi, government officials said the attacks were a spontaneous reaction to an anti-Islam film. Now that officials have acknowledged they were a premeditated act of terrorism, the question some members of Congress are trying to answer is why it took so long for the truth to come out. Unclassified documents from the Central Intelligence Agency suggest the answer may have to do with so-called talking points written by the CIA and distributed to members of Congress and other government officials, including Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to the United Nations. The documents, distributed three days after the attacks that killed Ambassador Chris Stevens, said the events were spontaneous."
Those inside the compound heard gunfire at 9:40 p.m. local time and within minutes the compound was under siege. Surveillance photos and videos taken in the hours before the attack give no indication of a protest. And one CIA official tells Ignatius that it would have been better to substitute "opportunistic" for "spontaneous" since there was "some pre-coordination but minimal planning."
Which leads us to the claims in the Los Angeles Times article that ran under the heading: "No evidence found of al Qaeda role in Libya attack." That story begins: "The assault on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi last month appears to have been an opportunistic attack rather than a long-planned operation and intelligence agencies have found no evidence that it was ordered by al Qaeda, according to US officials and witnesses interviewed in Libya."
Indeed, as Eli Lake reported three weeks ago: "In the hours following the 9/11 anniversary attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, Libya, US intelligence agencies monitored communications from jihadists affiliated with the group that led the attack and members of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the group's north African affiliate."
CIA documents supported Susan Rice’s description of Benghazi attacks
By , Washington Post
“Talking points” prepared by the CIA on Sept. 15, the same day that Rice taped three television appearances, support her description of the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate as a reaction to Arab anger about an anti-Muslim video prepared in the United States. According to the CIA account, “The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. Consulate and subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists participated in the violent demonstrations.” .com
“It was a flash mob with weapons,” is how the senior official described the attackers. The mob included members of the Ansar al-Sharia militia, about four members of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and members of the Egypt-based Muhammad Jamal network, along with other unarmed looters"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/benghazi-attack-becomes-political-ammunition/2012/10/19/e1ad82ae-1a2d-11e2-bd10-5ff056538b7c_story.html
That memo raises more serious questions about the cover-up than it answers and does not provide cover for Obama.
The information that they supposedly relied on for the memo was an intercept involving an Al Qaida operative. That Al Qaida connection was left out of the memo. More importantly, we know that the CIA knew the day after the attack that it was a terrorist attack and Al Qaida was involved.
So why is the administration and CIA circulating the Talking Points memo, which goes to Capitol Hill, on the 15th?
This looks more than anything like they were intentional deceiving Congress. Rice/Obama/Ignatius might have had a point if the memo were released on 12th. However, the release of of a memo on the 15th, to Congress, containing assertions everyone in the intelligence community knew to be false, raises the questions of who wrote the memo and who approved it.
Obama himself has now claimed he called it a terrorist attack on the 12th. In any event, we know that was the conclusion of the intelligence community on the 12th. So why was he having the CIA lie to Congress on the 15th?
The attack on the U.S. consulate was a planned terrorist assault against U.S. and Libyan interests
Take U.S. Consulate in Retaliation for Abu Yaya Al-Libbi
Quilliam, a counter-extremism think tank in London with strong ties to Libya, issued the following press release this afternoon:
The military assault against the US Consulate in Benghazi should not be seen as part of a protest against a low budget film which was insulting Islam – there were just a few peaceful protesters present at the event. Indeed, there have been no other demonstrations regarding this film in Libya.
We at Quilliam believe the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi was a well planned terrorist attack that would have occurred regardless of the demonstration, to serve another purpose. According to information obtained by Quilliam – from foreign sources and from within Benghazi – we have reason to believe that the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi came to avenge the death of Abu Yaya al-Libi, al-Qaeda’s second in command killed a few months ago.
The reasons for this are as follows:
The weak security environment in Libya including in Benghazi and the failure of the government to project its power outside of the capital have been used as a cover for the attack.
- 24 hours before this attack, none other than the leader of al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, released a video on Jihadist forums to mark the anniversary of 9/11. In this video, Zawahiri acknowledged the death of his second in command Abu Yahya and urged Libyans to avenge his killing.
- According to our sources, the attack was the work of roughly 20 militants, prepared for a military assault – it is rare that an RPG7 is present at a peaceful protest.
- According to our sources, the attack against the Consulate had two waves. The first attack led to US officials being evacuated from the consulate by Libyan security forces, only for the second wave to be launched against US officials after they were kept in a secure location.
The failure to rebuild the defence and security sector, in an accountable, professional and responsible manner will only further the likelihood of such attacks in the future. Attacks in Benghazi are not new – the Red Cross has been attacked multiple times in previous months, as have the US consulate and also the UK Ambassador, and such security lapses encourage attacks. The International Community must take the challenge of not allowing extremist elements to hijack the Arab Uprisings very seriously, by renewing their focus on civic and governance responses to check the efforts of Islamist extremists attempting to exploit the inevitable security vacuum.
Noman Benotman, President of Quilliam says:
“These are acts committed by uncontrollable jihadist groups. We hope Libya will seize this opportunity to revive its policy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) in order to facilitate an end to the spread of such attacks, with the help of the International Community. We hope that the International Community, including NATO member states and especially the US, will continue their excellent work in Libya which began with the overthrow of the dictator Gaddafi after 42 years in power.”
http://warincontext.org/2012/09/12/the-attack-on-the-u-s-consulate-was-a-planned-terrorist-assault-against-u-s-and-libyan-interests/
The third new finding in the documentary is the explicit threat to attack the consulate to retaliate for the U.S. killing of a local al-Qaeda big shot. That comes at about the 3:53 mark. The threat aired in June. Its title: “Take U.S. Consulate in Retaliation for Abu Yaya Al-Libbi.”
As the security situation worsened, Ambassador Stevens puts up a brave face as you’ll see in the documentary, talking about education and health care to the press in the newly free Libya, while downplaying the increasing security threat and appealing to the average Libyan’s desire to be free. Behind the scenes, he and his security officers repeatedly asked the State Department for more help. We don’t know if sending more security to Benghazi would have kept him alive. We do know that the terrorists probed security with lower scale attacks in the summer and got no American response, and we do know what they did with that intelligence.
We also know what President Obama was doing with his intelligence in the weeks leading up to the attacks: He was paying little or no attention to it. He had it delivered to his iPad and…that’s all we know. He had attended fewer than half of his Presidential Daily Briefings in 2012 prior to the Benghazi and Cairo attacks.
What Did the CIA Know and When Did It Stop Knowing It?
Written by:Diana West 10/20/2012
Yesterday, we learned specifically that the CIA station chief in Tripoli reported to Washington within 24 hours that the consulate attack was executed by terrorists and was not a spontaneous demonstration over a video that turned violent. The President, of course, would continue to weave a narrative blaming the video for two more weeks, hitting that narrative's climax in his UN address on September 25. Citing the video six times in his address, Obama declared: "The future must not belong to those who slander the prophet of Islam." It seems clear that the video, not the jihad, simply had to be driver in all of the 9/11/12 Islamic rampaging or else Obama's big pitch for the Islamic anti-"blasphemy" movement wouldn't have been, even in his world, feasible.
We now know there was no demonstration in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. And we know also that this fact was apparent to the State Department in real time.
Another thing we know -- helpfully pointed out by the AP, I must add -- is that the Obama administration has a history of downplaying terrorist attacks on its watch. Regarding the Benghazi controversy, AP reports:
Obama has weathered similar criticisms before. After both the failed bombing of a U.S.-bound airliner on Christmas Day 2009 and the attempted car bombing in Times Square in 2010, the Obama administration initially said there were no indications of wider terrorist plots. The Christmas Day bomber turned out to be linked to al-Qaida and the Times Square bomber was trained by the Pakistani Taliban.
Since Benghazi has become a resonating campaign issue for Romney-Ryan, Obama's pivot is much more difficult this time. A concerted effort seems to be underway to power that pivot on faulty or, maybe better, conflicting intelligence. Sure enough, David Ignatius brings us CIA pushback today in his WaPo column headlined online: "CIA documents support Susan Rice's description of Benghazi attacks".
These documents, "provided by a senior US intelligence official," include "talking points" prepared by the agency on September 15, the day Susan Rice taped her notorious Sunday TV talk show appearances. Ignatius writes that they
support her [Rice's] description of the Sept. 11 attack on the U.S. Consulate as a reaction to Arab anger about an anti-Muslim video prepared in the United States. According to the CIA account, "The currently available information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. Consulate and subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists participated in the violent demonstrations."
To repeat, there were no demonstrations in Benghazi -- known by State in real time -- so either somebody got something so wrong they should be fired, or somebody inserted into the intell something so wrong they should be fired. The column now begins to wiggle:
The senior intelligence official said the analysts’ judgment was based in part on monitoring of some of the Benghazi attackers, which showed they had been watching the Cairo protests live on television and talking about them before they assaulted the consulate.
So, the "attackers" -- not terrorists, not militants, not even evil-doers -- weren't protesting outside the US consulate, they were watching protests on TV. How did that get turned into protests outside the consulate?
"We believe the timing of the attack was influenced by events in Cairo," the senior official said, reaffirming the Cairo-Benghazi link. He said that judgment is repeated in a new report prepared this week for the House intelligence committee.
Sounds as if this senior intell official is digging in for the duration (until new intelligence emerges or Election Day, whichever comes first). Ignatius continues:
Here’s how the senior official described the jumble of events in Benghazi that day: "The attackers were disorganized; some seemed more interested in looting. Some who claimed to have participated joined the attack as it began or after it was under way. There is no evidence of rehearsals, they never got into the safe room . . . never took any hostages, didn’t bring explosives to blow the safe room door, and didn’t use a car bomb to blow the gates."
This shines a flare onto another unresolved question. Without a car bomb to blow the gates, how, pray tell, did the "attackers" start "flowing into the compound," as the signal State Department background briefer put it on October 9? Could "bad apples" in the February 17 Martyrs Brigade stationed inside the compound have opened the gates? This October 9 briefing is also where the American peoples learned definitively that all was quiet on the Benghazi front until 9:40 pm -- almost exactly one month after the attack.
Ignatius:
The political debate has focused on whether the attack was spontaneous or planned, but the official said there’s evidence of both, and that different attackers may have had different motives.
The intell official admits to having evidence the attack was "planned"? Later, he casually slips in that this "flash mob with weapons" -- RPGs, mortars -- "included members of the Ansar al Sharia militia, about four members of al Qaeda in the Mahgeb, and members of the Egyptian Muhammd Jamal network, along with other unarmed looters."
Big news, buried, about what is now retro-described as the act of terror Obama supposedly always said it was. Ignatius writes:
There’s no dispute, however, that it was "an act of terror," as Obama described it the next day.
Reality check #1: The phrase "acts" -- plural -- "of terror" crossed Obama's lips in his famous Rose Garden remarks but he was in no way describing or explaining to the American people that what happened in Benghazi was more of the same jihad terrorism the US has been experiencing for more than a decade. As the days and weeks went by, it was all about the video.
Reality check #2: On September 14, ABC established that a bifurcated narrative was emerging from different wings of the administration. On the one hand, CIA Director David Petraeus was putting out the (non-existent) protest story; on the other hand, the Pentagon was already talking terrorist attack.
(Worth tucking away as background from an earlier Ignatius column is that the CIA Director "is also said to have pushed hard in Libya, rushing case officers there to work with the opposition" -- a.k.a. al Qaeda.)
ABC reported:
The attack that killed four Americans in the Libyan consulate began as a spontaneous protest against the film "The Innocence of Muslims," but Islamic militants who may have links to Al Qaeda used the opportunity to launch an attack, CIA Director David Petreaus told the House Intelligence Committee today according to one lawmaker who attended a closed-door briefing.
Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger, the top Democrat on the House Intel committee, said Petraeus laid out "a chronological order exactly what we felt happened, how it happened, and where we’re going in the future."
"In the Benghazi area, in the beginning we feel that it was spontaneous – the protest- because it went on for two or three hours, which is very relevant because if it was something that was planned, then they could have come and attacked right away," Ruppersberger, D-Md., said following the hour-long briefing by Petraeus. "At this point it looks as if there was a spontaneous situation that occurred and that as a result of that, the extreme groups that were probably connected to al Qaeda took advantage of that situation and then the attack started."
This is key. On September 14, the top Democrat on the Intell Committee comes out of the Petraeus briefing and tells the press the Benghazi "protest" went on for two or three hours, and how very important that protest was to the conclusion that this was a "spontaneous" attack.
This is the same Petraeus briefing, Fox New reported, that some members found "shocking" given that they saw the intelligence pointing not to a "spontaneous" movie-riot but to a planned terrorist attack.
Today, Ignatius's source isn't talking about that protest lasting "two or three hours" anymore; all of that, presto, is forgotten. Instead, he says the "attackers" watched protests on TV -- which is, gosh, practically the same thing. In fact, the official adds that "the only major change he would make now in the CIA's September 15 talking points would be to drop the word `spontaneous' and substitute "opportunistic.' He explained there was `some pre-coordination but minimal planning.' "
Nice manipulation of facts, perception and language. If no protest took place -- which neither Ignatius nor the intell official ever frankly addresses -- what opportunity were those pre-coordinating but minimally planning members of Ansar al-Sharia, AQIM, and the Egypt-based Muhammad Jamal network being "opportunistic" and not "spontaneous" about?
Ignatius: "One obvious lesson is that the United States could use much better real-time intelligence from places such as Libya." Or, next time, call the State Department.
Now back to September 14 when Petraeus briefed the Intell Committee about that protest lasting "two or three hours," according to Rep. Ruppersburger, "shocking" some members who thought the evidence supported the conclusion that the US had suffered a terrorist attack. The Pentagon, meanwhile, apparently offered a completely different brief.
Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee were also briefed today by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs Admiral James Winnefeld. But senators emerging from that private briefing reported that they believed the attack in Libya was premeditated.
"It was a terrorist attack organized and carried out by terrorists," Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., the top Republican on the committee said, adding that about 15 "al Qaeda or radical Islamists" were armed with rocket propelled grenades and other lethal weapons.
"This was a calculated act of terror on the part of a small group of jihadists, not a mob that somehow attacked and sacked our embassy," McCain said. "People don’t go to demonstrate and carry RPGs and automatic weapons."
"I don’t think any of us are clear yet about who carried out these attacks in Libya, but from all that I’ve heard the murderous attacks on Libya that resulted in the death of four Americans were not accidental," Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., added. "They were not just some kind of coincidental protests to this film, this anti-Muslim film. They were a well-planned and professional terrorist attack against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi."
That Obama adminstration sure spoke with a forked tongue. It's time for CIA Director Petraeus to be asked why.
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On Thursday, Senator Dianne Feinstein, the California Democrat who leads the intelligence committee, said talking points put out by Clapper may have contributed to the shifting commentary on Benghazi.
When asked why the U.S. government initially played down the role of Islamic militants in the assault, she told KCBS-TV: "I think what happened was the director of intelligence, who is a very good individual, put out some speaking points on the initial intelligence assessment. I think that was possibly a mistake."
U.S. intelligence analysts summarized intelligence about the attack for public consumption in a Sept. 15 document circulated to U.S. policymakers and members of Congress.
The language in the public summary was virtually identical to language in a classified intelligence report circulated on Sept. 12, according to multiple U.S. government sources familiar with the matter. The secret document, however, reported that the extremists in question had possible links to al Qaeda - a point the unclassified document omitted.
White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said both assessments were prepared by members of the intelligence community and referred questions to them.
Al Qaeda's plan for Libya highlighted in congressional report
An unclassified report published in August highlights al Qaeda's strategy for building a fully operational network in Libya. The report ("Al Qaeda in Libya: A Profile") was prepared by the federal research division of the Library of Congress (LOC) under an agreement with the Defense Department's Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office.
Al Qaeda's senior leadership (AQSL) in Pakistan has overseen the effort. AQSL "issued strategic guidance to followers in Libya and elsewhere to take advantage of the Libyan rebellion," the report reads. AQSL ordered its followers to "gather weapons," "establish training camps," "build a network in secret," "establish an Islamic state," and "institute sharia" law in Libya.
Each part of this strategy is being implemented, and al Qaeda's plan has advanced to the final stages. The three conceptual phases of an al Qaeda affiliate's development are outlined in a chart prepared by the US military and shown here.
The chart shows that, according to the US military, al Qaeda's operatives in Libya have already completed many of the tasks set forth by AQSL.
"AQSL in Pakistan dispatched trusted senior operatives as emissaries and leaders who could supervise building a network," the report notes. They have been successful in establishing "a core network in Libya," but they still act clandestinely and refrain from using the al Qaeda name.
The report finds that al Qaeda "will likely continue to mask its presence under the umbrella of the Libyan Salafist movement, with which it shares a radical ideology and a general intent to implement sharia in Libya and elsewhere."
Senior terrorists and others involved in effort
Al Qaeda's emir, Ayman al Zawahiri, has overseen the effort to establish a robust presence in Libya. Other senior al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan have also been involved. Abu Yahya al Liba and Atiyah Abd al Rahman, two top al Qaeda operatives who have been killed in drone strikes, helped guide the project prior to their demise. Some al Qaeda operatives have been tasked with taking over, or forming, katibas -- or fighting battalions. Others oversee al Qaeda's project and coordinate with senior leaders operating elsewhere.
The following al Qaeda operatives in Libya, as well as other suspected al Qaeda-affiliated individuals, are identified by name in the report:
Abu Anas al Libi is described as the "builder of al Qaeda's network in Libya." Other names listed for him include 'Abd al Hamid al Ruqhay, Anas a Suba, and Nazih 'Abd al Hamid al Rughi. Abu Anas was raised in Tripoli and moved to Afghanistan in the late 1980s, then followed al Qaeda to Sudan in the 1990s. He is "believed to have met Osama bin Laden." In the late 1990s, Abu Anas "was granted asylum in Britain...but fled that country in 1999 to avoid arrest when he was convicted by an American court in relation to the 1998 terrorist attacks against US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam." He is an "al Qaeda-trained intelligence specialist" and "well trained in operational security."
Abu Anas is "most likely involved in al Qaeda strategic planning and coordination between AQSL and Libyan Islamist militias who adhere to al Qaeda's ideology." Abu Anas and his fellow al Qaeda operatives "have been conducting consultations with AQSL in Afghanistan and Pakistan about announcing the presence of a branch of the organization that will be led by returnees from Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, and by leading figures from the former LIFG." (The LIFG refers to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an al Qaeda-linked jihadist group formed in Libya in the 1990s.)
The report says that "intense communications" from AQSL in Pakistan are passed through Abu Anas in Libya.
Abd al Baset Azzouz was sent to Libya by Zawahiri and has been close to al Qaeda's leader "since 1980 and first visited Afghanistan in the 1990s to join the mujahedin fight against the Soviet occupation." Azzouz "has been operating at least one training center" and "sent some of his estimated 300 men to Brega to make contact with other militant Islamist groups farther west."
Sufyan ben Qumu is a former Guantanamo detainee who has been tasked with training militia fighters. According to other published accounts, Qumu leads a brigade named Ansar al Sharia, but that is also the name of al Qaeda's umbrella organization in Libya. Qumu was transferred from Guantanamo to Libya in 2007 and set free in 2010 as part of a general amnesty deal the Qaddafi government granted Islamists and jihadists.
Qumu has denied any links to al Qaeda in interviews with the press. However, the authors of "Al Qaeda in Libya" say the Ansar al Sharia battalion led by Qumu "has increasingly embodied al Qaeda's presence in Libya, as indicated by its active social-media propaganda, extremist discourse, and hatred of the West, especially the United States." Qumu has led a campaign of targeted assassinations, including against those opposed to al Qaeda.
Qumu is reportedly suspected of involvement in the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012.
Hafiz al-'Aghuri (aka Hayaka Alla) is "a close ally of Wisam Ben Hamid," and co-leader of Katiba Dir' Libya. Sitting in front of an al Qaeda flag, al-'Aghuri recorded a video in which he rebutted the Libyan government's claim that his battalion is insignificant, saying that "Dir' Libya has secured the southeast border with Chad and Egypt without asking anything from the government."
Wisam Ben Hamid "is a young rebel leader who allegedly fought in Iraq." Two brigades, Katiba al-A'hrar Libya and Katiba Dir' Libya, are reportedly under his control and both of them are "involved in postrevolutionary militia fighting in the Qaddafi stronghold Sirt and in Kufra in southeast Libya." Ben Hamid "has been cited as one of the possible leaders of al Qaeda in Libya even though it is unlikely, given his prominence in the media, which contradicts AQSL's usual penchant for secrecy."
Abu Jandal al Libi is described as an al Qaeda "adherent" and "Libyan rebel." Not much is known about Abu Jandal, but he sought guidance from al Qaeda's legal forum. An al Qaeda theorist known as Abou Mouslim al Djazairi responded to Abu Jandal's query, issuing a fatwa that he and his allies should secretly "form an organization bringing together sincere and loyal people" and should split from the Transitional National Council, which has "embroiled itself as well as all Libya in the swamp of servitude to the Crusaders."
Ahmad Abu al Rashid (real name Nauri Husayn) fought in Yemen but has returned to Libya, via Somalia and Sudan. He is described as one of a group of "jihadist Salafists upholding al Qaeda ideology in Libya." Jihadists "such as Abu al Rashid indeed control militias composed of hundreds of people," the report reads. Abu al Rashid is among the "returnees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as elements of the former LIFG" who are "preparing to announce their presence after the conclusion of consultations with AQSL."
Ansar al Sharia and the militias
The leaders listed above likely constitute a small fraction of al Qaeda's overall presence in Libya. Citing media reports, the authors of "Al Qaeda in Libya" note that "a few hundred al Qaeda members must currently be operating in Libya." The report continues by observing that "most of them are likely connected with three katibas -- Ansar al-Sharia in Darnah, al-A'hrar Libya in Sirt, and Dir' Libya in Kufra."
These three katibas are just the most conspicuous, however, because of "their radical rhetoric and allegiance to the black flag, which symbolizes the commitment to al Qaeda-type militant jihad."
In addition, the name Ansar al Sharia is used by multiple groups inside Libya. It is not just the name of individual battalions, but also may be al Qaeda's new overall brand in Libya. Ansar al Sharia is being used by al Qaeda in Yemen, Tunisia and elsewhere to rebrand itself as an organization that represents true Islamic law. For example, the emir of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al Wuhayshi, is also the emir of Ansar al Sharia Yemen.
The various Ansar al Sharia branches have their own social media sites, including in some cases Facebook pages. Their digital presences, while containing some differences, are also eerily similar. Much of the content and branding is the same, and they all praise senior al Qaeda leaders.
The three battalions identified in the report as most likely affiliated with al Qaeda are just the "tip of the iceberg." In June 2012, Ansar al Sharia "staged a large-scale rally and military show of force involving dozens of military vehicles, with Islamists wearing the Afghan mujahidin's traditional outfit." The rally included "a parade in which some 30 battalions" from various Libyan towns participated "in the first meeting in support of sharia in Benghazi."
In all, 15 militias attended the Ansar al Sharia rally. It is not clear how many are firmly within al Qaeda's orbit, allied with the group, or otherwise positioned. Even if some of these militias are not staunchly allied with al Qaeda currently, they may cooperate or be co-opted by the group in the future.
"Al Qaeda in Libya" contains graphic evidence that al Qaeda-affiliated battalions have already acquired heavy armaments, including mobile rocket launchers and self-propelled antiaircraft guns. As al Qaeda's clandestine network continues to acquire arms, the group will have more firepower with which it can target any dissenters, as well as the shaky Libyan government.
Al Qaeda is doing its best to destabilize the new post-Qaddafi government, seeing an opening to inculcate its radical ideology and organization during a time of uncertain transition. Al Qaeda is also exploiting tribal and ethnic conflicts, using them to "build alliances and support, especially in the south, where Arab tribes are fighting the Tubu (Tebu) African minority that straddles the Libya-Chad border." One of the al Qaeda-connected battalions, Dir' Libya, is fighting alongside the Arab tribes against the Tubu.
Connections to other al Qaeda franchises
Al Qaeda's growing presence in Libya is not self-contained, but instead part of an international network. Al Qaeda operatives in Libya work with their counterparts in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a known al Qaeda affiliate, and other parties throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
Al Qaeda's "clandestine network in Libya will probably continue to provide critical support to AQIM," the report reads, "especially with regard to arms procurement and safe passage of militants, which are essential to sustain AQIM's war in northern Mali."
The report's authors warn that Libya "may already have become the favorite destination for would-be jihadists in Syria." Recruits from north Africa and Europe "are increasingly crossing Libya's borders on their way to Syria, probably with the blessing of the current Libyan government." Libya has long been tied to the jihadist network in Syria, as many of the al Qaeda fighters who transited through Syria to fight the US-led coalition in Iraq came from eastern Libya.
Although al Qaeda did not bring the Arab Spring, the terrorist group is seeking to capitalize on it. Al Qaeda "has tried to exploit the 'Arab Awakening' in North Africa for its own purposes during the past year," the report reads.
A clandestine network in Libya is just part of AQSL's plan.
Each part of this strategy is being implemented, and al Qaeda's plan has advanced to the final stages. The three conceptual phases of an al Qaeda affiliate's development are outlined in a chart prepared by the US military and shown here.
"AQSL in Pakistan dispatched trusted senior operatives as emissaries and leaders who could supervise building a network," the report notes. They have been successful in establishing "a core network in Libya," but they still act clandestinely and refrain from using the al Qaeda name.
The report finds that al Qaeda "will likely continue to mask its presence under the umbrella of the Libyan Salafist movement, with which it shares a radical ideology and a general intent to implement sharia in Libya and elsewhere."
Senior terrorists and others involved in effort
Al Qaeda's emir, Ayman al Zawahiri, has overseen the effort to establish a robust presence in Libya. Other senior al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan have also been involved. Abu Yahya al Liba and Atiyah Abd al Rahman, two top al Qaeda operatives who have been killed in drone strikes, helped guide the project prior to their demise. Some al Qaeda operatives have been tasked with taking over, or forming, katibas -- or fighting battalions. Others oversee al Qaeda's project and coordinate with senior leaders operating elsewhere.
The following al Qaeda operatives in Libya, as well as other suspected al Qaeda-affiliated individuals, are identified by name in the report:
Abu Anas is "most likely involved in al Qaeda strategic planning and coordination between AQSL and Libyan Islamist militias who adhere to al Qaeda's ideology." Abu Anas and his fellow al Qaeda operatives "have been conducting consultations with AQSL in Afghanistan and Pakistan about announcing the presence of a branch of the organization that will be led by returnees from Iraq, Yemen, and Afghanistan, and by leading figures from the former LIFG." (The LIFG refers to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an al Qaeda-linked jihadist group formed in Libya in the 1990s.)
The report says that "intense communications" from AQSL in Pakistan are passed through Abu Anas in Libya.
Abd al Baset Azzouz was sent to Libya by Zawahiri and has been close to al Qaeda's leader "since 1980 and first visited Afghanistan in the 1990s to join the mujahedin fight against the Soviet occupation." Azzouz "has been operating at least one training center" and "sent some of his estimated 300 men to Brega to make contact with other militant Islamist groups farther west."
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Sufyan ben Qumu.
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Qumu has denied any links to al Qaeda in interviews with the press. However, the authors of "Al Qaeda in Libya" say the Ansar al Sharia battalion led by Qumu "has increasingly embodied al Qaeda's presence in Libya, as indicated by its active social-media propaganda, extremist discourse, and hatred of the West, especially the United States." Qumu has led a campaign of targeted assassinations, including against those opposed to al Qaeda.
Qumu is reportedly suspected of involvement in the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi on Sept. 11, 2012.
Hafiz al-'Aghuri (aka Hayaka Alla) is "a close ally of Wisam Ben Hamid," and co-leader of Katiba Dir' Libya. Sitting in front of an al Qaeda flag, al-'Aghuri recorded a video in which he rebutted the Libyan government's claim that his battalion is insignificant, saying that "Dir' Libya has secured the southeast border with Chad and Egypt without asking anything from the government."
Wisam Ben Hamid "is a young rebel leader who allegedly fought in Iraq." Two brigades, Katiba al-A'hrar Libya and Katiba Dir' Libya, are reportedly under his control and both of them are "involved in postrevolutionary militia fighting in the Qaddafi stronghold Sirt and in Kufra in southeast Libya." Ben Hamid "has been cited as one of the possible leaders of al Qaeda in Libya even though it is unlikely, given his prominence in the media, which contradicts AQSL's usual penchant for secrecy."
Abu Jandal al Libi is described as an al Qaeda "adherent" and "Libyan rebel." Not much is known about Abu Jandal, but he sought guidance from al Qaeda's legal forum. An al Qaeda theorist known as Abou Mouslim al Djazairi responded to Abu Jandal's query, issuing a fatwa that he and his allies should secretly "form an organization bringing together sincere and loyal people" and should split from the Transitional National Council, which has "embroiled itself as well as all Libya in the swamp of servitude to the Crusaders."
Ahmad Abu al Rashid (real name Nauri Husayn) fought in Yemen but has returned to Libya, via Somalia and Sudan. He is described as one of a group of "jihadist Salafists upholding al Qaeda ideology in Libya." Jihadists "such as Abu al Rashid indeed control militias composed of hundreds of people," the report reads. Abu al Rashid is among the "returnees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, as well as elements of the former LIFG" who are "preparing to announce their presence after the conclusion of consultations with AQSL."
Ansar al Sharia and the militias
The leaders listed above likely constitute a small fraction of al Qaeda's overall presence in Libya. Citing media reports, the authors of "Al Qaeda in Libya" note that "a few hundred al Qaeda members must currently be operating in Libya." The report continues by observing that "most of them are likely connected with three katibas -- Ansar al-Sharia in Darnah, al-A'hrar Libya in Sirt, and Dir' Libya in Kufra."
These three katibas are just the most conspicuous, however, because of "their radical rhetoric and allegiance to the black flag, which symbolizes the commitment to al Qaeda-type militant jihad."
In addition, the name Ansar al Sharia is used by multiple groups inside Libya. It is not just the name of individual battalions, but also may be al Qaeda's new overall brand in Libya. Ansar al Sharia is being used by al Qaeda in Yemen, Tunisia and elsewhere to rebrand itself as an organization that represents true Islamic law. For example, the emir of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Nasir al Wuhayshi, is also the emir of Ansar al Sharia Yemen.
The various Ansar al Sharia branches have their own social media sites, including in some cases Facebook pages. Their digital presences, while containing some differences, are also eerily similar. Much of the content and branding is the same, and they all praise senior al Qaeda leaders.
The three battalions identified in the report as most likely affiliated with al Qaeda are just the "tip of the iceberg." In June 2012, Ansar al Sharia "staged a large-scale rally and military show of force involving dozens of military vehicles, with Islamists wearing the Afghan mujahidin's traditional outfit." The rally included "a parade in which some 30 battalions" from various Libyan towns participated "in the first meeting in support of sharia in Benghazi."
In all, 15 militias attended the Ansar al Sharia rally. It is not clear how many are firmly within al Qaeda's orbit, allied with the group, or otherwise positioned. Even if some of these militias are not staunchly allied with al Qaeda currently, they may cooperate or be co-opted by the group in the future.
"Al Qaeda in Libya" contains graphic evidence that al Qaeda-affiliated battalions have already acquired heavy armaments, including mobile rocket launchers and self-propelled antiaircraft guns. As al Qaeda's clandestine network continues to acquire arms, the group will have more firepower with which it can target any dissenters, as well as the shaky Libyan government.
Al Qaeda is doing its best to destabilize the new post-Qaddafi government, seeing an opening to inculcate its radical ideology and organization during a time of uncertain transition. Al Qaeda is also exploiting tribal and ethnic conflicts, using them to "build alliances and support, especially in the south, where Arab tribes are fighting the Tubu (Tebu) African minority that straddles the Libya-Chad border." One of the al Qaeda-connected battalions, Dir' Libya, is fighting alongside the Arab tribes against the Tubu.
Connections to other al Qaeda franchises
Al Qaeda's growing presence in Libya is not self-contained, but instead part of an international network. Al Qaeda operatives in Libya work with their counterparts in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a known al Qaeda affiliate, and other parties throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
Al Qaeda's "clandestine network in Libya will probably continue to provide critical support to AQIM," the report reads, "especially with regard to arms procurement and safe passage of militants, which are essential to sustain AQIM's war in northern Mali."
The report's authors warn that Libya "may already have become the favorite destination for would-be jihadists in Syria." Recruits from north Africa and Europe "are increasingly crossing Libya's borders on their way to Syria, probably with the blessing of the current Libyan government." Libya has long been tied to the jihadist network in Syria, as many of the al Qaeda fighters who transited through Syria to fight the US-led coalition in Iraq came from eastern Libya.
Although al Qaeda did not bring the Arab Spring, the terrorist group is seeking to capitalize on it. Al Qaeda "has tried to exploit the 'Arab Awakening' in North Africa for its own purposes during the past year," the report reads.
A clandestine network in Libya is just part of AQSL's plan.
October 8, 2012
Pre-Benghazi Attack Pentagon Report: Al Qaeda Jihadists Significant Threat to Libya
The Pentagon knew how significant the jihadist threat in Libya was, prior to the terror attack that took four lives. The nonpareil national security investigative reporter Bill Gertz brings to our attention an internal 54 pp. Pentagon report obtained by the Washington Free Beacon:
"AL-QAEDA IN LIBYA: A PROFILE-A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency Agreement with the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office's Irregular Warfare Support Program, August, 2012."Prepared and issued before the murderous 9/11/12 attacks, which left 4 dead-the US ambassador Chris Stevens, two former US Navy Seals (Glenn Doherty and Tyrone Woods), and a US Air Force veteran (Sean Smith)-the report emphasized how Al Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL), working via a large, powerful, and well-established jihadist infrastructure in Libya, sought to capitalize on the US and NATO-supported insurrection which toppled the Libyan despot Qaddafi, and fulfill its goal of making Libya part of an eventual transnational caliphate.
Libyan Jihadists Per Capita and by Hometowns as of 2005 During the Iraq War
The report highlighted an ominous July, 2012 public jihadist rally, while emphasizing, with resigned sobriety, how such jiadist/Al-Qaeda discourse resonates with a significant swath of the Libyan populationIn June 2012, Ansar al-Sharia staged a large-scale rally and military show of force involving dozens of military vehicles, with Islamists wearing the Afghan mujahidin's traditional outfit. Some leaders described themselves as Islamists and called for implementation of sharia similar to that which the Taliban had implemented in Afghanistan or al-Qaeda in Somalia and Yemen. The military show of force consisted of a parade in which some 30 battalions from Benghazi, Darnah, Misrata, Al-Nufilyah, Ajdabiyah, and other Libyan towns took part in the first meeting in support of sharia in Benghazi. Islamist leaders pointed out that the aim of the military parade was to terrorize (Arabic: irhab) those who do not want to be judged by God's law. Islamist leaders urged the Transitional National Council to clarify the identity of the state as Islamic or secular. Such a system of local affiliates might use neighborhood mosques as a support infrastructure for a religious and popular movement that could frighten politicians attempting to run on a moderate Islamic platform. ...A weak Islamist-dominated central government is unlikelyto confront such a radical movement, at least in the short term. The minister of religious affairs expressed his government's weakness when he lamented the "hijacking" of mosques by extremist imams imposed by militiamen. Two of these local Islamist-oriented militias-Ansar al-Sharia and al-A'hrar Libya-are the tip of the iceberg. They broadcast typical al-Qaeda-type propaganda on the Internet, and they have adopted the black flag, which symbolizes commitment to violent jihad promoted by AQSL.The report's EXECUTIVE SUMMARY features these 10 points of emphasis, which raise serious questions about both the callous inattention to security for US diplomatic and ancillary personnel in Benghazi, as well as the abysmal failure of imagination regarding overall US policy in Libya, which has abetted the most fanatical jihadist movement extant -- Al Qaeda itself.
AQSL's discourse may attract a sizable audience, especially among disenchanted former rebels, insecure tribal leaders, and Salafist clerics that could be turned into a support network and recruiting tool for jihadists. As demonstrated by ongoing rallies of supporters of the implementation of sharia, the Salafist movement is gaining ground in Libya and is most likely to adopt an uncompromising stance with regard to sharia and secularism close to the one typically promoted by al-Qaeda.
1. Al-Qaeda has tried to exploit the "Arab Awakening" in North Africa for its own purposes during the past year. Al-Qaeda Senior Leadership (AQSL), based in Pakistan, is likely seeking to build a clandestine network in Libya as it pursues its strategy of reinforcing its presence in North Africa and the Middle East, taking advantage of the "Arab Awakening" that has disrupted existing counterterrorism capabilities. Although AQSL's previous attempt to co-opt the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was inconclusive, the Libyan Revolution may have created an environment conducive to jihad and empowered the large and active community of Libyan jihadists, which is known to be well connected to international jihad.
2. AQSL's strategic goals remain restoration of the caliphate, instituting sharia, and ending the Western presence in Muslim lands. Al-Qaeda's primary goal in Libya is to establish an Islamic emirate as part of its overall objective to reestablish the caliphate.
3. AQSL in Pakistan issued strategic guidance to followers in Libya and elsewhere to take advantage of the Libyan rebellion. AQSL's strategic guidance was to:
- gather weapons,
- establish training camps,
- build a network in secret,
- establish an Islamic state, and
- institute sharia.
4. AQSL in Pakistan dispatched trusted senior operatives as emissaries and leaders who could supervise building a network. Al-Qaeda has established a core network in Libya, but it remains clandestine and refrains from using the al-Qaeda name.
5. Ansar al-Sharia, led by Sufian Ben Qhumu, a former Guantanamo detainee, has increasingly embodied al-Qaeda's presence in Libya, as indicated by its active social-media propaganda, extremist discourse, and hatred of the West, especially the United States.
6. Al-Qaeda adherents in Libya used the 2011 Revolution to establish well-armed, well-trained, and combat-experienced militias. Militia groups, led by Wisam Ben Hamid and Hayaka Alla, have adopted similar behavior, with, however, fewer advertised grudges against the West. The only open-source material that has linked these groups, aside from their jihadist credentials and their defense of sharia, is their attachment to the flag that has come to symbolize al-Qaeda.
7. The al-Qaeda clandestine network is currently in an expansion phase, running training camps and media campaigns on social-media platforms, such as Facebook and YouTube. However, it will likely continue to mask its presence under the umbrella of the Libyan Salafist movement, with which it shares a radical ideology and a general intent to implement sharia in Libya and elsewhere.
8. Al-Qaeda affiliates such as AQIM are also benefiting from the situation in Libya. AQIM will likely join hands with the al-Qaeda clandestine network in Libya to secure a supply of arms for its areas of operations in northern Mali and Algeria.
9. The July 2012 elections failed to generate a strong and unified national leadership that could address the chronic insecurity posed by the multiplicity of local militias, which al-Qaeda's clandestine network has probably infiltrated.
10. Al-Qaeda's clandestine network is highly likely to recruit and train local and foreign jihadists to be sent to Syria.
Last report sent by Ambassador Chris Stevens
Al Qaeda Winter
Pentagon report: Terror group a significant threat to Libya
AP Images
Pakistan-based al Qaeda is secretly setting up sleeper cells and a clandestine network of jihadists to destabilize and take over Libya while hiding under a new cover name to prevent exposure and attacks, according to an internal Pentagon report obtained by the Washington Free Beacon.
“Al Qaeda has established a core network in Libya, but it remains clandestine and refrains from using the al Qaeda name,” according to the report produced jointly by the Library of Congress and the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office’s Irregular Warfare Support Program, a unit under the assistant defense secretary for special operations.
The report concludes that al Qaeda poses “a significant threat to the state-building process in Libya.”
The 54-page unclassified report describes al Qaeda—which President Barack Obama recently declared to be in decline—as “seeking to create an al Qaeda clandestine network in Libya that could be activated in the future to destabilize the government and/or to offer logistical support to al Qaeda’s activities in North Africa and the Sahel”—the Sahara desert region stretching across northern Africa.
The report is dated August 2012 and was published before the Sept. 11 terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that killed U.S. Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other Americans.
Intelligence officials have said since shortly after it occurred that the assault appeared to have been an al Qaeda attack. The Obama administration is currently under fire from Congress for initially claiming the Benghazi attack was the result of a spontaneous uprising by Muslims angry over an Internet video.
Several U.S. intelligence officials said the Obama administration sought to hide intelligence that exposed the al Qaeda links to the Benghazi attack because doing so undermined Obama’s statement at the Democratic National Convention that al Qaeda was on “the path to defeat.”
Intelligence reports related to the attack showed that the al Qaeda front Ansar al-Sharia discussed the Benghazi attack with al Qaeda operatives outside Libya, which the Daily Beast reported on Sept. 28. The FBI currently is investigating the consulate attack.
The Pentagon report, based on public sources, said al Qaeda has formed “sleeper cells” of terrorists around Libya that are likely part of an underground network providing weapons and training to jihadists.
“Postrevolutionary Libya is a militarized society where young self-proclaimed jihadists are on the loose, ready to follow anyone offering a meaningful purpose for their newly acquired combat skills,” the report said.
“Al Qaeda’s clandestine network is likely attempting to attract these self-proclaimed jihadists through a mix of ideology, intimidation, and financial incentive.”
“Al Qaeda militants are using the countries that toppled their leaders in the ‘Arab Awakening’ as bases to train radical Western youths for potential attacks,” the report said, adding that a small number of British jihadists are moving to Arab countries to seek training.
Throughout Libya, al Qaeda is using a “secret and cautious approach” to avoid local and international scrutiny. However, there are indications al Qaeda infiltrated “dozens” of mosques and prayer halls in Libya in the aftermath of the 2011 revolution.
Covert al Qaeda operatives in Libya also appear to be engaged in a campaign of assassinations against former officials and others from the Muammar Qaddafi regime as part of efforts to destabilize the new government in Tripoli.
The report also said al Qaeda’s network is heavily armed due to the wide availability of weapons in Libya following the collapse of the Qaddafi regime.
“The al Qaeda clandestine network has certainly stocked enough arms and ammunition to allow it to operate independently, given the wide availability of weapons in Libya,” the report said.
Recent efforts by the Libyan government to try and disarm militias and other groups have thus far been unsuccessful. As a result, the country will face continued violence, the report said.
Funding for the al Qaeda network in Libya is believed to be originating from central leaders in Pakistan, who the report said are funded by “financiers, or regular charity donors in the wealthy [Persian] Gulf states.”
One tactic being used, according to the report, is infiltrating Libyan militias. The goal is “destabilize the central government and intimidate local communities.”
Strategically, al Qaeda’s goal in the country is to set up a “caliphate, instituting sharia, and ending the Western presence in Muslim lands,” the report said.
“Al-Qaeda’s primary goal in Libya is to establish an Islamic emirate as part of its overall objective to reestablish the caliphate.”
In Libya, the group Ansar al-Sharia, led by former Guantanamo prison inmate Sufyan Ben Qhumu, is the key al Qaeda presence, and is using social media to propagandize the al Qaeda message, including “extremist discourse, and hatred of the West, especially the United States,” the report said.
The report states that al Qaeda in Tunisia and Yemen are using Ansar al-Sharia as a cover name and that the groups are probably communicating with its namesake in Libya.
Last week, the State Department designated Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen as an al Qaeda front.
According to the report, French and Algerian security services identified 21 Algerians and five French nationals of North African descent as al Qaeda fighters in Syria. Those terrorists were trained in Libya before traveling to Turkey with false Libyan passports and crossing from Turkey into Syria.
Two al Qaeda training camps are reportedly operating in Libya, one near Houn in the center of the country and the other near Sahl ‘Ajiha, in eastern Libya.
“These facilities are designed to train volunteers for jihad from the Maghreb, Egypt, and Europe (Europeans of North African descent),” the report said.
Darnah, Libya, known as a former redoubt of Islamist terrorists in the past, is also emerging as a new training and organization location for militants, the report said.
During the 2011 revolution that ousted Libyan leader Qaddafi, al Qaeda was able to set up well armed, well trained, and combat-tested militias.
Two militias headed by Wisam Ben Hamid and Hayaka Alla adopted the black flag of al Qaeda, although they advocate fewer animosities against the non-Muslim West, the report said.
Currently the secret al Qaeda network in Libya is “in an expansion phase,” according to the report, and is operating training camps and media campaigns on Facebook and YouTube.
“However, it will likely continue to mask its presence under the umbrella of the Libyan Salafist movement, with which it shares a radical ideology and a general intent to implement sharia in Libya and elsewhere,” the report said.
The affiliate Al Qaeda in the Maghreb is expected to connect to the central al Qaeda network in Libya as a way to secure its arms supplies for operations in northern Mali and Algeria, the report said.
Also, al Qaeda in Libya is expected to use the lack of central government control to train both local and foreign militants who will be dispatched to Syria, where rebel forces are battling the regime of Bashar al-Assad.
The central al Qaeda group, currently led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, remains couched in secrecy and has sought to distance itself from regional affiliates in Africa and the Middle East for “security reasons,” according to the report.
However, the report concludes that Ansar al-Sharia and Qhumu “could be the new face of al Qaeda in Libya despite its leader’s denial.”
Various militias, called katibas, are operating throughout the country and “are thought to be cooperating with Ansar al-Sharia and probably make up the bulk of al Qaeda’s network in Libya.”
Numerous jihadists were identified during a gathering held June 7 and 8 in Benghazi of some 15 militia groups that support the imposition of sharia law. Ansar al-Sharia hosted the gathering.
The report traced the rise of al Qaeda to the Transitional National Council, the rebel political group that first ruled Libya after the ouster of Qaddafi in 2011. The Council never controlled the rebel movement that was initially led by a former Qaddafi army chief of staff who was assassinated by an Islamist rebel faction thought to be close to al Qaeda.
Two radical Islamists—Abdel Hakim Belhaj, who became the military commander of the 20,000-strong Tripoli Military Council, and Ali Sallabi, a Muslim cleric linked to the Muslim Brotherhood—are now the key figures in the new Libyan government.
Little is known about the number of al Qaeda terrorists in Libya, according to the report. However, a December 2011 report by CNN revealed that al Qaeda leader Zawahiri dispatched jihadists to Libya, including one leader identified only as “AA,” and that more than 200 operatives are in the country.
The Pentagon report said “AA” is likely Abd al-Baset Azzouz, a jihadist who lived in Britain until 2006 and who traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2009.
“His selection for the Libyan mission indicates that senior al Qaeda leaders trust him to carry out the strategic task of establishing an al Qaeda network in Libya,” the report said.
“It is likely that Azzouz will operate in conjunction with other senior al Qaeda operatives in Libya.”
The CNN report said Azzouz had recruited 200 terrorists in eastern Libya alone.
Another key al Qaeda leader in Libya was identified in the report as Abu Anas al Libi, who is “most likely involved in al Qaeda strategic planning and coordination between [al Qaeda senior leaders] and Libyan Islamist militias who adhere to al-Qaeda’s ideology.” His location remains unknown, and he is wanted for his role in the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa in 1998.
“Abu Anas is well trained in operational security and he is likely co-located with other senior al-Qaeda members in Libya, possibly with Abd al-Baset Azzouz,” the report said.
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