Sunday, September 23, 2007

All an officer has is his Honor and Integrity, Democrats and Hillary Clinton wanted to strip a valiant officer of what makes a soldier.

Of course she does not realize that an Army Officer takes an oath to defend this nation and Honor is his touchstone.

Soldiers have a duty not to let freedom die on their watch. And they take on this responsibility even to the death so as not to let down the spirit of those warriors who have made the final sacrifice before them.

Honor is the bedrock upon which the Army officer builds a successful career. Honor encompasses integrity and dedication. Honor is the thread that holds together the fabric of our Army as it discharges its critical mission of being the strategic force which maintains the integrity of our nation and peace in our world.

Giuliani Defends Petraeus, Blasts MoveOn and Clinton
Former New York mayor Rudy Giuliani on Thursday submitted a full-page ad to the New York Times attacking his rival, Hillary Clinton, and defending General David Petraeus.In the ad, Giuliani accuses Democrats of "orchestrated attacks on General Petraeus," and says Clinton's comment about needing to suspend disbelief was a "character attack" on the general.Maria Comella, a spokeswoman for Giuliani, would say only that the ad has been submitted to the Times, but declined to confirm that it was actually running the ad, or to say how much the campaign paid for it. Times spokeswoman Catherine Mathis could not be reached for comment.
At a campaign stop in Atlanta, Giuliani defended Petraeus against a MoveOn.Org ad that ran in the Times Monday, which lambasted him as General "Betray Us." He also criticized the Times for giving the organization a heavily discounted rate for what he called an "abominable" ad.MoveOn said it paid $65,000 for their ad, far less than the standard $180,000 rate for a full-page ad. Mathis told a Reuters reporter that the content of the ad was not considered and that there are many different rates for a full-page ad."The advertising folks did not see the content of the ad before the rate was quoted," she told the news service. Giuliani is trying to make a point about Clinton, who he accused of calling Petraeus a liar during her questioning of him at a congressional hearing. Giuliani said her questioning of Petraeus was "typical" of the Clinton."Hillary Clinton, The New York Times, should apologize for what they did," Giuliani said. "Their excessive political view led them to character assassination." Clinton spokesman Phil Singer responded that "Mayor Giuliani supports George Bush's Iraq policy and believes it is working. Senator Clinton knows it isn't and will keep up her efforts to end the war. She believes the best way to honor our heroes in Iraq is to bring them home."
--Michael D. Shear
Our efforts in Iraq are working. Have you seen a division size unit attack us? No. We can not lose, only if we give in.
"The willing suspension of disbelief."
-Hillary Clinton, 9/11/07
Another Clinton Donor Scandal Emerges
Thursday, September 6, 2007 12:09 PMBy: Charles R. Smith
Talk about bad hair days . . . Hillary Clinton is having a bad scandal month.

The scandal involving yet-another campaign donor skipping the country after charges of illegal activities and criminal convictions is par for the Clinton style of politics. The fact that it is again linked to China is alarming.

One would think the Democrats are getting tired of the Arkansas dynasty and all that it brings to the forefront of American justice. Yet, Hillary has another major donor linked to China scandals that few talk about. Former Loral CEO Bernard Schwartz has made massive donations to the Democrat Party and its associated 527 liberal advocacy groups. In fact, Schwartz has donated nearly $4 million to the DNC and Hillary Clinton.

Schwartz has a long donation history with the Clintons. In a September 1994 memo to then President Clinton, Harold Ickes, White House chief of staff, informed him that Schwartz could be used to raise campaign donations “in order to raise an additional $3,000,000 to permit the Democratic National Committee to produce and air generic TV/radio spots as soon as Congress adjourns.”

Ickes then urged Clinton to invite Schwartz to the White House “to impress [him] with the need to raise $3,000,000 within the next two weeks.” In another memo, Ickes informed Clinton that Schwartz “is prepared to do anything he can for the administration.”

Between October 1995 and March 1996, as Clinton mulled over whether to ignore State, Justice, and Defense Departments’ reasons against granting Loral waivers to export advanced military technology to China, Loral Chairman Bernard Schwartz injected more than $150,000 into the DNC’s coffers.

In 1996, President Clinton moved the oversight of satellite exports from the State and Defense Departments to the Commerce Department. After Clinton’s decision to lift the ban in Loral’s case and to allow the exportation of the company’s technology to the Chinese military, Loral CEO Schwartz handed over an additional $300,000 to the DNC.

Yet, in 1994 President Clinton personally authorized Schwartz to meet with a key Chinese politico — Commissioner Shen Roujun. It is here the story gets real interesting.

There are those who claim that the Clinton administration only lied to the world about sex. The claims are wrong because I was a witness to the smashing of the biggest Clinton lie.

I am not a lawyer but I have won three out of four cases brought before a federal court. The wins were against the best lawyers that the government could buy. The victories also came at a cost, not to me, but to the credibility of the U.S. government and the Clinton presidency.

The first and most damaging lie that the Clinton lawyers made was that the Chinese commissioner, Shen, was a civilian representative of the communist government. This claim, and the accompanying claim of personal and business privacy made on behalf of Loral and Bernard Schwartz, was made before Federal Judge Robert Payne. The claim was part of an elaborate effort to deny access to over 1,000 pages of information dealing with Shen and his so-called civilian organization, the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND).

When the Clinton lawyers finished I, in turn, dropped a complete bio of Gen. Shen Roujun on Payne's desk. The dossier on Shen included his current military status and details about COSTIND, the military unit he was in. Shen was not only second in charge of COSTIND but the unit itself is run entirely by and for the Chinese army. It is charged with obtaining advanced military technology for Chinese nuclear weapons.

To say that Payne was upset is an understatement. While many judges facing Clinton administration lawyers took lying for granted, Payne threatened to lock all of the U.S. government attorneys up and throw away the key if he did not have the 1,000 pages of withheld materials on his desk in 48 hours. Over 900 pages of those documents made it to me.

One such document was quite revealing. In a May 3, 1996 letter signed by the CEOs of Hughes, Lockheed, and Loral, the three executives expressed their thanks directly to Bill Clinton. “In October of last year we wrote to you asking you to complete the transfer of responsibility for commercial satellite export licensing to the Department of Commerce. Your administration recently announced it intention to do just that. “We greatly appreciate this action which demonstrates again your strong commitment to reforming the U.S. export control system,” states a letter signed by Hughes CEO Armstrong, Lockheed CEO Norman Augustine, and Loral CEO Bernard Schwartz. The rest of the story is history.

Shen got the technology and even played a personal role in the following charges of illegal exports against Hughes, Lockheed and Loral. China has advanced nuclear tipped missiles that now work. In January 2002, Loral reached a settlement with the U.S. government in a case relating to the company’s involvement in passing U.S. military secrets to the Chinese military. Loral agreed to pay a civil fine of $14 million to the State Department without admitting or denying the government’s charges. Bernard Schwartz has claimed repeatedly that his donations were not a quid pro quo and they did not buy his way into the Clinton White House. Will Hillary return his money and end any further questions to her integrity or will she — true to form — keep the money and remain silent?

Home > Legislation & Records Home > Votes > Roll Call Vote
U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Congress - 1st Session Vote Summary
Question: On the Amendment (Webb Amdt. No. 2909 )
Vote Number:

Vote Date:
September 19, 2007, 05:30 PM

Required For Majority:

Vote Result:
Amendment Rejected

Amendment Number:
S.Amdt. 2909 to S.Amdt. 2011 to H.R. 1585 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008)
Statement of Purpose:
To specify minimum periods between deployment of units and members of the Armed Forces deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Vote Counts:
YEAs 56
NAYs 44
Cut and Run Democrats voted yes by 56 votes with (5) Republicans

YEAs ---56
Akaka (D-HI)Baucus (D-MT)Bayh (D-IN)Biden (D-DE)Bingaman (D-NM)Boxer (D-CA)Brown (D-OH)Byrd (D-WV)Cantwell (D-WA)Cardin (D-MD)Carper (D-DE)Casey (D-PA)Clinton (D-NY)Coleman (R-MN)Collins (R-ME)Conrad (D-ND)Dodd (D-CT)Dorgan (D-ND)Durbin (D-IL)
Feingold (D-WI)Feinstein (D-CA)Hagel (R-NE)Harkin (D-IA)Inouye (D-HI)Johnson (D-SD)Kennedy (D-MA)Kerry (D-MA)Klobuchar (D-MN)Kohl (D-WI)Landrieu (D-LA)Lautenberg (D-NJ)Leahy (D-VT)Levin (D-MI)Lincoln (D-AR)McCaskill (D-MO)Menendez (D-NJ)Mikulski (D-MD)Murray (D-WA)
Nelson (D-FL)Nelson (D-NE)Obama (D-IL)Pryor (D-AR)Reed (D-RI)Reid (D-NV)Rockefeller (D-WV)Salazar (D-CO)Sanders (I-VT)Schumer (D-NY)Smith (R-OR)Snowe (R-ME)Stabenow (D-MI)Sununu (R-NH)Tester (D-MT)Webb (D-VA)Whitehouse (D-RI)Wyden (D-OR)

NAYs ---44
Alexander (R-TN)Allard (R-CO)Barrasso (R-WY)Bennett (R-UT)Bond (R-MO)Brownback (R-KS)Bunning (R-KY)Burr (R-NC)Chambliss (R-GA)Coburn (R-OK)Cochran (R-MS)Corker (R-TN)Cornyn (R-TX)Craig (R-ID)Crapo (R-ID)
DeMint (R-SC)Dole (R-NC)Domenici (R-NM)Ensign (R-NV)Enzi (R-WY)Graham (R-SC)Grassley (R-IA)Gregg (R-NH)Hatch (R-UT)Hutchison (R-TX)Inhofe (R-OK)Isakson (R-GA)Kyl (R-AZ)Lieberman (ID-CT)Lott (R-MS)
Lugar (R-IN)Martinez (R-FL)McCain (R-AZ)McConnell (R-KY)Murkowski (R-AK)Roberts (R-KS)Sessions (R-AL)Shelby (R-AL)Specter (R-PA)Stevens (R-AK)Thune (R-SD)Vitter (R-LA)Voinovich (R-OH)Warner (R-VA)

Home > Legislation & Records Home > Votes > Roll Call Vote

U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Congress - 1st Session
Question: On the Nomination (Confirmation Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army, to be General )
Vote Number:

Vote Date:
January 26, 2007, 09:45 AM

Required For Majority:

Vote Result:
Nomination Confirmed

Nomination Number:
Nomination Description:
Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus, in the Army, to be General

Vote Counts:

All of the Democrats voted for the Petraeus Nomination, then tthey urned against him. Can you trust a party like this?

Akaka (D-HI), Yea Alexander (R-TN), Yea Allard (R-CO), Yea Baucus (D-MT), Yea Bayh (D-IN), Yea Bennett (R-UT), Yea Biden (D-DE), Yea Bingaman (D-NM), Yea Bond (R-MO), Yea Boxer (D-CA), Not Voting Brown (D-OH), Yea Brownback (R-KS), Yea Bunning (R-KY), Yea Burr (R-NC), Yea Byrd (D-WV), Yea Cantwell (D-WA), Not Voting Cardin (D-MD), Yea Carper (D-DE), Yea Casey (D-PA), Yea Chambliss (R-GA), Not Voting Clinton (D-NY), Yea Coburn (R-OK), Not Voting Cochran (R-MS), Yea Coleman (R-MN), Yea Collins (R-ME), Yea Conrad (D-ND), Yea Corker (R-TN), Yea Cornyn (R-TX), Yea Craig (R-ID), Not Voting Crapo (R-ID), Yea DeMint (R-SC), Yea Dodd (D-CT), Yea Dole (R-NC), Yea Domenici (R-NM), Yea
Dorgan (D-ND), Not Voting Durbin (D-IL), Yea Ensign (R-NV), Yea Enzi (R-WY), Yea Feingold (D-WI), Yea Feinstein (D-CA), Yea Graham (R-SC), Not Voting Grassley (R-IA), Yea Gregg (R-NH), Yea Hagel (R-NE), Yea Harkin (D-IA), Yea Hatch (R-UT), Yea Hutchison (R-TX), Yea Inhofe (R-OK), Yea Inouye (D-HI), Not Voting Isakson (R-GA), Yea Johnson (D-SD), Not Voting Kennedy (D-MA), Yea Kerry (D-MA), Not Voting Klobuchar (D-MN), Yea Kohl (D-WI), Yea Kyl (R-AZ), Not Voting Landrieu (D-LA), Yea Lautenberg (D-NJ), Yea Leahy (D-VT), Not Voting Levin (D-MI), Yea Lieberman (ID-CT), Yea Lincoln (D-AR), Yea Lott (R-MS), Not Voting Lugar (R-IN), Yea Martinez (R-FL), Not Voting McCain (R-AZ), Not Voting McCaskill (D-MO), Yea McConnell (R-KY), Yea
Menendez (D-NJ), Yea Mikulski (D-MD), Yea Murkowski (R-AK), Yea Murray (D-WA), Yea Nelson (D-FL), Yea Nelson (D-NE), Yea Obama (D-IL), Yea Pryor (D-AR), Yea Reed (D-RI), Yea Reid (D-NV), Yea Roberts (R-KS), Not Voting Rockefeller (D-WV), Yea Salazar (D-CO), Yea Sanders (I-VT), Yea Schumer (D-NY), Yea Sessions (R-AL), Yea Shelby (R-AL), Yea Smith (R-OR), Not Voting Snowe (R-ME), Yea Specter (R-PA), Yea Stabenow (D-MI), Yea Stevens (R-AK), Not Voting Sununu (R-NH), Yea Tester (D-MT), Yea Thomas (R-WY), Not Voting Thune (R-SD), Yea Vitter (R-LA), Yea Voinovich (R-OH), Yea Warner (R-VA), Yea Webb (D-VA), Yea Whitehouse (D-RI), Yea Wyden (D-OR), Yea

Home > Legislation & Records Home > Votes > Roll Call Vote
Now Democrats who Voted for Petraeus a man they selected to lead efforts in Iraq now turn against him for political reasons attacking the honor of not only this fine General but all the members of the military saying we can not be trusted as we put our lives in harms way. If they had honor they would resign as Senators because they did not think of this nation first in this vote…only their political party. Shame on them. Shame…..

U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 110th Congress - 1st Session
Question: On the Amendment (Cornyn Amdt. No. 2934 )
Vote Number:

Vote Date:
September 20, 2007, 12:36 PM

Required For Majority:

Vote Result:
Amendment Agreed to

Amendment Number:
S.Amdt. 2934 to S.Amdt. 2011 to H.R. 1585 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008)
Statement of Purpose:
To express the sense of the Senate that General David H. Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, deserves the full support of the Senate and strongly condemn personal attacks on the honor and integrity of General Petraeus and all members of the United States Armed Forces.

Vote Counts:
YEAs 72
NAYs 25

Akaka (D-HI), Nay Alexander (R-TN), Yea Allard (R-CO), Yea Barrasso (R-WY), Yea Baucus (D-MT), Yea Bayh (D-IN), Yea Bennett (R-UT), Yea Biden (D-DE), Not Voting Bingaman (D-NM), Nay Bond (R-MO), Yea Boxer (D-CA), Nay Brown (D-OH), Nay Brownback (R-KS), Yea Bunning (R-KY), Yea Burr (R-NC), Yea Byrd (D-WV), Nay Cantwell (D-WA), Not Voting Cardin (D-MD), Yea Carper (D-DE), Yea Casey (D-PA), Yea Chambliss (R-GA), Yea Clinton (D-NY), Nay Coburn (R-OK), Yea Cochran (R-MS), Yea Coleman (R-MN), Yea Collins (R-ME), Yea Conrad (D-ND), Yea Corker (R-TN), Yea Cornyn (R-TX), Yea Craig (R-ID), Yea Crapo (R-ID), Yea DeMint (R-SC), Yea Dodd (D-CT), Nay Dole (R-NC), Yea
Domenici (R-NM), Yea Dorgan (D-ND), Yea Durbin (D-IL), Nay Ensign (R-NV), Yea Enzi (R-WY), Yea Feingold (D-WI), Nay Feinstein (D-CA), Yea Graham (R-SC), Yea Grassley (R-IA), Yea Gregg (R-NH), Yea Hagel (R-NE), Yea Harkin (D-IA), Nay Hatch (R-UT), Yea Hutchison (R-TX), Yea Inhofe (R-OK), Yea Inouye (D-HI), Nay Isakson (R-GA), Yea Johnson (D-SD), Yea Kennedy (D-MA), Nay Kerry (D-MA), Nay Klobuchar (D-MN), Yea Kohl (D-WI), Yea Kyl (R-AZ), Yea Landrieu (D-LA), Yea Lautenberg (D-NJ), Nay Leahy (D-VT), Yea Levin (D-MI), Nay Lieberman (ID-CT), Yea Lincoln (D-AR), Yea Lott (R-MS), Yea Lugar (R-IN), Yea Martinez (R-FL), Yea McCain (R-AZ), Yea McCaskill (D-MO), Yea
McConnell (R-KY), Yea Menendez (D-NJ), Nay Mikulski (D-MD), Yea Murkowski (R-AK), Yea Murray (D-WA), Nay Nelson (D-FL), Yea Nelson (D-NE), Yea Obama (D-IL), Not Voting Pryor (D-AR), Yea Reed (D-RI), Nay Reid (D-NV), Nay Roberts (R-KS), Yea Rockefeller (D-WV), Nay Salazar (D-CO), Yea Sanders (I-VT), Nay Schumer (D-NY), Nay Sessions (R-AL), Yea Shelby (R-AL), Yea Smith (R-OR), Yea Snowe (R-ME), Yea Specter (R-PA), Yea Stabenow (D-MI), Nay Stevens (R-AK), Yea Sununu (R-NH), Yea Tester (D-MT), Yea Thune (R-SD), Yea Vitter (R-LA), Yea Voinovich (R-OH), Yea Warner (R-VA), Yea Webb (D-VA), Yea Whitehouse (D-RI), Nay Wyden (D-OR

As we wind down Talk Like A Pirate Day, If there ever was a pirate council in American politics, it's

They're scurrilous, they play dirty, and they're degenerates in every sense of the word. So when they announced that they had purchased the Democratic Party, that they own it, they can't be very happy with their captain, Senator Harry Reid. Reid and the Democrats did their head-counting this afternoon, and thought they finally had a window of opportunity in order to declare rhetorical defeat in Iraq in the Webb troop rotation bill. The Democrats moved up the vote, tried to spring the anti-war trap, had one extra vote going in with the appearance of Tim Johnson, and got 56 votes, four short of what he needed. Reid got beat again. Instead of marching through the Carl Levin defeat bill, or any of the myriad of defeat bills he had hinted was coming earlier in the day, Reid retreated. As Joe Lieberman said to the media outside of the Senate chamber, the Webb amendment was the last chance of victory for the anti-Iraq crowd, and they lost. So what's next for Senator Reid? At some point, is going to call the special Harry Reid hotline phone they installed on his desk. What is Reid going to say? At what point do the left start in on their own for failing to deliver time and time again? Fortunately for the Republicans, Harry Reid is a feckless leader of the Senate, a poor head-counter, and an even worse strategist. He's not even a good pirate.

The people of Iran are having their future taken away from them by poor leadership.

South Pars Gas Field Development Project (Phase –1 )
South Pars Gas Complex (SPGC)
LPG Plant, Fajr-e-Jam
LPG Plant
Fajr-e-Jam (Kangan) Gas Refinery Co.
Parsian Gas Refinery Co.
Gas Refinery Co.
Pumping Station and Gas refinery of Shahre Khas
Pumping Station and Gas refinery
Bandar-Abbas Refinery
Bid Boland Gas Refinery Co.
Gas Refinery Co.
Sarkhon & Qeshm
Gas Refinery Co.
(KhangIran) Gas Refinery Co.
Masjed Soleiman
Gas Treating Plant
Bazargan Metering Station
Mand – Siri and Bahregan Jetties
Onshore Complex of Assaluyeh
Utility Plant
Fajr Petrochemical Co.
Engineering Polymers Plan
Khoozestan Petrochemical Co.
Metanol Kharg
Petrochemical Industry Development Co.
Kharg Island
ABS Factory
Ghaed Bassir Petrochemical Company
Kharg Storages
Kharg Petrochemical Co.
Kharg Island
Pumping station of Assaluyeh
Mobin Petrochemical Co.
Parehsar Cyclic Power Plant
Ilam Gas Refinery Co.
Gas Refinery Co
Dahagh Gas Station

Deharen Dam
Water Treatment Organization of Hormozgan
Karun-3 dam
Karun-4 dam
Karkheh dam
Jiroft dam
Amir Kabir dam
Dez Dam
Nader Shah dam
Sefid rood dam
Shirvan dam
Lar Dam

Latyan Dam
(Bukan) dam
Drudzan dam
Zayandeh rud dam
Sivand Dam
Chelogohreh Earth Dam
Agriculture Organization of Hormozgan
Sikan Dam
Water Treatment Organization of Ilam Province
Rasht Pipeline Route
Water Treatment Organization of Gilan Province
Isphahan Cyclic Power Plant
Shirvan Cyclic Power Plant
Power Development Organization of Iran
Parand Cyclic Power Plant
Power Development Organization of Iran
Tehran Monorail
Khodrosazan Pars Co.
Chabahar Shipping Complex
Sadra Omid Chabahr Co.
Iran Nuclear Sites (PDF)
Iran Nuclear Reactor Sites (PDF)
Iran Nuclear Enrichment Sites (PDF)
Iran Missile Sites (PDF)

Natanz Gas Centrifuge Uranium Enrichment Complex
Arak Heavy Water Reactor Complex
Gachin Uranium Mill
Gachin Uranium Production PlantP
*Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40)
In detailed design phase *Hot cell facility for production of radioisotopes
In preliminary design stage *Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) Under construction
Not subject to Safeguards Agreement
*Waste storage site Waste to be transferred to JHL
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) Operating
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon
Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)
Constructed, but not operating
*Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) Operating
*Waste Handling Facility (WHF) Operating
*Kalaye Electric Company Dismantled pilot enrichment facility; being converted to
centrifuge enrichment R&D
Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) Operating
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon
Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility)
Constructed, but not operating
*Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL) Operating
*Waste Handling Facility (WHF) Operating
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) Under construction
Target List Continued
*Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) Operational; currently suspended
*Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) Under construction; currently suspended
*Radioactive Waste Storage Under construction, but partially operating
*Pilot Uranium Laser Enrichment Plant Dismantled
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR) Operating
Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL) Operating
Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL) Closed down
Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
Under construction, first process units being commissioned for operation
Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor (GSCR) Decommissioned
*Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
In detailed design stage, construction to begin in 2004
Miniaturized Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) Operating
Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR) Operating
*Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP) Under construction


Abu Musa Island

Bandar Abbas





















Mo'allem Kalaych


N?? ??
E?? ??




Qeshm Island











Sirri Island






[Uranium Mines]

Target List ContinuedNAME DESIG. LATITUDE LONGITUDE AREA UTM JOG NO.Air Fields Vahdati AFB [aka Paygah Hava'i Vahdat / Paygah-e Vahdat] AIRB 32°26'00"N 48°23'00"E IR00 TR59 NI39-13 Paygah-e Hava'i-ye Nowzheh AIRB 35°12'00"N 48°42'00"E IR09 TU99 NI39-01
Air BasesSort Order By Coordinate NAME DESIG. LATITUDE LONGITUDE AREA UTM JOG NO.+ Estahbanat Airfield AIRF 29°07'28"N 54°04'15"E IR07 BT12 NH40-09+ Gach Saran AIRF 30°20'18"N 50°49'33"E IR05 VP85 NH39-06 Behbahan: see Behbahan, Forudgah-e AIRF 30°35'00"N 50°14'00"E IR00 VP28 NH39-06 Behbahan, Forudgah-e AIRF 30°35'00"N 50°14'00"E IR00 VP28 NH39-06 Agha Jari: see Agha Jari, Forudgah-e AIRF 30°44'32"N 49°40'33"E IR00 UQ70 NH39-06+ Agha Jari, Forudgah-e AIRF 30°44'32"N 49°40'33"E IR00 UQ70 NH39-06 Deh Dasht AIRF 30°48'16"N 50°33'53"E IR00 VQ50 NH39-06+ Yazd AIRF 31°51'22"N 54°20'18"E IR31 BA42 NH40-01 Vahdat AIRF 32°26'00"N 48°24'00"E IR00 TR59 NI39-13+ Esfahan, Forudgah-e AIRF 32°37'17"N 51°41'51"E IR28 WS60 NI39-15+ Khatami Ab Airfield AIRF 32°45'22"N 51°51'52"E IR28 WS82 NI39-15 Khatami Airport: see Khatami Ab Airfield AIRF 32°45'22"N 51°51'52"E IR28 WS82 NI39-15+ Nain Airfield AIRF 32°51'46"N 53°03'36"E IR28 XS93 NI39-16+ Abyazan Airfield AIRF 33°21'26"N 51°56'40"E IR28 WS89 NI39-11+ Jalnabad AIRF 34°29'09"N 51°20'02"E IR28 WU31 NI39-07+ Qom AIRF 34°41'36"N 50°49'43"E IR24 VU83 NI39-06 Hamadan AIRF 34°52'00"N 48°33'00"E IR00 TU76 NI39-05+ Manzariyeh Airfield AIRF 34°58'58"N 50°48'20"E IR24 VU87 NI39-06 Target List Continued + Kushk-e Nosrat AIRF 35°01'37"N 50°48'54"E IR24 VU87 NI39-02 Shahrokh AIRF 35°13'00"N 48°39'00"E IR00 TU89 NI39-01 Shahroki Air Force Base: see Shahrokh AIRF 35°13'00"N 48°39'00"E IR00 TU89 NI39-01+ Kahrizak Airfield AIRF 35°26'59"N 51°18'38"E IR26 WV22 NI39-03+ Vayqan AIRF 38°02'37"N 45°44'02"E IR02 NH61 NJ38-07+ Tabriz AIRF 38°07'55"N 46°14'25"E IR02 PH02 NJ38-07+ Qezel Qeshl Ag AIRF 39°06'27"N 45°20'00"E IR01 NJ22 NJ38-03+ Parsabad AIRF 39°36'17"N 47°52'40"E IR02 QJ48 NJ38-04
C-802 coastal defense cruise missile site (3km)
Iranian Hawk missile battery (3.3km)
Bushehr helicopter base (4.6km)
Bushehr Nuclear Facility (5.3km)
Surface to air missile site near Iranian nuclear plant (7.3km)
Iranian F-14 Tomcat (8km)
Iranian F-14 Fighter (8.3km)
Bandar-e Bushehr Airfield (8.5km)
Bushehr I-HAWK missile site (9.3km)
Iranian Naval Vessels In Port (11.1km)
Target List Continued
Ghadr Missile Project
a. The Defense Ministry is pursuing a new missile project in the Missile Industries -- a subunit of the Aerospace Industries Organization. It is called Ghadr 101. The improved version of it is called Ghadr 110. The above missiles are produced in Hemmat Missile Industries Complex.
b. Ghadr missile differs from Shahab 3 and Shahab 4 missiles. It has better maneuverability. This means that it could be prepared for launch in 30 minutes, whereas Shahab 3 missile would take several hours to launch.
c. Ghadr missile has a range of 2,500 to 3,000 km and is designed in such a way that the range could be increased.

d. The missile is completely manufactured in Iran and is not a copied version of Russian or Korean missiles. In designing and manufacturing Ghadr missiles, Shahab 3 was used and many changes were made to the missile. Ghadr missiles could be compared to the advanced Scud E missiles.
e. The industrial groups in Hemmat Complex involved in the research, testing and manufacturing the missile and its warhead have been given code numbers to maintain the secrecy of the project.
Location of Hemmat Industrial Complex
The complex is located in Azemayesh-Lashgark Junction, Tehran-No Road in the northeast of Tehran. There are other industrial complexes located to the east of the above road such as the Aerospace Industries and Mechanical Industries. But Hemmat Industrial Complex is situated in the far northern part of the industrial complexes adjacent to the southern side of Ghazal National Park. Please refer to the satellite image and the map.
The director of Hemmat Complex is Brig. Gen Danesh Ashtiani and the complex is responsible for producing the main parts of Shahab missiles.
Shahab-4 Missile
a. After several years of work on producing Shahab 4 missile, the Iranian regime ran its first tests on Shahab 4 missile in mid August 2004.
b. Contrary to the current two-stage missiles, Shahab 4 is a three-stage missile. In the first stage the missile's booster starts working with solid fuel but separates from the missile a few seconds after launching. The second stage consumes liquid fuel and finally the third rocket engine directs the missile towards the target.
c. The range of Shahab 4 depends on the weight of the warhead and it varies from 1,900 to 3,000 km. The relation between the weight of the warhead and the range of Shahab 4 missile is shown in the table below:
Missile Range/ km
Weight of Warhead/ kg
The Missile Industries have improved the guidance and control systems of Shahab 4 missiles. The error of hitting the target in Shahab 3 missiles was 8 in 10,000 which was improved to 2 in 10,000 in Shahab 4. This means that Shahab 4's error in 2,500 km range is only 50 meters.
The most important change made by the Iranian regime in Shahab 4 was in the missile's guidance and targeting system.
According to the available information, Shahab 4 missile has not yet reached the stage of mass production.
The Improved Version of Zelzal 2 Missile
The IRGC Air Force tested a new improved version of Zelzal 2 SS missile in the region east of Salt Lake south of Tehran in late September. The improved version of Zelzal 2 is accurately guided to the target by the non directional beacon (NDB) frequency system1.
The Defense Ministry's Missile Industries has employed the above system and has fitted an NDB receiver in the new missile warhead. After launching and four seconds before hitting the target, the missile receives the signals transmitted by the NDB system already placed in the target area and accordingly corrects its direction to hit the target accurately.
Zelzal 2 missile has a range of 300 km and the main feature in it is the guiding system. It has an error of 70 m.
At the present time, Zelzal 2 project is going through its final stages and it is pursued by the IRGC Missiles Unit, the Defense Ministry, the Aerospace Organization and Isfahan Aircraft Industries. The manufacture and the preliminary tests of Zelzal 2 were carried out in the Missile Industries' new sites in Moorcheh Khort2 near Isfahan. After successful tests, the IRGC Missile Unit will be in charge of maintaining and launching Zelzal 2 missile.
The IRGC Air Force prepared a confidential report on the features of the new missile and sent it to the IRGC command. It read: "Zelzal 2 missile has been produced for deploying in other countries and in Iraq in particular." When we want to hit a building in Iraq, we simply have to send an agent with the transmitter unit (which is not bigger than a mobile telephone) near the building to put it in a trash bin, beside the wall or on the roof. After an hour, an improved version of Zelzal 2 missile is launched towards the building and by receiving the signals from the transmitter the missile would be guided towards the target.
Designing Nuclear Warhead
Making nuclear warheads is one of the most sensitive projects being executed by the Iranian regime and it is pursued in Shahid Karimi Industrial Group in Hemmat Complex. The code number for the group is 2500 and the people who do not know the code could not even get in touch with the group. The director of the group is RG Commander by the name of Gholi Zadeh and the activities of Shahid Karimi Industrial Group are under more severe counter-intelligence measures.
Chemical warheads are also made in the same location.
The Iranian regime has obtained advanced missile technology through the Aerospace Industries Organization and has made enormous efforts in this field. It also develops its capabilities through scientific committees, several research centers and the available industries.
Increasing the number of missile brigades from three to five under the Air Force of the Islamic Republic Guards Corps (IRGC) and allocating surface to surface missiles to such units. The current IRGC missile units are called: 15th Ghaem Missiles Brigade, 5th Ra'ad Missile Brigade armed with Shahab 3 and Shahab 4 Missiles, 7th Al-Hadid Missile Brigade armed with Shahab 1 and Shahab 2 Missiles (that is Iran's designation for Scud B and Scud C missiles), 19th Zulfeqar Missile Brigade armed with Al-Naze'at and Zelzal Missiles and 23rd Towhid Missile Brigade.
Imam Ali Missile Site in Khorramabad
The site is situated 35 km away from Khorramabad on the road to Koohdasht. The base's location is in the south of Mount Seffid Kooh in a mountain pass called Heroor Pass. Imam Ali base belongs to Al-Hadid Brigade, a subordinate unit of the IRGC Missile Force. The missile launching sites are mobile and hidden in the heights. There are medium and long range missiles in the base and the sites are guided outside the silo for launching the missiles and then retreated. The base was one of the sites that launched Scud missiles on the PMOI bases in Iraq on Apr. 18, 2001. The base's buildings are built into the heights or under the ground. Imam Ali Base's air distance from Khorramabad is 20 km.
The base is highly protected by the IRGC and cannot be seen from outside. Sky Guard weapons and AA guided missiles are defending the base against any air attack. Two years ago, a Russian-made passenger plane carrying 120 people on board was shut down by the base's automatic AA weapons while flying over the base. The plane faced a bad weather condition on its course to Khorramabad and had to change its course where it flew over the base and was shut down. It was announced in the news that the plane had hit the mountain.
It is worthwhile mentioning that the personnel working in the base are completely replaced every 1.5 to 2 months and during this period no one is allowed to leave the base. The base's personnel are not local people and are moved to the base with cars having smoked glass windows.
In August 2003 the IRGC demanded a large amount of cement in last August for a secret project inside the base. The Governor's Office in Lorestan Province gave the priority to the IRGC and supplied it with the cement. During the following months, the IRGC completed the project and in November 2003, 25 missiles were moved to the base.
Let me end by saying that the Iranian regime's efforts to obtain long-range missiles and its attempts to acquire nuclear weapons are two wings of a single strategy.
Militarily speaking, by obtaining long range and medium range missiles, the clerics are trying to put many regions of the world, including all of Europe within their range. With Ghadr missile, Berlin would fall within the range of this missile.
Secondly, they are bent on acquiring long-range and medium-range missiles that could carry nuclear and chemical warheads. Politically speaking, this would be the end game. Had Hitler succeeded in obtaining a nuclear bomb in the final year of the Second World War, he could have changed everything.
Increasingly isolated at home and under pressure internationally, the mullahs are working to acquire a nuclear arsenal and long-range missiles to expand their rule beyond Iran's borders and prevent the overthrow of the clerical state.
The EU troika that signed the shameful deal with Tehran earlier this week, has in effect paved the way for the success of that strategy.
The practical and correct approach to this threat is a two-pronged approach:
- Adopting a tough approach against Tehran by referring its WMD program to the United Nations Security Council.
- Recognizing the right of the Iranian people to resist against this oppressive regime, which includes removing the people's Mojahedin Organization of Iran from the list of terrorist organizations. Accusing this group of terrorism impedes efforts to bring about a regime change in Iran, which the overwhelming majority of Iranians demand.
Russia has begun deliveries of the Tor-M1 air defence rocket system to Iran, Russian news agencies quoted military industry sources as saying, in the latest sign of a Russian-US rift over Iran.
"Deliveries of the Tor-M1 have begun. The first systems have already been delivered to Tehran," ITAR-TASS quoted an unnamed, high-ranking source as saying Friday.
The United States has pressed Russia to halt military sales to Iran, which Washington accuses of harbouring secret plans to build a nuclear weapon.
Moscow has consistently defended its weapons trade with Iran. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said the contract for 29 rocket systems, signed in December last year, was legitimate because the Tor-M1 has a purely defensive role.
ITAR-TASS reported that the rockets were to be deployed around Iran's nuclear sites, including the still incomplete, Russian-built atomic power station at Bushehr.
Khojir missile complex RECKLESS RUSSIAN ROCKET EXPORTS White House Action Taken to Russian Missile Misdeed Enforce U.S. Sanctions Law Air ships North Korean Tel erector launcher units may NONE SCUD launchers to have been mistaken by Russians Syria (8/93) to be trucks. Sells China mobile, Russia made these transfers as NONE multiple-war-head, an MTCR adherent and so is high-accuracy solid legally exempt from US and liquid missile sanctions. Acting against technology to Beijingwould jeopardize U.S.-modernize its aging China relations strategic rocket forces (1993). Russian rocket builder Shown evidence of Russia's NONE says it's still continued missile assistance lending India space to India and warned it could launch integration jeopardize $100's of millions tech (6/94) despite in U.S.-Russian space MTCR and Russia's cooperation.White House tells pledge not to give House Space Committee Chairman India missile (9/94) CIA will "look into production assistance the matter.'' Washington Post Waived U.S. missile sanctions NONE reports Russia has against Brazil and Russia been helping Brazil (citing US national security build a large rocket interest), admitted both into (6/8/95) the MTCR because of their creation of a sound systems of nonproliferation export controls Ships intercontinental- Shipment of gyroscopes was a range ballistic aberrational action. Missile guidancesets Russian efforts to find who to Iraq. Jordan was responsible are interdicts ship-inconclusive shipment (11/95). Sells Iran 1,250-mile Administration official is NONE Range missile quoted in Los Angeles Times production technology explaining that the transfer (96-97) may have been beyond control of thegovernment'' (2/12/97). Sells Armenia 8 Scud-B Administration officials claim NONE missile launchers that there may have been no with 24-32 missiles transfer since the Scud (through late 1996) systems were in Armenia under Soviet control prior to the sale. Russian officials claim that they were only able to confirm these sales recently.
I. Entities providing design assistance and general purpose missile related technologies.
1) Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, TSAGI.
TSAGI contracted in 1997 to build a wind tunnel in Iran, for use in aeronautical research projects. Their Iranian client was the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, the Defense Industry Organization's liquid fuel missile development group. TSAGI also agreed to manufacture model missiles and to create missile design software for the Iranians.9.
The State Department's International Science and Technology Center in Moscow was planning to fund a TSAGI project involving new aircraft design at the same time TSAGI engineers were traveling to Iran to work on Iranian missile projects. Funding was only withdrawn when TsAGI's Iran connection was leaked to the Washington Times.10
2) Bauman Technical University.
This is Moscow's leading aerospace research institute, something of the Russian equivalent of MIT. (It also happens to be the alma mater of Russia Space Agency boss Yuri Koptev). According to leaked U.S and Israeli intelligence reports, Bauman is helping the Iranians master production of the highly-corrosive liquid fuel--red fuming nitric acid--and the specialty steels needed to contain it11. U.S. missile experts say that without this steel, IIran will be unable to keep the missiles fueled and ready for more than a few hours at a time12. Bauman designers are also said to be helping Iran to adapt SS-4 technology to the North Korean Nodong missile which served as the basis for Iran's Shahab-3 missile.13
3) Baltic States Technological University.
The government of the Russian Federation has opened the doors to Iran of this formerly state-run institute in Saint Petersburg, which helped develop ICBM rocket motors during the Cold War. BSTU has contracted with the Shahid Bagheri facility in Tehran, and the DIO's Sanam College, to help Iran design long-range solid fuel rocket boosters. Both of these are attached to Department 140, the missile Industries Group of DIO.14 President Clinton imposed sanctions on BSTU by Executive Order on July 28, 1998.
4) Moscow Aviation Institute.
Iranian President Hashemi-Rafsanjani was the first to acknowledge the assistance from MAI in a little- noticed speech in February 1997, when he noted that MAI was providing aerospace instructors to Sheikh Bahaei University in Isfahan.15 In November 1997, MAI was identified as being engaged in training Iranian "students" in aeronautics and ballistic design.16 MAI had been receiving Nunn-Lugar funding for a project to develop high-tech plastic joints for the aerospace industry, but this was cut off in March 1998 because of MAI's Iran connections.17
The Russian internal security agency, FSB, claimed on July 15, 1998 that it had "foiled unauthorized activities of a group of specialists [from MAI]... who participated in research on missile technologies" with Iran. The Institute was officially sanctioned for missile technology transfers by the White House on Jan. 12, 1999.18
5) Ustinov Military Mechanics State Technical University
Iranian students from the Sanam Industrial group, the DIO's liquid fuel missile design and manufacturing arm, were expelled in late June 1998 from Ustinov as part of Russia's "international obligations to control the spread of missile technology," Vocational Education Minister Aleksandr Tikhonov said.19
6) Ramenskoye Design Bureau
This institute, which specializes in navigation and airflow systems for aircraft and missile, has also been cited as having carried out design work for the Shahab missile projects, although no specific details were available.20
7) Komintern Factory
Directors of this Novosibirsk factory "made attempts at circumventing restrictions in order to ease their difficulties," by sending specialists with "technical military documentation" to Iran via Tadjikstan, FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev said on 7/15/9821. White House officials said they were "not familiar" with the company's activities. 22
8) Tikhomirov Instrument Building Scientific and Research Institute
Directors of this factory "made attempts at circumventing restrictions in order to ease their difficulties," by sending specialists with "technical military documentation" to Iran via Tajikstan, FSB Director Nikolai Kovalev said on 7/15/9823. White House officials said they were "not familiar" with the company's activities.24
II. Entities providing specific components, parts, and subassemblies for the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 programs.
Many of the transfers carried out by the following entities would appear to constitute Category I violations of the missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
9) NPO Trud (a.k.a. Kutznetzov)
This formerly state-owned production plant, one of the two largest manufacturers of liquid-fuel boosters in Russia, was one of the first companies publicly identified as having provided assistance to Iran.25. Responding to these charges, a Russian government spokesman said that the authorities had stopped an Iranian attempt to manufacture "joints and parts for a liquid-fuel missile engine" at NPO Trud "under the guise of equipment for gas-pumping stations."26 Later it was revealed that NPO Trud had transferred SS-4 rocket motors and design information to Iran.27 Russian reports said five Iranians had been expelled from Russia for attempting to purchase missile-related components from NPO Trud in Samar.28
10) Energomash
Energomash was cited in a European Union intelligence report as having manufactured the RD 214 motors transferred to Iran in 1996, but has denied the charges29. Energomash has also provided technical assistance in overseeing static tests of the Shahab boosters at the Shahid Hemat facility outside of Tehran.30
The company acknowledged that it had supplied guidance kits taken from decommissioned SS-N-18 strategic missiles to a Jordanian intermediary working for Iraq in 1995, but was eager to show visiting U.S. emissaries Bob Gallucci and Jack Keraveli, who toured the plant in late 1998, that it had stopped working with Iran. United Technologies subsidiary Pratt & Whitney is building a plant in Florida and a second one in Russia to build rocket motors based on an Energomash design, for use in Lockheed space launchers. The White House has been eager to exonerate Energomash from wrongdoing, since that could scotch the deal..31
11) Khrunichev
Khrunichev has been mentioned periodically as being involved in the effort to transfer RD 214 and more recently RD 216 boosters to Iran, but both the U.S. and Russian governments have denied that any specific information implicating the company exists.32
Like Energomash, Khrunichev has signed important contracts with U.S. companies, and stands to loose a lot if it is also shipping missile-related equipment to Iran. While Khrunichev's involvement in Iran's missile programs remains enigmatic from public sources, I would caution Members of this Committee that the White House record of "fudging" intelligence estimates to fit administration policies makes the administration denials suspect.
12) Glavcosmos
The Russian government acknowledges that Glavcosmos is involved in "civilian space" cooperation with Iran, and has signed as many as 18 separate contracts with Iranian entities engaged in missile production.33 One of these contracts, which the U.S. has protested, involves the sale of a high-temperature vacuum furnace used for manufacturing missile parts.34
Glavcosmos subsequently denied any wrongdoing, and said the contracts involved "deliveries of industrial and science-related equipment that fall under no [arms control] limitations."35
I will discuss the relationship between Glavcosmos and the RSA in a separate section below.
13) Rosvoorouzhenie
The Russian state arms exporting agency, Rosvoorouzhenie, was implicated in negotiating and implementing the contract to build a wind tunnel for missile tests at the DIO's Shahid Hemat Industrial Group.36 An Israeli intelligence report in late 1996 named the aerospace director of Rosvoorouzhenie as helping Iran line up Russian firms who would assist in designing the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4.37 The Russian government told the U.S. in September 1997 it had fired the head of the company, General Alexandr Kotelkin, because of his involvement in Iranian missile projects.38
14) INOR (a.k.a. the Russian Scientific and Production Center)
INOR contracted with Iran's Shahid Hemat Industrial Group in early 1997 to supply special mirrors, maraging steel for missile bodies and tungsten-coated graphite for use in booster parts, according to U.S. intelligence reports39. The Washington Times subsequently reported that INOR had signed yet another agreement with Iran's Defense Industries Organization in late September 1997 - only days after Russian officials provided assurances in Moscow to Vice President Al Gore that Russia had no involvement in the Iranian programs40. The latest agreement involves the supply of special steel alloys and foil used to shield guidance equipment from the tremendous heat encountered during re-entry into the earth's atmosphere.
15) Polyus Research Institute (a.k.a. North Star).
The Polyus Research Institute in Moscow has helped Iran jointly design the guidance package for the Shahab-3 and follow-on missiles, and has supplied advanced ring-laser gyroscopes41. Ring-laser gyros are the navigation system of choice for Third World countries since once they are installed they require no recalibration or maintenance. Outside of Russia, only the United States, France, and Germany are capable of making these devices. In addition, Polyus reportedly has helped Iran adapt Soviet-era SS-4 technology to the North Korean Nodong airframe. 42 Sanctions were imposed on Polyus by U.S. Executive Order on 7/28/98.
This is a small, private firm in Moscow, founded by missile experts formerly employed by Moscow State University, who allegedly set up the firm to ship materials to Iran and to recruit missile scientists to work in Iran43. On March 26, 1998, MOSSO trucks containing 22 tons of maraging steel used for liquid fuel tanks were stopped by Azerbaijani customs as they were attempting to enter Iran44. Sanctions were imposed on the firm by U.S. Executive Order on 7/28/98.
17) Europalas 2000
This was the front company listed as shipper for MOSSO's shipment of 22 tons of maraging steel.45 Sanctions were imposed by U.S. Executive Order on 7/28/98
18) Ni Grafit Research Institute
Austrian customs intercepted a container of a specialized material used to coat ballistic missile warheads, manufactured by Ni Grafit, en route to Iran in early 199846. This company was one of those sanctioned by U.S. Executive Order on 7/28/98.
19) Mytishchi Machine-Building Plant
Iranian attempts to purchase missile production equipment from Mytischchi led to the expulsion of an Iranian national, Reza Teymouri, in November 1998.47 Russia used this example to support its claims that it was cracking down on Iranian attempts to acquire missile technology in Russia.
20) The Russian Space Agency
RSA director Yuri Koptev was named in an early Israeli intelligence report, handed to the U.S. in 1997, as having personally coordinated the participation of Russian companies with Iran to design and build the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 missiles.48 Those accusations were repeated by U.S. intelligence officials in code-word briefings in January 1998.49 The RSA was charged with supervising what some experts believe is the most critical phase of all: systems integration. This is when all the different parts of the missile are finally pieced together and made to function as a coherent whole. Many Third World missile programs have failed because they lacked engineers with this type of expertise.50
1 "In the wake of the accidental downing of an Iranian Airbus on July 3, Soviet diplomats said Iran "would interpret the withdrawal of even one American warship from the Gulf as a conciliatory gesture." However, U.S. diplomats said the Soviet position was "merely an attempt to officialize their own naval presence in the Gulf," which dates only from late 1986." Source: "Gorbachev's Middle East Offensive," Middle East Defense News (Mednews), Aug. 11, 1988, Issue 1,20. The Mednews archive is available through Lexis-Nexis.
2Confidential source; interviews in 1995-1996.
3Jane's Defense Weekly, 7/5/99.
4Similarly, the January 1995 nuclear protocol between Russia and Iran foresaw the training of Iranian nuclear technicians in Russia, and the dispatch of Russian nuclear experts to teach physics and related disciplines in Iranian universities.
5The RSA was "carved out" of the original Soviet-era Glavcosmos, to oversee U.S.-Russian space cooperation, according to Russian officials, and to oversee the research and production institutes of the Russian space and missile industries. In the post Soviet-era reorganization, Glavcosmos lost its production role. Cf.: "Russia rebuffs U.S., pledges new nuclear sales to Iran," The Iran Brief, 12/7/98.
6The SS-5 has an estimated range of approximately 2,640 miles (4,250 kilometers).
7" Iran planning new missile test," The Iran Brief, 6/7/99
8Kosar is a Koranic term, adopted by Persian, that refers to the stream of Eternal Life in paradise.
9"Russia disregards pledge to curb Iran missile output," by Bill Gertz, WT, 5/22/97 pA3; see also "The Russian List," The Iran Brief, 3/2/98.
10For the ISTC project, see "No Progress in Moscow," The Iran Brief, 5/4/98.
11Washington Times, 9/10/97, Bill Gertz, "Russia, China aide Iran's missile program," pA1
12"The Russia List," The Iran Brief, 3/2/98.
13 " Iran's missile Program viewed," Izvestiya, Oct 21, 1998
14"The Russia List," The Iran Brief, 3/2/98.
15Reuter 2/27/97
16Con Coughlin, London Daily Telegraph, 11/23/97;
17Peter Eisler, USA Today, 4/16/98.
18Wire service reports, 1/12/99
19International Iran Times 7/3/98
20"The Russia List," The Iran Brief, 3/2/98
21Russian Embassy press release #27, July 15, 1998
22Washington Times, 7/16/98.
23Russian Embassy press release #27, July 15, 1998
24Washington Times, 7/16/98.
25Washington Times, 9/10/97, Bill Gertz, "Russia, China aide Iran's missile program," pA1; Reuter 10/2/97
26Itar-TASS 10/3/97
27Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Missile Threat from Iran," Reader's Digest, January 1998.
28International Iran Times 12/26/97, quoting Kommersant Daily.
29"La Stampa" June 28, 1997
30"The Russia List," The Iran Brief, 3/2/98
31"Russia rebuffs U.S., pledges new nuclear sales to Iran," the Iran Brief, 12/7/98
32"White House protects Russian missile-makers," The Iran Brief, 3/8/99.
33"The Russia List," The Iran Brief, 3/2/98
34"Primakov seen driving Russian cooperation with Iran," The Iran Brief, 4/5/99
35Itar-Tass 7/30/98.
36"Russia disregards pledge to curb Iran missile output," by Bill Gertz, WT, 5/22/97 pA3
37 Bill Gertz, "Russia, China aide Iran's missile program,"Washington Times, 9/10/97,pA1
38William Safire, " Iran Girds for War," NYT 9/28/97
39"Russia disregards pledge to curb Iran missile output," by Bill Gertz, WT, 5/22/97 pA3
40"Russia sells Iran missile metals," By Bill Gertz, WT, 10/20/97, pA1
41Bill Gertz, "Russia, China aide Iran's missile program," Washington Times, 9/10/97, pA1
42" Iran's Missile Program viewed," Izvestiya, Oct 21, 1998
43"Major Suppliers to the Shahab-3 program," Iran Brief, 8/3/98.
44NY Times 4/25/98.
45NY Times 4/25/98.
46NY Times 4/25/98
47Itar-Tass 4/13/98
48Bill Gertz, Gertz, "Russia, China aide Iran's Missile program," Washington, Times, 9/10/97, pA1
49"U.S. claims progress on Russian sales," The Iran Brief, 2/2/98
50"The Russian List," The Iran Brief, 3/2/98
Nuclear Use
Method of Attack
Mining/MillingCentral Iran including Narigan, Khoshomi, Zarigan, Chah – juleh, Esfordi, Lakeh – Siah and Ariz,Saghand 185 km ne of Yazd, yellow cake facilitySite 35 km north of Ardakan city by the of Isfahan- Chadormaloo also in Khorassan, Sistan va Baluchestan, and Hormozgan Provinces, and in Bandar e Abbas and Badar-e Lengeh
Produces ore to be used in centrifuges
Not viable unless you can permanent contaminate the ground such that material is unusable -- for instance a tactical nuclear weapon could be used but such a weapon is not politically viable.
UF 6 FacilitiesRudan Center at Shiraz (Fasa?)28°56'19"N 53°38'58"E
Uranium hexaflouride used in preparation of weapons grade material
A primary target, however may require some precise targeting and multiple strikes. It is thought that the actual conversion facility is underground, and a surface attack will only serve to destroy source and output lines, or gas storage tanks which can easily be replaced.
Cyclotron FacilitiesKaraj Nuclear FacilitiesBonab Atomic Energy Research Center
Calutron and Cyclotrons used in uranium enrichment

Uranium Enrichment,NatanzPilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) Large-scale commercial scale Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), 120 miles South of Tehran, 250 miles NE from nearest Iraqi border.
1000+ centrifuges, estimated to reach 5000 by 2005.
Centrifuge facilities are in hardened bunker behind, two meter thick walls. Analysts believe however that while difficult, multiple strikes are able to penetrate. This is not an easy task, but doable.
Fuel Fabrication and bomb assemblyUnknown
Used to prepare the material for actual machining to fit the bombs framework
No public source of information on the whereabouts of these facilities is likely to emerge unless someone writes to the Washington Post to leak it. This is a hot target for intelligence gathering. Intelligence analysts do not believe the U.S. has HUMINT which is capable of getting close enough to uncover this information, and even if the U.S. did have such HUMINT, we'd never hear about it.
Plutonium ProductionHeavy water reactors Arakheavy water production plant located 150 miles south of Tehran, 200 miles NE of nearest Iraqi borderAlso a 40 MW IR-40Bushehr1000 MW nuclear power reactor in southwestern Iran (approx. 80 miles SE of Kuwait on the Persian Gulf)IsafahanUF6 facility 200 miles NE from nearest Iraqi Border, 200 miles south of Tehran
Puts the big bang in the weapon
Nuclear plants are the source for this material, and killing the source is easy, however, storage is easy and hard to find. The time for this kind of attack has long since passed in terms of stopping the current bomb manufacturing activity, however, to prevent further manufacturing these sites are easily taken out with air power, may require a few bunker busters on containment vessels. High collateral damage, as radiation will be released on any active reactors.
Plutonium Reprocessing PlantsUnknown
Part of enrichment program
This is the ideal production step for mobile or quickly constructed sites that process than are disposed of. Live span is under the time necessary to detect and mount an attack and are therefore not viable.
Zirconium Production Plant15 kilometers south – east of Esfahan with Magnesium production unit nearby as well as large areas of engineering support
Required material for construction of certain elements of nuclear plants
Dual use technology and production, and most likely much of needed material has already been manufactured. However, a direct action program might still target Zirconium production facilities to delay or partially inhibit replacement of parts destroyed in an attack.
Waste Treatment FacilitiesKaradj 40 km from the capitalAnarak
Required to process reactor facilities waste output,
Could also be used to provide input to a reprocessing centrifuge facility that would decrease the time necessary produce weapons grade material. In any case, damage to waste processing facilities requires cleanup time and expenditure of funds and resources that might detract from repair and regeneration of other attacked facilities. And clearly, if there is no waste processing facilities, reactors may have to be taken off line or waste to be dumped, decisions that should delay reactor operations.
Training FacilitiesEsfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and Processing CenterSmall Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCF) and Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP)Miniature Neutron Source reactor (MNSR); Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR); Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR); Fuel Fabrication Laboratory (FFL); Uranium Chemistry Laboratory (UCL); Graphite Sub-Critical Reactor, decommissioned (GSCR); and the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP).at N32°40' E51°40'The University of Isfahan has a unique location at the foot of the Kuh Sofeh (Sofeh mountain, 32°35'00"N 51°38'00"E)Jaber Ibn Hayyan (JHL) Research LaboratoryLocated in Tehran at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center, conducts nuclear research, process, engineering science, instrumental analysis and operation safety including UF6 and UF4 with "missing" gas excused as leaks. Also has produced UO2a.ka. Ibn Haytham LaboratoriesTehran Research Reactor (TRR)location features a Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility (MIX Facility), and the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL). conducts uranium Laser enrichment and the inertial-confinement fusion are also studied.
Required to train R &D and operational employees
This target is a futures only target, that is, to reduce the number of knowledgeable employees in any future expansion of facilities. Unfortunately, this facility can be temporarily replace with sophisticated simulation facilities hidden at any university or industrial complex, broadening the target list beyond the viable. However, an attack here will force movement of training to clandestine locations will impede and delay the program. For this reason the attacks should be designed to take out researchers and students to impede or destroy the later ability to reconstitute facilities in secret.
Engineering ResourcesPishgam Energy Industries Development CompanySupplies architecture, Structure, Civil, Pressure Vessel and Tank Design, Piping, HVAC, Electrical Systems, Communication Systems, Process, Control and Instrumentation, Inspection and Non-Destructive-Testing (NDT) and also Supervision of construction and installation works of industrial projects
Commercial contractors are required to build reactor and processing facilities
Typically smaller countries do not have a multitude of second sources as is the case of Iran. Destroying this commercial entity would prevent, at a minimum, rapid reconstruction after an attack, thus could be a high value target. The target would include warehousing and manufacturing facilities as well as locations of management and engineering teams.
The table below lists the targets by priority and states the rationale:
Perhaps the most expensive facility and easily destroyed with a minimum of weapons, also quite ideal, for the most part, with cruise missiles. Containment vessels may require a bunker buster, however, and MILNET does not have information that confirms a bunker buster capable cruise missile, thus requiring an attack with aircraft. All other surface features can be oblitered with one or two MOABs placed properly making this a high availability as well as high priority target. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
This heavy water reactor is new technology and thus may be more expensive to replace, however, unless it is in production or near being put into production, the facility could wait and serve as a high value target that could be destroyed later -- using it as a lever to prevent Iran from retaliating against U.S. targets. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
This pilot fuel enrichment program site could easily be the number one priority and should receive separate and redundant targeting. In any attack it is a MUST to be destroyed. However, it is certainly not the only enrichment facility and indeed may be only one of several if not a dozen (smaller) sites that could be found throughout the country. This facility is deep underground and will require successive attacks and ultimately bunker buster technology. This will most certainly require high delivery aircraft such as B-52, B-1B, or B-2A bombers.
This UF6 facility is necessarily destroyed to prevent or delay future enrichment activity. It should be attacked with numerous cruise missiles and at peak operating hours to ensure destruction of equipment and personnel.
Pishgam Energy Industries Development Company
The location is required for reconstitution of any facility destroyed in an attack as well as day to day engineering support for currently active operation of most nuclear facilities. Several MOAB may be necessary or multiple smaller air-fuel type bombs could be used to eliminate surface facilities. Some on-site enginnering facilities at various nuclear sites may require bunker buster type technology. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
The Tehran Research Reactor is one of three targets in Tehran that must be eliminated, and if in the attack researchers are killed, than all the better. For this reason, the attack should be via cruise missile and during high workload hours with the majority of employees at work. To be targeted would be buildings identified as the MIX and uranium Laser enrichment facilities as well as surrounding support buildings. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
The Jaber Ibn Hayyan (JHL) Research Laboratory has a number of sub components that must be elminated utterly. Multiple attacks with assessment between them to ensure obliteration is necessary. Attention should also be paid to engineering support and prototype processing facilities as well as employees -- specificially research staff and students. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
The Esfahan facility is attached to the Isfahan University complex and is tightly integrated to that institution. Unfortunately that means that the student body becomes at risk. This is a common plight of strategic planners -- the students make up, in a small part, the potential future scientists who would conduct research at the Esfahan facility and later at the various nuclear facilities in the country. Therefore the strike should be implemented with cruise missiles and during the peak operating hours optimized to catch researchers and their students at work.
Cyclotron facility used in enrichment becomes a target to disable future weapons production
Cyclotron facility used in enrichment becomes a target to disable future weapons production
The Zirconium Production Plant east of Esfahan must also be eliminated, as part of a effort to prevent future reconstitution, the necessary production for current capabilities has most likely already occurred. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
The waste facility at this location must be destroyed to halt further large scale reactor production, hopefully to result in impeding or halting production of future weapons grade material. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
The waste facility at this location must be destroyed to halt further large scale reactor production, hopefully to result in impeding or halting production of future weapons grade material. A large number of cruise missiles would be required to produce equivalent damage that an air-fuel designed weapon would deliver to surface features of the plant. This needs to be a wide area destruction attack.
1. Bonab (38°26'N, 45°54'E)--Bonab Atomic Energy Research Center, unsafeguarded nuclear research facilty
3. Chalus (36°39'N, 51°25'E)--possible underground facilty for nuclear weapons development
5. Karaj (35°49'N, 51°00'E)--Nuclear Research Center for Agriculture and Medicine, laser enrichment equipment
5. Kolahdouz (35°44'N, 50°51'E)--possible nuclear weapons development facilty
6. Tehran (35°42'N, 51°25'E)--
Kalaye Electric Company (35°44'N, 51°34'E), centrifuge enrichment research facilty under construction; former pilot enrichment facilty
Lavisan Shiyan Technical Research Center (35°46'20"N, 51°30'00"E), unknown nuclear research, facilty razed in 2004
Sharif University of Technology (35°42'10"N, 51°21'20"E), nuclear research facilty
Tehran Nuclear Research Center:
Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (35°44'22"N, 51°23'18"E), experimental plutonium separation and uranium processing
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon facilty (35°44'22"N, 51°23'18"E), nuclear research facilty
Tehran Research Reactor (35°44'18"N, 51°23'17"E), 5 MW light water research reactor, LEU fuel (116 kg of fuel, 20% U-235), experimental irradiation of uranium targets, under IAEA safeguards
laser enrichment plant
7. Parchin (35°32'00"N, 51°45'07"E)--suspected testing of explosive assemblies for nuclear weapons
10. Arak--
Arak Heavy Water facilty (34°22'12"N, 49°14'41"E), production of heavy water for nuclear reactors
IR-40 (34°22'21"N, 49°14'26"E), plutonium production reactor under construction
11. Natanz--
Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (33°43'33"N, 51°43'21"E), operational pilot uranium enrichment plant, 12,000 m2 above ground facilty
Fuel Enrichment Plant (33°43'32"N, 51°43'41"E), uranium enrichment plant under construction, 60,000 m2 underground facilty
12. Esfahan--Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (32°34'51"N, 51°49'38"E):
Miniaturized Neutron Source Reactor, 30 kW light water research reactor, operational, HEU fuel (90% U-235), under IAEA safeguards
Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor, 100 W heavy water research reactor, operational, unenriched fuel (0.7% U-235), under IAEA safeguards
Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor, research reactor, operational
operational pilot fuel fabrication plant; fuel fabrication plant under contruction (32°34'42"N, 51°49'39"E)
underground facilities under construction (32°35'15"N, 51°47'49"E and 32°35'26"N, 51°49'04"E)
13. Yazd (32°29'N, 55°24'E)--uranium mining and milling
14. Darkhovin (30°44'N, 48°26'E)--possible underground facilty for nuclear weapons development
17. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant--
BNPP Unit 1 (28°49'46"N, 50°53'08"E)--near completion, 1 GW light reactor, LEU fuel (5% U-235)
BNPP Unit 2 (28°49'38"N, 50°53'17"E)--under construction, 1.3 GW reactor
25. Neka (36°39'N, 53°18'E)--Gorgan al-Kabir Center, possible nuclear research facilty
Chemical/biological weapon-related:
2. Tabriz (38°05'N, 46°15'E)--possible biological weapons storage
4. Qazvin (36°15'N, 50°01'E)--nerve gas production
5. Karaj (35°49'N, 51°00'E)--chemical weapons production and storage; possible bioweapons research at Razi Institute
6. Tehran (35°42'N, 51°25'E)--possible bioweapons research at Pasteur Institute and Biotechnology Department of IROST
7. Parchin--chemical weapons production (35°31'32"N, 51°46'29"E and 35°32'59"N, 51°46'02"E)
8. Damghan (36°10'N, 54°20'E)--production of chemical warheads for artillery shells and Scud missiles
12. Esfahan (32°39'N, 51°40'E)--chemical weapons production
15. Bandar Khomeini (30°25'N, 49°04'E)--chemical weapons production
16. Mahshar (30°28'N, 49°11'E)--possible chemical weapons production
18. Marvdasht (29°36'50"N, 52°32'20"E)--mustard gas production
20. Abu Musu Island (25°52'31"N, 55°01'58"E)--chemical/biological weapons storage
Missile sites
9. Bakhtaran (34°22'N, 46°52'E)--possible underground launch site for Shahab-3 IRBMs
19. Sirri Island (25°55'N, 54°32'E)--HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker ASCMs
20. Abu Musu Island (25°52'31"N, 55°01'58"E)--HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker ASCMs; YJ-2/CSS-C-8 Saccade ASCMs
21. Queshm Island (26°58'N, 56°16'E)--hardened launch site for YJ-2/CSS-C-8 Saccade ASCMs; HY-1/CSS-C-2 Silkworm ASCMs; HY-2/CSS-C-3 Seersucker ASCMs
22. Kuhestak (26°48'N, 57°01'E)--hardened launch site for YJ-2/CSS-C-8 Saccade ASCMs
23. Bandar Abbas (27°09'N, 56°12'E)--launch site for HY-1/CSS-C-2 Silkworm ASCMs
24. Shahrud (36°26'N, 55°04'E)--testing site for Shahab-3 IRBMs

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